

Advaita and other Systems

P. K. Sundaram

E. 7769



The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for
Advanced Study in Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

Madras University Philosophical Series — No. 32

GENERAL EDITOR
Dr. R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

ADVAITA AND OTHER SYSTEMS

ADVAITA AND OTHER SYSTEMS

by

Dr. P. K. SUNDARAM, M.A., Ph.D.,

Professor of Philosophy,

*The Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy
University of Madras*



THE Dr S. RADHAKRISHNAN INSTITUTE FOR
ADVANCED STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

1981

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1981
© University of Madras, 1981

Price Rs. 12/-

PRINTED IN INDIA

AT AVVAI ACHUKKODAM, 17, P. V. KOIL STREET, MADRAS-600 013

PREFACE

This monograph confines itself to the criticisms that Śaṅkara offers of the various systems of Indian philosophy in his commentary of the *Brahma-sūtras*. I have tried wherever necessary to collect the points raised by Śaṅkara against some of the systems in various places and contexts in his *sūtra-bhāṣya*. Some systems, however, like the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Yoga, the Bhāgavata, the Pāśupata and Buddhism are discussed by him in one place and context. Thoughts on the Mīmāṃsaka and the Sāṅkhya, for instance, are found *passim* and hence have to be collected together in specific continuous chapters.

Some discussions by Śaṅkara do not mention any school as such. For instance, the view on the *ānandamaya*, though identified later as that of a Vṛttikāra, or the questions like Brahman being *nirguṇa* are analysed by Śaṅkara without any specific reference to a school or an author.

Śaṅkara's criticism ends invariably in construction. He is never merely negative. Cavil is not his method. Weighed against the Vedānta wisdom other points of view suffer. Where the views have soundness in them measured by the norm of the Vedānta, Śaṅkara accepts them. For instance, the Yoga and the Bhāgavata systems have validity in so far as they agree with the Vedānta. The former helps the rise of knowledge and the latter accepts Brahman as the material and the efficient cause of the world and as one appearing as manifold (*S.B.* II-2-43.). Where they go wrong is indicated in the body or in the appendix of this monograph.

Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, which publishes this monograph, runs an M.A. course in Indian Philosophy wherein one paper for examination is

Advaita and Other Systems. The aim of this course is to make the student familiar with Śaṅkara's critique of the other systems of Indian Philosophy in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*.

I hope that this monograph will be useful to all students of Śaṅkara. I trust I have presented Śaṅkara correctly and faithfully. If, by chance, there are shortcomings, I crave the indulgence of scholars.

MADRAS

29-7-81

P. K. SUNDARAM

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. Refutation of Materialism	... 1
II. Refutation of Jainism	... 4
III. Refutation of Buddhism—I	... 8
IV. Refutation of Buddhism—II	... 18
V. Refutation of Sāṅkhya—I	... 25
VI. Refutation of Sāṅkhya—II	... 45
VII. Refutation of Sāṅkhya—III	... 53
VIII. The Statement and the Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika	... 62
IX. Refutation of Mīmāṃsā—I	... 80
X. Refutation of Mīmāṃsā—II	... 92
XI. Refutation of Mīmāṃsā—III	... 99
XII. Refutation of the Pāśupata view	... 102
XIII. Refutation of the Pāñcarātra or the Bhāgavata Doctrine	... 106
XIV. Refutation of the view that the word “Ānanda- maya” refers to Brahman	... 109
XV. Refutation of the view that the soul is atomic	... 116
XVI. Refutation of Bhedābheda—I	... 119
XVII. Refutation of Bhedābheda—II	... 123
XVIII. Refutation of the view that Brahman is both Nirguṇa and Saguṇa	... 127
Appendix	
Notes on the Jaina System	... 130
Notes on the Pāśupata system	... 134
Notes on the Yoga system	... 139
Notes on the Bhāgavata system	... 141

CHAPTER I

Refutation of Materialism

The materialists believe that there is no soul apart from the body. The body is the result of the combination of material elements of earth, water, air and fire. One distinguished feature of an embodied being is that it is sentient and conscious. The materialists explain away this conscious element as but the by-product of the arrangement of material constituents.

It is true that the physical elements of earth and the other three do not have consciousness taken either separately or collectively. But they acquire the power to produce consciousness when they come to constitute the bodily system.¹ It is not *any* combination that generates consciousness. Evidently, the bodily system with its nerve and brain mechanism alone is fit to produce consciousness. The analogy is that of certain elements which when combined in a certain proportion produce intoxicating power in the brew.² So man is nothing more than the body wherein is produced the quality of consciousness.³ There is no soul and no consciousness apart from the body.

This is proved by the fact that consciousness is observed only in a body.⁴ The principle involved is that that which is present when the other is present and is absent when the other is absent is the property of that other. Light and heat, for example, are determined to

1. *Śarīrākāra-pariṇateṣu bhūteṣu syāt. S.B. III,3.53*

2. One other example used to be given, though Śaṅkara does not give it here, is that of betel leaves, arecanut and lime, which when chewed together produce red solution.

3. *caitanya-viśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ.*

4. See *Brahma-sūtra*: III. 3. 53

be properties of fire because they are present when fire is present and absent when fire is absent. They cannot and do not exist apart from fire.

Similarly consciousness, memory, vital forces etc., are found only in a body and never without it. It cannot be proved that there is any thing like a soul over and above the body. Hence, consciousness and memory are but the properties of the body. If there is any soul at all, it is the body itself.

Śaṅkara's Criticism

Śaṅkara refutes the arguments of the materialists. He, in the very first instance, rebuts the materialist contention that consciousness exists only when the body exists. He tries to show that sometimes while the body exists, consciousness does not exist. It is true that consciousness is *observed* only in a body. It is equally a matter of common observation that sometimes when the body is observed, consciousness is not. If the materialist could argue that consciousness is but the property of the body because it is present when the body is present one can in counter-argument suggest that because consciousness is not always present in a body it is not the property of the body.

Besides, there are certain properties belonging to the body which are observed in the body at all times invariably. The shape or form, for example, always coexist with the body and when the body perishes or changes, they also perish or change. Regarding such things, they can be said to be nothing other than the body. But consciousness is not always found in the body. For instance, the dead body or even the body that is in swoon is not conscious.

Again, the shape and form of the body are observable by the sense but not so consciousness or memory. Further, the best that can be said for materialism is that consciousness is present when the body is alive. But it can never be said that consciousness does not exist when the body is not. There is no proof for it.

Moreover, if consciousness is the by-product of the physical elements, what are its form and nature? The materialist does not admit anything other than the four elements. If consciousness is the experi-

ence or knowledge of the physical elements, then, it cannot be a property of the physical elements because the elements are *objects* of that consciousness. One cannot have an action in oneself.⁵ Fire does not burn itself. Consciousness must be different from its objects in order to experience or know them. The dancer cannot stand on his own shoulders. A form of an object, for instance, cannot experience either itself or the form of other objects. But consciousness knows form etc., from which it is clear that consciousness cannot be the form etc., of physical objects. If it is to be admitted that a consciousness is required to know the objects, it is to be equally admitted that such a consciousness is different from the objects.

And according to Advaita, the Self is of the nature of consciousness. Therefore, it is established that there is such a Self different from the body. Such a consciousness is of one uniform nature. The diversities are introduced by the objects. Hence, the changeless consciousness is eternal. The self-consciousness, such as "I saw it" is proof for recognition which in turn is proof for changeless continuity of the Self and consciousness. If there were no such continuity, memory itself will become impossible.

Moreover, knowledge of objects arises when there are the conditions like the light etc. No knowledge of objects is possible when conditions like light are absent. From this, one cannot conclude that knowledge is the property of light. Similarly, the body and other cognitive instruments like the nervous system and the brain are only necessary conditions for cognitions of objects to arise. On that account one should not conclude that consciousness is the property of the body.

Even this instrumentality of the body for knowledge does not seem to be a very necessary condition. In dream, several experiences take place while the body with the senses lies dormant. Therefore, there is a Self of the nature of consciousness different from the body and its instruments.⁶

5. *svātmani kriyāvirodhāt.*

6. See also S.B. II-2.2.

CHAPTER II

Refutation of Jainism

I

Saṅkara in his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* (II-2.33-36) takes up only two very important tenets of Jainism for criticism. They are (1) the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅginaya* and (2) the doctrine of the finite dimension of the soul. Śaṅkara's criticism of the *Saptabhaṅgi-naya* or *Syādvāda* is as follows :

The contradictory judgments of the *Syādvāda* cannot apply to an object at the same time. The attributes of 'is' and 'is not' standing respectively for existence and non-existence cannot belong to the same object. Cold and heat cannot be attributed to an object at the same time.

This becomes quite evident and also serious when we try to apply this sevenfold judgment to the categories of Jainism themselves. The seven categories accepted by them are : (1) *jīva* (2) *ajīva* (3) *āsrava* (4) *saṁvara* (5) *nirjarā* (6) *bandha* and (7) *mokṣa*, respectively the soul, the material world, the influx of *Karma*, the stoppage of *Karmic* influx, the extinction of past *Karmas*, bondage and release.

These seven categories have been determined to have certain natures. Śaṅkara wants to know whether the *Syādvāda* will apply to these categories whose nature has been determined. Categorially if they admit of varying and even mutually incompatible natures as "they exist", "they do not exist" etc., in terms of the *Syādvāda*, then, no conclusive wisdom is possible about them for anybody. Since they may be this or that or anything, one will be left in unrelieved doubt. Such a knowledge serves no purpose even in Jainism and is therefore to be dismissed as profitless.

Perhaps the Jainas may argue that the knowledge that anything whatsoever has a variety of characteristics and cannot be fully des-

cribed by a single judgment is itself certain, and hence is valid and useful. But this contention is weak because nothing in Jainism is exempt from the varied character (*anekātmakatva*). Hence, even the knowledge that everything is of varied character must be subject to this principle of varied character. Hence, it must be *anekātmaka* and hence inconclusive (*anekānta*).

Such inconclusiveness vitiates every aspect of Jaina doctrine with the result that there remains nothing like a Jaina doctrine, nor a Jaina teacher, nor a follower of that school. A school and its followers presuppose a definite doctrine with the clearly indicated means to realise the goal that the school envisages.

Similarly the *Syādvāda*¹, or the doctrine of "may be", when applied to the five *astikāyas* leaves us wondering whether this number is at least fixed or it is also subject to mutation. If it were, then at least there is one place where the *anekāntavāda* or the theory of variety of natures fails. If it were not, the system suffers from uncertain wavering,

In the same way, the *Syādvāda* itself becomes suspect. One of the judgements in this is *unstability* (*avaktavya*). Anything that is unstable cannot be stated at all. To say that there cannot be statement and yet to teach the categories is to indulge in a self-contradiction.

In short, everything is adrift in the system of Jainism without any foothold or steady anchorage anywhere. Nothing has a determinable or predictable character. The possibilities are left as mere possibilities with no attempt to fix the choice among them. Thus, the school does not have a message as to what one should do, how one should go about doing it and why one should do it at all.²

1. The five *astikāyas* are: *jīvāstikāya*, *pudgalāstikāya*, *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaśtikāya*, and *akāśāstikāya*. These are respectively the soul, the matter, the principle of motion, the principle of rest and space.

2. The Jaina doctrine that the world is constituted by atoms of earth, water, fire and air is rejected by Śaṅkara on the same grounds on which the Vaiśeṣika atomism was rejected. Hence he does not attempt to reject it here. See his refutation of Vaiśeṣika in this monograph.

II

Then Śaṅkara criticises the theory according to which the soul³ is of finite dimension. That theory will involve the consequence that the soul will lack completeness. When the soul is of finite magnitude and thus, is of the size of the body it happens to occupy, this will mean that the soul is not only limited with the attendant result that it will be non-eternal but also that it will be varying its size according to the size of the body, contracting if the body is that of an ant and expanding if it is, for example, that of an elephant. Such a soul with modifiability cannot be immortal. Expansion will mean accretion of parts and contraction will mean subtraction of parts. This is quite incompatible with the eternality of a substance. If the soul were non-eternal, release will be a meaningless talk.

Moreover, it is very difficult to say how and wherefrom the parts accrue to the soul to make it expand or where the parts go when the soul contracts. Evidently, these parts cannot be physical particles as the soul is admittedly spiritual.

Further, as it is impossible to calculate the magnitude of the parts that accrue to the soul or that get away from it, the nature of the soul will be left undetermined at any time.

If modifiability is given up because of the aforesaid difficulties and if the soul is fixed in its size, it becomes unaccountable how the soul can pervade the entire body when it enters a larger body like that of an elephant or how it can avoid spilling over when it enters a smaller body like that of an ant. The same argument applies even in one and the same body undergoing the vicissitudes of childhood, youth and old age.

If it were the contention of the Jainas that, though the magnitude of the soul varies, yet in and through these variations the soul remains with a continuity of its own and that, therefore, there is eternality for it, yet the problem, says Śaṅkara, is not solved. For, if the soul is a substance, it must be changeless to keep its identity. If it were merely a changing series like the stream of

3. In Indian thought, some people believe that the soul is infinite and all-pervasive ; others hold that it is of atomic size. The Jainas think that it is of a finite and medium magnitude, *madhyama-parimāṇa*.

consciousness as it is in Vijñānavāda Buddhism it is non-eternal having no identity of its own.

Further, even the Jainas are obliged to admit that in release the magnitude of the soul is constant. Similarly, they should admit the constancy of the soul's magnitude even in bondage. What is finally the size should be *the* size of the soul even earlier. Hence, the soul is either atomic or infinite. It cannot be of the finite magnitude.

CHAPTER III

Refutation of Buddhism

I

In his *Bhāṣya* on 11—2—18 of the *Brahma-sūtras*, Śaṅkara mentions three main schools of Buddhism, namely, the Sarvāstivādin, the Vijñānavādin and the Sūnyavādin. Of these, Śaṅkara takes the first for criticism first. These Buddhists hold that everything is real and that gives them the name.

The real may be either internal or external. The external can be either the element (*bhūta*) or the elemental (*bhautika*) made of the elements which are earth, water, fire and air. Elementals are colour and the other sense - objects and the sense - organs which apprehend them.

The elements of earth, water, fire and air themselves arise due to the combination of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Each of these four kinds of atom has got its own peculiar properties. Earth atom, for example, has hardness; water has viscosity; fire has heat; air has mobility.

The internal elements are psychological in nature. They consist of five *skandhas* or groups. They are (1) *rūpa* (2) *saṃjñā* (3) *vedanā* (4) *saṃskāra* (5) *vijñāna*.

Of these, the *vijñāna-skandha* is called strictly the *citta* or the mind. It is the running stream of cognitions as 'I' and also indeterminate and determinate cognitions. Other *skandhas* are called *caitta* or the mental. The *rūpaskandha* consists of the senses and their objects. They are mental because they are connected with the conscious life of the mind. The *vedanā-skandha* comprises the feeling of emotions, pleasure, pain etc. The *saṃjñā-skandha* consists of the cognition of objects by their names. The *saṃskāra-skandha* is the

dharma and *adharma* and, generally the impressions that are registered in the mind by the conscious experiences.¹

Saṅkara now directs his criticism against the theory of these aggregates, internal and external.

(1) The constituent materials of these aggregates themselves are physical entities, lack intelligence and, hence, cannot be supposed to organise themselves into any intelligible unities like body-mind complex. Even for an intelligence to appear, there must, on the Buddhist account, be a prior organisation of mind which is brought about by the atomic combination. But then, such an organisation itself presupposes a mind of some kind. As such, the question how the aggregates are formed remains a riddle on the Buddhist hypothesis.

(2) Another undesirable consequences of the atoms combining by themselves is that, there being no restrictive principle anywhere, the atoms will be active always.

(3) It cannot be argued that there is the presence of the *ālayavijñāna* or cognition-stream which, then, can be supposed to cause a motion in the atoms. For it is to be asked: is the stream of cognitions the same as the cognitions or different from them? If the first, it is something permanent and thus becomes indistinguishable from the Vedāntic concept of the permanent soul. If it were the second alternative, the cognition - stream is momentary and cannot cause any motion in the atoms. That which exists only for a moment ceases the next moment and hence cannot possibly excite any force which will require at least a brief duration of existence.

It is found, then, that, on the Buddhist account, there is no satisfactory explanation as to how the aggregates are formed. And without aggregates there will be no life and its activities. But there is life and there are activities. Hence, the theory of aggregates fails miserably.

(4) The Buddhist may yet argue that the empirical life and activities may be explained by the "mutual causality". This is the well known doctrine of dependent origination where the cycle of

1. These *skandhas* together may be said to constitute the human personality.

existence is sought to be explained by the causal chain beginning with Nescience or *Avidyā*.²

The world operates as a physical and psychological system which is a closed one. More than the causal sequences and consequences listed in the dependent origination scheme, no outside agency or power like God is considered necessary to explain or work it.

Śaṅkara calls into question the soundness of this scheme. So far as the individual links of the chain are concerned, their proximate causes have been given there. But the question is how the aggregates are constituted. It has been clearly demonstrated elsewhere in these while examining the Vasika system that the permanent atoms and the soul with unseen moral potency are not adequate to account for the formation of aggregates. It is much more so in the case of Buddhism with its denial of the soul and acceptance of only momentary atoms.

Avidyā etc., are efficient causes of their own immediate effects. But *avidyā* etc., must have some aggregate as their abode. They cannot be abstract principles just hanging in the air. They must have a concrete basis. Therefore, a logical *cul-de-sac* has arisen. Without the aggregates, *avidyā* etc., will have no local habitation and the cycle of casual series or the *pratityasamutpāda* will have no occasion to start, much less to function. In other words, the doctrine of *pratityasamutpāda*, not only fails to explain the world-process, it fails to explain itself.

Again, admitting for the sake of argument that a series of aggregates are somehow formed on which the links of *avidyā* etc., depend, the question is inevitable: when an aggregate is produced from the earlier aggregates (the formation of aggregates being a

-
2. This is in Sanskrit called *Pratitya - samutpāda*. It is the cycle of a natural order of causation of twelve links (*Nidānas*) which are: *Avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, *viññāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *spṛśa*, *vedanā*, *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*, *jāti*, *jarā - maraṇa*. Śaṅkara mentions a different number. According to him, the links are: Nescience (*avidyā*) impression (*saṃskāra*), consciousness (*viññāna*), name and form (*nāma-rūpa*), the six senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*), touch (*spṛśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), desire (*tṛṣṇā*), activity (*upādāna*), birth (*janana*), species (*jāti*), decay (*jarā*), death (*maraṇa*), grief (*śoka*), lament (*paridevana*) pain (*duḥkha*), mental affliction (*durmanas*). (See S.B. II-2-19).

strem) is it produced similar to the previous aggregate as a rule or in *any* manner?

If the first, then, one aggregate (for instance, the human body-mind complex) will never change into any other form dissimilar to it (for instance, the divine form, or the animal form). In other words, there will be no birth of one human mind-body complex as a divine being or an animal being.

If there was no such rule of similarity, anything may change into anything indiscriminately in a moment. Any aggregate being momentary, the next momentary aggregate may be anything with the result that what is at one moment a human aggregate may suddenly transform itself the next moment into an animal or a divine aggregate. In concrete terms, an individual may now be a man, change into an elephant next moment, change into a divine being the third moment because there is no restrictive principle that one aggregate at one moment (for instance, human mind-body complex) should have a similarity to the one which succeeds it the next moment.

But both these alternatives are abhorrent to the Buddhist presupposition according to which there is a continuity but yet change. If anything persists for any two moments the same, it will be an admission of permanence which is contrary to Buddhist belief.

Moreover, the aggregate (*i.e.* body-mind complex) does not have a soul who desires it and uses it for experiencing pleasures. Similarly there is no one who desires *nirvāṇa*. Even if one desires *nirvāṇa* he will not be the one who obtains that *nirvāṇa*. because at the time of *nirvāṇa*, it is altogether a different aggregate. If, on the contrary, the same person desires and obtains it, that will be the admission of a permanent soul.

Because of such logical difficulties, the concept of aggregates (*samudāya*) and the dependent origination as self-caused must be abandoned as useless.

Hitherto Śaṅkara did not question the claim that *avidyā* etc. are the causes. For instance, *avidyā* causes *saṃskāra*, which in its turn produces *viññāna* and so on. He only argued that these links of

avidyā etc., cannot bring about the aggregates because they themselves are dependent on the aggregates for their existence.

Now, he questions even the very possibility of *avidyā* etc., producing their own results in the scheme of *pratitya-samutpāda*. Since any cause is momentary, no cause-effect relationship is conceivable. Since the cause exists only in its own moment, it cannot have any connection with the so-called effect. In fact, there is no "effect" as such.

If it is replied that that which exists the previous moment is called the cause, even then, if the previous moment has no connection whatever with the succeeding moment, there could be no cause-effect relationship between them. If to be an effect does not require any such relationship, then anything may be produced from anything.

Again: The Buddhist supposes that a momentary entity has an origination and a destruction, Śaṅkara wants to know whether these origination and destruction are (a) the very nature of the momentary entity (b) or different states of the entity or (3) different entities themselves altogether?

None of these alternatives is satisfactory. If (a), it amounts to saying that the momentary entity is the *same* as or means the same as origination and destruction. This will entail the consequence that origination is destruction or *vice versa*. This is not the way these terms are used in any language system. It involves a contradiction. If (b), the momentary entity has two states in and through which it persists. This means that the momentary has a permanence relatively to those states. In short, it is not momentary any more. And the Buddhist cannot grant this.

If (c), then also the momentary entity will no more be momentary but will become permanent because it is different from origination and destruction. In other words, it has no origination, nor destruction. It cannot be suggested that the manifestation to perception is origination and invisibility is destruction, because visibility or otherwise belong to an intelligent perceiver and not the characteristics of an object.

Śaṅkara now turns to the concepts *Pratisaṅkhyānīrodha*, *Apratisaṅkhyā nīrodha* and *ākāśa*; ³ which triad are described as merely non-substantial, essenceless and of the nature of mere negation.⁴

Of these, by *Pratisaṅkhyānīrodha* is meant the cessation (*nīrodha*) of the stream of becoming through knowledge (*pratisaṅkhyā*). By *Apratisaṅkhyā* is meant just the opposite. Here things or the stream of positive momentary existents cease, not through the knowledge of the individual, but because they pass over without coming into the range of his experience at all. By *ākāśa* is meant the absence of covering or being occupied.⁵

Now, the point that is to be made clear is whether these two modes of cessation have the series or stream of becoming as their reference or the individual momentary entities that constitute the series. If the stream, it is clearly impossible because the cause-effect forces are endless. If these forces stop at any time, the point at which they stop will become unreal because it is unproductive. The Buddhists fix the criterion of reality as causal efficiency or productivity.⁶ Hence there is the danger of the series becoming unreal because of causal inefficiency.

Nor is it the second alternative. That which is existent can never be destroyed totally and completely. Experience tells us that things change and become different but are not destroyed. Even amidst changes, a thing is identified as that which has undergone the change. Sometimes things *seem* to disappear into nothing. For instance, when water is dropped on a red-hot iron, it is vaporised and is seen no more. But even here, the water is turned into some other form, though imperceptible. The heat of the sun, for instance, vaporises the sea water which becomes invisible. But this same vapour turns into clouds to rain. Nothing is destroyed in this world. There is, if one may say so, conservation of matter and energy.⁷

3. Buddhism holds that anything different from these three which are non-composite (*asaṃskṛta*) is composite (*saṃskṛta*) and momentary (*kṣaṇika*).

4. These *asaṃskṛta* dharmas are *avastu*, *abhāvamātra* and *nirupākhya*.

5. *āvaraṇābhāvamātram*.

6. *arthakriyākāritvam*. The unreality of the last unproductive link will render retrogressively the entire series unreal.

7. *nahī bhāvānāṃ nīranvayo nirupākhya vināśaḥ sambhavati*. S. B. II. 2. 22.

Thus it is clear that the causal series beginning with *avidyā*, has no cessation. If it ceases even without any cause, the Buddhist teachings are unnecessary and useless. If it ceases due to knowledge, it goes contrary to the Buddhist doctrine that it is destroyed without a cause.

Similar considerations are urged against *ākāśa* being considered as merely negative and essenceless. If the Buddhists are averse to accepting Vedic authority in this matter⁸ at least they should accept the force of inference like the one: "Sound is dependent on a substance; because it is a quality, like smell." As smell belongs to earth, sound must belong to *ākāśa*.

Again, if *ākāśa* is merely the absence of covering (*āvarāṇābhāva*) there will be no space for one bird to fly when another is already in flight. If it were replied that the second bird will fly where there is no other bird (*i.e.* where space is unoccupied), this is to admit that space is something positive wherein a part is not covered. It is not a mere non-existence, *abhāva-mātra*.

The theory of space being merely negative conflicts with the other parts of the Bauddha system. A question is put to the Master as to what the support for earth is and the Master is reported to have answered that water is its support and so on and then he declares that *ākāśa* is the support of air. This will be clearly unintelligible if *ākāśa* were merely negative.

Refutation of Momentariness

The Buddhists contend that the soul is merely the conglomeration of elements (*skandhas*) which are but momentary. This non-soul (*anattā*) theory is a logical consequence of his doctrine of universal impermanence (*anityatā*) and momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*).

But this is psychologically an impossibility. The fact of memory itself is a falsification of the theory. Memory presupposes the identity and persistence of the individual. It is one and the same individual who experiences the objects and events, and remembers

8. The *Taittirīya upaniṣad* declares that *ākāśa* originated from the Self. *ātmanāḥ ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*.

them later on as having occurred to him. It is not as if one remembers another man's experiences.

Not merely that. There is the element of recognition in the same person when he remembers an object. He recognises that he is remembering what he saw. Hence, it is evident that the individual does not pass away with the passing events. He persists to keep together the memories and recall them when needed. To deny this is to fly against facts.

Nor can it be contended that such a recall and recognition are understandable because of similarity of moments in the series, and that this similarity is hastily mistaken for identity of the soul. For, the knowledge of similarity arises as "This is similar to that" where obviously two terms are involved in comparison. First, such an act of comparison will mean that the compared entities are durable enough to be judged similar. But this can never happen on the Buddhist hypothesis that no entity exists for more than one moment.

Secondly, the act of comparison itself will imply the one who compares judging the two entities on the points of their similarities. But to admit such a person transcending the fleeting moments is anathema to the Buddhists.

It cannot be contended that the cognition of similarity is a *new* momentary one arising in the series and that it does not require the persistence of the earlier moments, nor even the similarity being real. For, the cognition of similarity even if it is false arises in the form "This is similar to that". This contains three terms "this", "similar" and "that", which, each one of them, has its own meaning and reference. It means three different things, the two entities, (one belonging to the past and the other to the present) and thirdly, the cognition of similarity.

If it were merely a *new momentary* cognition with no relation to the past moment, these three terms in the statement will become meaningless. One, then, will just say "similarity". All this is clearly contrary to the way in which we use the language and to our experience in general. One cannot adopt an arbitrary language to

suit one's own predilections. In that case he cannot even be engaged in a debate. Nor can he establish either the correctness of his own position or the incorrectness of the opponent's.

Moreover, it is not merely a question of something being similar to something else. It is also a question of one being conscious of that similarity. A doubt may be cast on the validity of the cognition of similarity between things that exist outside us. But the comparing person himself never doubts whether he is himself or something similar to himself.

The Buddhists hold that the second moment arises on the extinction of the first moment. This will mean that the second moment arises out of nothing which is its antecedent. The production of the "effect" means the destruction of the "cause", and the effect has no positive cause of its own. This is, according to the Buddhist *asatkāryavādin*s, the report of experience also. The seed should perish if the plant is to appear. The very principle of causal production or origination is that the cause should perish giving birth to the effect. If the cause were imperishable, and if such imperishability were common to all causes, then it will follow that anything can be produced from anything else.

To this Śaṅkara makes a reply. Positive effect can never be produced from non-existing nothingness. Non-existence being common and having no distinction, anything can come into being anytime. Such distinctions as curds being produced from milk, a particular plant being produced from a particular seed will not exist. We can get curds even from the hare's horn (a non-entity). Such productions have never been observed in human history, A mere nothing is never known to be the cause of anything, much less anything in particular. Theoretically, anything appearing from nothing will share the character of being nothing. It will not be "anything". A thing made of clay does not have the character of iron.

In any causal production, the causal element passes into the effect. That which perishes at the time of the production of the effect does not belong to the causal substance essentially.

Again, the Buddhists hold that things are produced by four kinds of cause⁹ and things arise out of the aggregation of atoms. Having said this, it is quite inconsistent on their part now to say that positive effects appear from pure negation.

And, if the above *asatkāryavāda* were true, there need be no effort on the part of anyone to produce anything. So the theories of the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika Buddhists are quite unacceptable.

9. They are (1) *ālambanapratyaya*, (2) *samanantarapratyaya* (3) *adhipatipratyaya* (4) *hetu-pratyaya*.

CHAPTER IV

Refutation of Buddhism - II

The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism believes that the externality of the world of experience is an illusion. The same consciousness called *ālaya-vijñāna*, internally diversifies itself into subject and object. All the usages and practices of knowledge like the knower, known and knowledge arise only in the consciousness. Thus, what is of the nature of consciousness appears to be external to it. Even if we admit the reality of an external world, there could be no knowledge without the object being connected with the mind. It is very difficult to say whether there could be an object quite apart from and unperceived by the mind.

The Vijñānavādin tries to show by an analysis of the concept of an object that it is riddled with contradictions. The object is either the atoms or the aggregates of those atoms.¹ If the former, the object can never become an object of perception because of the infinitesimal magnitude. Nor can it be the aggregate of atoms, for, it should be stated in that case whether the object is different or non-different from the atoms. If it is different from the atoms it cannot be said to be the aggregate of the atoms. If it were non-different, it cannot be perceived.

Again: Consciousness is of one uniform nature. Cognitions like the knowledge of pot, of cloth etc., have the specificity of form of pot, cloth etc., which distinguishes one cognition from another. This specificity of form in the cognition itself, therefore, is enough to make us know the form of the object also. We need not further postulate the object as existing outside that cognition.

1. The Vijñānavādin thus is opposed to the *sarvāstivādin* who is a realist admitting the reality of an external world of objects.

Again, the object and the mind always appear together in experience. This fact of appearance together² is a proof of their non-difference.

Further, the claim that one and the same consciousness appears internally divided as the subject and the object is not far-fetched. We do find in our experience that cognitions arise without any external object. The instances are the dream and the mirage. In dream one sees objects and deals with them as though they are external to oneself. But all the time, the objective entities are but the modifications of one's own mind. Mind, in other words, objectivises itself and perceives itself as an object. So far, therefore, as the experience is concerned, the waking is as good as the dream.

To the question why there should be distinctions in one uniform consciousness if there were no external objects to cause them, the Vijñānavādin answers that the internal distinctions of consciousness are caused by residual impressions caused by the cognitions themselves. The cognitions and impressions are beginninglessly there and hence it is idle to ask for temporal priority of any one of them. It is observed that in dream, for instance, the merest impressions alone cause experiences of objects. These experiences in turn produce impressions; and such impressions generate experiences and so on, progressively and regressively.

Śaṅkara refutes the above contentions of the Vijñānavādin. It is not possible to deny the reality of the external object for the simple reason that the object appears in experience as external. In every specific cognition of objects as different as pot and cloth, the objects are *given* to us through the senses, not created from inside ourselves. To deny this patent experience is as ridiculous and contradictory as to say that one has not eaten anything or one's hunger has not been appeased while one has been eating and satisfying his hunger all the time. Experiencing a world outside us all the time through the channels of sense and enjoying it, it is contradictory to deny such an experience or the object of it.

One does not cognize his mind as pot and pillar and cloth. Even when one denies the external world, as the Vijñānavādin does, he

2. This is the *sahopalambhaniyama* or appearing together invariably.

asserts that the world which is really internal appears *as if* it is external. This is because the externality is quite so apparent to everyone. Otherwise, why should one say "as if external?" If there were no external world, even the illusion of externality is impossible. No one says that Viṣṇumitra looks like a barren woman's son, a barren woman's son being a logical impossibility.

Therefore, it is but reasonable to accept the world as it is given in experience. If it were the intention of the Vijñānavādin to subject the given experience to scrutiny and to declare it as an appearance as if it were external, even this is plainly an unwarranted conclusion. The possibility or impossibility of something being real or otherwise is not determined *a priori* but by the function of the methods of knowledge and proof. The proof determines the possibility or the absence of it. That is the criterion. By such a criterion, the externality of the world cannot be declared to be impossible. The fact remains that the world is given in experience.

And, it is a weak argument to say that an object is secured by the consciousness having the form of that object. Consciousness, which has no particular form of its own, cannot become determined except by an object outside it.

The appearance of consciousness and its object together can be best explained by the fact of the object causing the modification of consciousness in its image.³ It is not because they are identical but because they are different.

Moreover, it is obvious that consciousness in itself is undetermined and uniform. When it is determined by various objects, we speak of consciousness of pot, consciousness of cloth etc. The diversity is of the objects, not of the consciousness, just as when one talks of white cow and black cow, the diversity is not of the cow but of the colours. What remains unvaried is as a rule different from that which varies.⁴ The same consideration prevails with regard to the experience of an object and its memory on the one side and the object itself on the other. There is patently a difference between direct experience of a

3. The object is the *upāya* and the mode of consciousness is the *upēya*.

4. *dvābhyām ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmācca dvayorh. S.B. II. 2. 28.*

pot, for instance, and the memory of it and they vary from the pot itself which remains constant in and through them. Similarly, difference exists among the smell, taste etc., of milk while milk itself remains the same. In other words, the modes or attributes vary but the object qualified is constant and invariable. Hence, by the fact that consciousness is the same and invariable amidst the qualifying objects thereof, it is established that consciousness is different from its objects.

The Vijñānavādin commits a mistake in another front also. He seems to believe that the so-called object is only a mode of consciousness and that the subject who knows it is another mode of consciousness. This means that one mode of consciousness is known as an object by another which is the subject. The subject-object relation⁵ is an infrastructural division within one consciousness.

This stance of the Vijñānavādin is indefensible because the Vijñānavādin believes at the same time that modes of consciousness (*cognitions or vijñānas*) are momentary and cease with their only activity of knowing⁶ themselves. That is, cognition cannot become the object of another because they occupy different moments of time.

If there were no connection between cognitions which exist only in their own moments, knowledge becomes impossible and this sweeping skepticism results in the abolition of Buddhism itself with its metaphysics, epistemology, logic and psychology.⁷

Again the Vijñānavādin accepts the *Vijñāna* or consciousness as the reality. But there is no reason why they should not recognize the external objects. If they say that they accept consciousness as reality

5. *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*

6. This is *svasāhvedana* or self-consciousness.

7. The following are the doctrines of the school mentioned by Śaṅkara in this connection: (1) *Svalakṣaṇa-pratijñā* (that individual realities are unique momentary particulars) (2) *sāmānyalakṣaṇ* (the generality born of the continuity of the series) (3) *vāsya-vāsakatva* (the succeeding cognition and the preceding cognition respectively) (4) *avidyopaplava* (relation to nescience) (5) *saddharma* (cognition of an object as existent) (6) *asaddharma* (cognition of the object as non-existent) (7) *bandha mokṣa* (bondage and *nirvāṇa*).

because it is given as a datum of experience, the external objects also are given equally solidly as data of experience.

It cannot be said that consciousness is self-luminously known like a lamp which shows itself unlike an external object which is not. For, the Vijñānavādin attempts to do the self-contradictory by making consciousness an object of itself. A thing cannot be both the subject and an object of itself.⁸ He does not mind this self-contradiction while he refuses to grant what is so patently given in experience.

A doubt may arise whether the Advaitin, too, does not accept consciousness as self-luminous witness. Then what is the difference between the Advaitin and the Buddhist? Śaṅkara makes this difference clear by the following considerations :

(1) The Vijñānavādin has declared that cognitions are momentary, have an origin, an end and are also manifold. Since this is the case, they cannot illumine one another though a cognition may illumine itself. In other words, there must be a unitive and permanent consciousness to perceive them together even as a series and to give them a character and meaning. The successive ideas themselves cannot grasp the succession. Change becomes utterly unintelligible without a permanent reality. Such a reality is consciousness, according to the Advaitin. Buddhism has no provision for such a concept.

(2) This permanent consciousness serves as a witness of all the cognitions that take place in the mind as cognition of this, cognition of that. This consciousness in general is self-luminous.

(3) Even a lamp is not an appropriate example for self-luminosity. A lamp shows itself but it does not know this. Lamp is physical light. But consciousness is spiritual 'light'. Even when one thousand lamps are shining in a remote cave, it requires a conscious intelligence to perceive them. The Vijñānavādin's conception of a self-luminous cognition resembles the inert unself-conscious lamp.

Dream analogy, false

The Vijñānavādin argues that just as in dreams, the experience of objects takes place without any external objects at all and without

8. It is a principle that a thing cannot be the locus of an action on itself. *svātmani kriyāvirodhāt. S.B. II. 2. 28.*

any of the senses functioning, similarly, the waking experience also can arise without any external object. This is plainly a false analogy. Dreams are quite unlike the waking and sensory experience. What is the difference between the two ?

Śaṅkara says that it is the sublatability and the non-sublatability of dreams and sensory experience respectively. Dreams are sublated on waking up. The objects and events of the dream are known to be false on awakening. But the objects and events of our waking experience of them are never known to be contradicted.

Again: dreams are matters of memory and are but reproductions. Waking experience is the result of direct contact of the senses with a world outside. People are clearly aware of the fact that when they are remembering something they are not experiencing it directly even though they wish to experience or see it. One may remember his son who is in a faraway land and wish that he were able to see him.

Merely because both the dreams and waking experiences share the common character of being conscious experiences, it does not follow that they are the same.⁹

A thing does not become another just because it has a few features in common with it. An attribute that does not belong to an object or experience by its own nature cannot be made to belong to it on the ground that it has something in common with another.¹⁰ Fire and water cannot be one just because they are similar in being physical elements.

Variety of knowledge unexplained

The Vijñānavādins urge that the variety of knowledge like knowledge of pot, of cloth etc., can be explained without postulating any external objects by the variety of residual impressions (*vāsanās*) alone.

But this position is untenable for the simple reason that the Vijñānavādins do not recognize an external world at all. And, consequently, they cannot account for the residual impressions. It will

9. The type of inference adopted by the Vijñānavādin seems to be the variety called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. But the inference, says Śaṅkara, is wrong.

10. *na ca yo yasa svato dharmo na sambhavati so'nyasya sādharmaṃ tasya sambhaviṣyati*, S.B. II-2. 29.

be a mystery how impressions are left behind when there is nothing anywhere to produce them. It is idle to maintain that impressions produce impressions.¹¹ Impressions must have a first cause which cannot be impressions but a direct presentation. Otherwise, the catastrophic result will be that all differences between experience and memory will be obliterated. The functioning of the senses also will be needless and meaningless.

It is a patent fact that when there is a first hand encounter with an external object through the senses, there is an impression created and registered by the mind to be retained and recalled later in memory; and when there is no such encounter at any time, there is no impression formed at all.¹² No one remembers the unexperienced.

Yet again, mental impressions are specific forms of tracks. Such tracks must have a locus. But in the Vijñānavāda there is no such locus, everything being the streaming momentary cognitions.¹³ If we accept any permanent locus, Buddhism becomes compromised.¹⁴

-
11. It will be, says Śaṅkara, like a blind man teaching another blind man about colour. This is absurd as the teacher himself does not know what colour is. And, therefore, the talk about colour cannot even start.
 12. This is the *Anvayavyatireka* type of inference.
 13. Even the individual cognitions are called *pravṛtti-vijñānas*. The *ālayavijñāna* is the transcendental source of the divisions of subject and object. All the same it is also momentary.
 14. Śaṅkara observes, after his critique of the other schools of Buddhism, that the *Sūnyavāda* is contrary to all known canons of reasoning. He merely says that the world of our everyday experience cannot be a nullity. A general truth is proved by the absence of a contrary instance. *apavāda-abhāve-utsarga-siddheḥ*.

CHAPTER V

Refutation of Sāṅkhya—I

A Question Regarding Authority

The Sāṅkhya *smṛti* well known as *tantra*, composed by Kapila, the great sage universally acknowledged by the Sāṅkhya thinkers as authentic and authoritative and the basis of ever so many later Sāṅkhya theses, will have to be declared as a meaningless lot if Brahman and not the Pradhāna is to be accepted as the cause of the world. In the Sāṅkhya texts, Pradhāna is declared categorically as the independent cause of the world.

If it were argued by Advaitins who accept Manu as the most authentic that the texts like those of Manu will be rendered null and void if Pradhāna is to be accepted as the cause of the world, it is replied by the Sāṅkhyas that the texts of Manu have other subjects to deal with. The purificatory ceremonies like the initiation into Gāyatri, determination of conduct according to one's station in life, the method of the study of scriptures, the married life to be led after the schooling is completed, the imperative rules for the performance of religious duties and such other matters are laid down in works like that of Manu. In short, the detailed disciplines pertaining to one's caste and class and to one's stage in life are given in those works.

But in the treatises on Sāṅkhya, the *motif* is entirely different. They spell out the right knowledge by which a person could achieve liberation. Thus, the Sāṅkhya works will be rendered contentless if Pradhāna, as they say, were not the cause of the world. Works like that of Manu will still have something to say even if what they affirm, among so many other subjects, namely, Brahman is the cause of the world, were to be nullified. Hence, the Sāṅkhya thin-

kers argue, the Upaniṣads must be construed only in such a way as not to contradict the Sāṅkhya texts.

It is but proper, say the Sāṅkhyas, that the Upaniṣads should be studied and understood only through the writings of the great authors like Kapila. For the ordinary run of mankind, the secrets of the Vedānta doctrine are beyond the reach of comprehension. And, the Sāṅkhya sages like Kapila are renowned as possessed of unlimited knowledge. In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, for example, it is declared: "One should know that Lord who at the beginning manifested Kapila and who made him omniscient."¹ It follows that the Sāṅkhya system, formulated by such sages like Kapila cannot be lightly set aside as false. Nor does the system lack any logical rigour. Both by virtue of its logical consistency and spiritual authority, the Sāṅkhya must be accepted.

To this argument of the Sāṅkhya, Śaṅkara answers as follows. If the Sāṅkhya *smṛtis* are in danger of becoming null and void in the event of the Vedānta account being taken as true, a similar disaster will overtake the *smṛti* texts which support the Vedānta view that Brahman, and not the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world. Such *smṛti* texts are too numerous to be recounted.²

To those who put forth their contention on the strength of *smṛtis* Śaṅkara shows the strength of the opposing *smṛtis*.

In the event of one *smṛti* opposing another *smṛti* its authority is decided by the criterion of its being in harmony with the *śruti* from which alone it derives its own validity.³ Even the wisdom and the Yogic power of Kapila cannot have an access to the supersensible truths which can be declared only by the revealed scripture. Yogic power is obtained by the discipline in Dharma which, in turn, is made

1 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*: V, 2.

2. Śaṅkara quotes here the texts: "From that Brahman, the unmanifested of the nature of the three guṇas was originated." "O Brāhmaṇa! The unmanifest merges in the attributeless Puruṣa". "Nārāyaṇa creates, supports and destroys all this." "I am the progenitor and destroyer of all the worlds," *Gītā*: (VII-6). "From that Lord, Brahmā and others are born, He is the material cause." *Āpastamba sūtra*: 1-8, 23, 2.

3. See the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* of Jaimini, I-3.3. *virodhe tu anaṣekṣaṁ syād asatiḥy anumānam*.

known only by revelation through its injunctions. Thus Kapila's power is derivative and cannot cast doubt on or call into question its own basis which is established prior to it.

Even granting for the sake of argument that Kapila is established in his Yogic power independent of the revealed scripture, he is not the only one of his kind. There are many more and if and when a conflict arises between his words and those of others like him, it will be impossible to decide their relative merits except by an appeal to the authority of the revealed scripture.

Nor can one blindly follow Kapila's authority by a personal partiality and preference. Since the opinions of persons are bound or found to be varied, it is not easy to ascertain and determine the truth of anyone of them by themselves, except by an appeal to an authority which is at once independent of personal partialities and is infallible. Such an authority can be only the revealed scripture alone.

A scriptural text was quoted to show the excellence of the wisdom possessed by Kapila. Such a text cannot, says Saṅkara, entitle us to give credence to Kapila's doctrines if they are at variance with the scripture which, though, extol Kapila's wisdom.

Moreover, the word "Kapila" in the text is a common name. There is no reason to believe that the name refers to Kapila who burnt the sons of Sagara to ashes and who was called Vāsudeva in the *smṛtis*.

Again, the quoted text saying that the Lord made Kapila omniscient has the intention of conveying the omniscience of the Lord. The context is the place where the Lord is praised.

There are also texts which extol Manu as a great authority whose testimony is the final answer⁴. This shows that Manu is as trustworthy an authority as, if not more than, Kapila. And Manu has clearly declared that one who sees everything in the Self and the Self in everything attains the kingdom of the Self, none else.⁵ This statement is a direct rebuttal of Kapila's standpoint which does not

4. *yad vai kīṛṇea manuravadat tad-bheṣajam. Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, II, 2, 10, 2.

5. Manu: XII, 91.

recognise the perception of everything as the Self.⁶ On the contrary, Kapila's Sāṅkhya admits plurality of selves. The *Mahābhārata* makes it plain by asking whether the selves are many or one and answering that it is the Sāṅkhya that holds the pluralist doctrine. It goes on to say, by way of refutation of the pluralist doctrine, that just as for all physical bodies earth is the one material cause, so the Self is for all. The Self is the witness of all that happens. It is not an object of knowledge. It is everything and everywhere and is one in all.⁷ Besides, the *Īśa Upaniṣad* categorically declares that for the wise man to whom everything is his own Self, there is no sorrow or delusion.⁸

It is evident then that Kapila's Sāṅkhya is false because, in addition to postulating a Pradhāna as an independent cause of the world, it preaches the plurality of selves contrary to the Vedic testimony and to the words of Manu who follows the Vedas faithfully. Vedas bear an authority of their own independently like the sun's light revealing the objects. This cannot be said of Kapila who is after all a fallible human being, dependent on other sources of knowledge for his information and his memory which is at a remove from a direct contact with reality. Pradhāna and its evolutes which are the basic postulates of the Sāṅkhya are neither given in experience nor are they mentioned in the scripture. Senses and the five elements are known to exist. But the Mahat, for example, is not a fact of experience and cannot, therefore, be incorporated in the *smṛti* quite arbitrarily and inventively.⁹

II

The Sāṅkhya doctrine can be shown to be hollow by a critical consideration on purely rational grounds also, apart from scriptural reference. Śāṅkara now proceeds to do so. He sets forth first the Śāṅkhya viewpoint.

6. *sarvātmatvadarśana*.

7. *ekaścarati bhūteṣu svairacāri yathā sukham*.

8. VII.

9. Where the term "mahat" does occur in the scripture, it does not refer to the Sāṅkhya mahat. This has been made obvious in Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* (I-4.1). There is no validity for the concept of *Maha* which is an effect; therefore, the concept of Pradhāna which is the cause is also invalid.

If Brahman were, as the Vedāntin would like to believe, the cause of the world, and not the Pradhāna, the effect in that case will be quite different from the cause. The world, the effect, is inert material while Brahman, its cause, is spiritual and intelligent. It is found, as a rule, that the effect should partake of the nature of the cause. An article made of gold will have only the nature of gold.

So, the world which is inert and material must have as its cause only something which is inert and material. The world which is full of pleasure, pain and inertia must have been produced only from a principle that itself contains pleasure, pain and inertia potentially.

That the world is inert and material is obvious by the fact that it subserves the ends and purposes of intelligent beings. That which is merely a subservient instrument to another cannot be equal in status to its user. Two lamps are not subservient to one another because they are equally self-luminous. The world and Brahman are not so.

But do we not observe an intelligent man being as a servant used by another intelligent man who is his master? The Sāṅkhya answers that even here, only the non-intelligent body-element in the intelligent servant is an instrument to the master. The intelligent part of the servant does not act.¹⁰

But does not scripture declare that the world is an effect of Brahman, an intelligent cause? Granted that the effect must partake of the nature of the cause, can it not be said that the world also is intelligent but that its intelligent character is concealed? It is not uncommon that intelligence is not perceptibly present even in intelligent beings, when they are asleep or in a swoon, for example. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that intelligence, though present, is not perceived in material entities. Such material entities, therefore, may be subservient instruments to intelligent souls, though in reality they have the same ontological status. Things that are the modifications of one and the same earth are found to be so diverse as to be one subservient to others like flesh, broth, pap and the like. Similarly, the world, though essentially intelligent, may, by virtue

10. It is *upajana-apāya-dharma-śūnya*, according to Sāṅkhya. It neither takes nor gives.

of the special nature of its modification, serve for all practical purposes as an instrument of action for the intelligent souls.

But is this, asks the Sāṅkhya, tenable in the light of either experience or scripture? Experience has a different tale to tell us. By no stretch of imagination can the world be said to be perceived to be intelligent. Scripture, too, leaves us in ample doubt. For example, the *Taittiriya* text declares that the world is of the nature of knowledge and the absence of knowledge (II-6). The implication is that there is in the world at least an element which is contrary to the nature of Brahman which is consciousness, pure and simple. Certain texts ostensibly speak about the physical elements being endowed with intelligence.¹¹ But, the reference here is not to the physical elements or the vital elements as such but to the divinities presiding over them. The Kauṣītakins do indeed use the word 'divinity' in connection with *prāṇa* in order to dispel the notion of intelligence in the physical or bodily elements.¹²

There are again texts like "Agni having become speech entered into the mouth."¹³ So runs the argument of the Sāṅkhya.

III

Now Śaṅkara proceeds to show that all this is wrong. It is not absolutely true that from an intelligent cause non-intelligent effect cannot be produced. In the individual living body animated by intelligence, material things such as hair and nails are observed to grow and conversely, from material things like the cow-dung, scorpions and worms are seen to be produced. It may appear that only the physical body of the scorpion is produced from the corresponding physical matter of the drug etc. But even then, Śaṅkara urges, the body of the scorpion houses an intelligence while the cowdung does not do so. Hence, it is obvious in this instance that the effect is not the same as the cause. Similarly nails and hair grow

11. To wit, *Satopathabrāhmaṇa*, VI. 1, 3, 2 and 4. "The earth spoke". "The waters spoke". *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: VI-2. 3 and 4. "Fire thought", "Water thought". The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text speaks as though the bodily elements like vital airs are intelligent. "These *prāṇas* went to Brahman"; "They said to speech". (VI-1-7, 1.3.2.)

12. *Kauṣītaki*: II. 14.

13. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*: II, 4, 2, 4.

only on a live body. But the nature of the nail and hair is vastly different from the live body in which they grow. Even as physical formations, the nail and hair are appreciably different from the physical body from which they arise.

Śaṅkara then lays it down as a general principle that absolute identity between cause and effect is neither observed nor could be insisted on as the nature of causal relationship. Hence, the world phenomenon as an effect cannot be the same as its cause which is Brahman.

If it were argued that in the case of nails and the body, scorpion and the cowdung there is at least materiality that is common, Śaṅkara answers that between Brahman and the world, too, there is a common feature of Being (*sattā*).

Moreover, when it is said that Brahman is dissimilar to the world, is it suggested that

- a) all the characteristics of Brahman are not found in the world or
- b) not even one of the characteristics of Brahman is found in the world or
- c) only the characteristic of intelligence is not found in the world?

The first suggestion is untenable because in the case of total identity, the cause-effect relationship will be meaningless. That relationship means some difference and dissimilarity between the cause and the effect.

The second suggestion also is unacceptable because, as has already been pointed out, there is indeed the feature of "being" that is common to the world and Brahman.

The third suggestion is not satisfactory because it is impossible to show an instance of a thing which is unintelligent and is yet not the effect of Brahman. For, according to the Advaitin, the entire world is the work of Brahman.¹⁴

14. Ultimately, *how* the world has been produced from Brahman is a mystery. We will have to accept it only on the strength of the scripture. It is not open to human reason. "Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim

Finally, Advaitins who, following the scripture, hold that Brahman is the cause of the world will be able to explain without difficulty the text of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*. "He became knowledge and the opposite of it". It is open for them to say that intelligence is never absent in anything in creation and that it may in some places be manifest and in others unmanifest. But the Sāṅkhya will be hard put to it to explain how on the hypothesis that Pradhāna is the cause of the world, intelligence anywhere could appear at all even occasionally or exceptionally.

A quite different consequence of the Advaita theory that Brahman is the cause of the world which is opposite to it in its characteristics now is presented as an objection. If the world of the material nature were to be granted as proceeding from Brahman, then, it has also to be granted that something that was not there already in Brahman appears for the first time. This is *asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda*¹⁵ which is not in the line of the Advaita Vedāntin who is wedded to *satkāryavāda* according to which the effect is prefigured in the cause and is not a *de novo* production.

Śaṅkara urges that the expression "prior non-existence" in the statement of *asatkāryavāda* that the effect is non-existent in its cause prior to its production will be pure negation without anything there to be negated. If the effect were non-existent in its cause, what is the meaning in saying that *it* is non-existent in its cause? What is *it* that is referred to as non-existent? If there is nothing to which the word 'non-existent' refers, then the denial is pure negation which denies nothing.

Śaṅkara holds that, not merely prior to its production, but even after its production the effect does not exist apart from its cause. The analysis is as follows.

it, when this creation arose?" (*Ṛg-veda Saṃhitā*, X, 129, 6). "That cannot be understood by reasoning". (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*: I-2, 9). The *smṛtis* also declare: "Let not reason be used to things which are beyond understanding." Above all, the *Gītā* says: "Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not even the great sages". (X. 2)

15. The effect is the counter-correlate of its own prior non-existence (*svaprāga-bhāva pratiyogi*) according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *asatkāryavādin*s.

IV

Śaṅkara makes an analysis of the notion of cause and effect in order to show that the effect is nothing over and above the cause. (1) The effect is observed only when there is the cause. The effect exists only when the cause exists, not when it does not exist. When clay exists, then its effects like pot exist. This is not so in the case of different unconnected things like a cow and a horse. Even the efficient cause of an effect is not necessarily present when the effect is present. For instance, when a pot exists, the potter need not necessarily exist. Therefore, we cannot speak of non-difference between the pot and the potter. Such a non-difference exists only between an effect and its material cause as in the case of pot and the clay.

One may raise a question whether the above statement is everywhere true. For instance, smoke and fire are not non-different but yet smoke is observed only when fire exists. Thus even different things may as a rule coexist.

But this is not so. Smoke is observed even when the fire which was its cause is no more present. Śaṅkara gives the example of herdsmen bottling up the smoke in a jar. Moreover, non-difference between cause and effect is not merely on the ground of being observed together but also being the content of a consciousness wherein the idea of the effect cannot exist without logically being connected with the idea of the cause.¹⁶ Obviously, such a kind of relationship does not exist between the smoke and the fire. Smoke is certainly produced by fire and therefore depends on the fire for its existence. But wherever fire is seen in experience smoke need not be, and fire is sometimes inferred from smoke. Thus, it is not the case that fire and smoke are always perceived together.

To take another example, threads and cloth which is constituted by them are non-different. The so-called cloth is only the threads in a particular texture. The cloth materially does not have an existence over and above the threads in that texture.

16. As Ānandagiri puts it: *tadbhāva-anuvīdhāyitvam* and also *tadbhāna-anuvīdhāyitvam* are the determinant of non-difference.

If we pursue this same line of reasoning, we will find that it holds true with regard to the threads and their constituent parts till we arrive at the position that the ultimate parts of the threads are the physical elements like earth, water and fire and that these again in their turn are one with ether (*ākāśa*) and that the ether is finally one with Brahman which is the material cause of everything that exists.

Further, the effect is present in its cause, even prior to its production. This can be stated not merely on the authority of the scriptures but also on the strength of reason.¹⁷

If the effect were not preexistent in the cause, it can never be said to be produced from that cause. Oil cannot be produced from the sands. If this were possible, anything could be produced from anything else, thus annulling all order from the world.

The fact that specific effects cannot be indiscriminately obtained from any set of conditions whatever is a proof that the effect is already contained in the cause and is not anything over and above its cause. Applying this theory of non-difference to Brahman and the world Śaṅkara declares that the world as an effect is non-different from Brahman, its cause.

The non - difference of the effect from the cause is a theory not unacceptable to the Sāṅkhya. The point is, however, that Brahman, not the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world.

Śaṅkara, however, interprets the texts¹⁸ declaring the effect non-existent in the cause quite in consonance with his own doctrine. The reference to non-existence in the statements¹⁹ referred to above does not signify absolute non-existence

17. Cp: *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: VI-2, 1; *Aitareya Upaniṣad*; II, 4, 1, 1. "In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is". "Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only"; In these scriptural statements the word "this" appears in grammatical coordination with the word signifying 'cause' which fact demonstrates the same substratum for both.

18. It may be objected: the scripture does not univocally speak of the effect being already contained in the cause. It also quite paradoxically states that the effect is non-existent.

19. The reference is to the same *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (III, 19, 1) and also to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II, 7). "Non-existent, indeed, this was in the beginning."

but only to a different state or quality. The differentiated world of name and form lies potentially as germ in Brahman, as any other worldly effect is in its cause. The scripture states therefore that the world is "non-existent" in its cause as differentiated.²⁰ In other words, the world existed in an unevolved and undifferentiated condition. The manifest world of name and form comes within sensory experience and is in ordinary language referred to as existent. In contrast to the word "existent", the word "non-existent" is used in the scripture to signify the opposite sense of undifferentiated potential content.

Those who maintain that effect is an emergent novelty not wholly contained in the cause account for the relation of the specific effect to its specific cause by the postulation of a special potency (*atiśaya*) by virtue of which, for instance, curds can be obtained only from milk and not from anything else.

But this does not carry much conviction with Śaṅkara as it has to be satisfactorily explained whether this "special potency" is an antecedent condition of the effect. If it were so, then it amounts to accepting the theory that the effect preexists in the cause in whatever form.

And the special potency must have some relation to the cause on the one side and to the effect on the other. In the absence of such a relation, it becomes inexplicable how a cause is a cause at all of its effect.

It is equally mysterious how any force, unconnected with the process of causal production in any conceivable manner, can bring about a specific result from a specific cause. If it could, such arbitrary assumption will mean indiscriminate and totally lawless causal connections which is the very negation of the orderly nature of the world and our experience of it.

20. The word 'non-existent' in the scripture is to be understood by its complementary statement which closely follows it: "That became existent", wherein "that" is the effect already contained in the cause. The word "was" in the text: "This was non-existent in the beginning" is also indicative of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. A mere negation can have no conceivable relation to time, past or present.

Again, such a factor cannot afford to be non-existent for the simple reason that a non-existent nothing can have no causal efficiency.

Not merely in factual order, but also in our experience of it, Śaṅkara urges, the ideas of cause and effect are correlatives, like substance and quality, and unlike different things like a horse and a buffalo.

What appears invariably together in experience can never be dismissed as chance or accident.²¹ Śaṅkara seems to believe that intelligibility of our experience arises from the intelligibility of an objective physical order. An objective idealism based on an epistemological realism characterises Śaṅkara's thinking here. Śaṅkara is repeatedly seen to insist that what appears in experience cannot be dismissed by mere theoretical presupposition. This will be evident in the sequence.

So, the world, as an effect, is non-different from its cause which is Brahman.

Yet an objection could be raised against the doctrine that it is Brahman that is the cause of the world from another point of view.²² If Brahman were the cause of the entire world and if the world as an effect were basically non-different from Brahman, the incidence of all the defects in the system of the world affecting Brahman which ought to be blemishless must have to be faced.

Again, the Advaita of Śaṅkara holds that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is one with the individual self.²³ Consequently certain con-

21. II-1-18. The *Brahma-sūtras* (II-1-19, 20), according to Śaṅkara, illustrate this fact by the example of folded cloth and of vital airs. The folded piece of cloth is the same as the unfolded one. Only the details like its length are manifestly known when it is unrolled. The cloth itself is unmanifest in the causal condition and by the suitable operations of shuttle, loom, weaver and so on, it becomes manifest and is then called the effect. To take the example of vital airs, one and the same air discharges diverse functions like that of Prāṇa, Apāna etc. When the breath is held, all the diversified functions are withdrawn into the causal condition. So, the various causes and effects are but manifestations of one and the same primal cause.

22. S.B. II-1, 21.

23. See *Chāndogya*: VI, 3, 2; IV-8, 7,

clusions follow from the above premise of Advaita creating difficulties. To wit, we will have to grant that the creative power of Brahman is possessed by the individual self also. This being the case, the individual self must create only that which is good and pleasant for itself; not what is painful to it like birth and death, old age and disease. Indeed, one does not willingly build a prison for him to enter and spend his life-time. Since, the individual self is free, it is to be hardly expected that it will entangle itself voluntarily in pain and suffering in any manner. It may even wilfully avoid the results of its own doings disowning the responsibility therefor if they turn out to be irksome and uncomfortable. It will see to it that pleasure alone is its lot.

Moreover, if it were the individual self that created the world, as the Advaitic presuppositions would lead one to believe, it should remember this act of creation as its own. But this is hardly the case with anyone of us.

As the magician is never deluded by his feats and is at liberty to close the show at his free choice and will, the individual self must be free to bring the world-process to an end and absorb it back again into itself at its own free choice. The hard realities are, however, otherwise. An individual self is not able to do anything even with regard to his own bodily existence, let alone the world. Such are the difficulties that Saṅkara is now obliged to answer and he proceeds to do so.

At the first instance, Saṅkara makes it clear that Brahman is not the same as the embodied self which is but the ego involved in the body-mind complex.²⁴ Ego vanishes with the dawn of right knowledge. What remains is the pure Self which is Brahman.

24. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, 4, 5, IV-3 35; *Chāndogya*: VI-8, 1, VIII-7, 1. for the declaration of difference between the embodied soul as such and Brahman. Saṅkara says that non-difference is the truth while difference is illusory. Difference of the ether at large and the same ether delimited by a box does not nullify the non-difference of ether which is the truth. Saṅkara gives numerous examples to show that though Brahman is one of uniform nature it may phenomenally be many. (1) Earth is of one nature; yet, admits of a variety of forms such as diamonds, crystals and ordinary stones and (2) Seeds sown in the same soil grow into plants as varied as sandalwood and cucumber different in their fruits and flowers and foliage and fragrance. (3) One and the same food eaten turns into blood, hair, nail and so on. (S.B. II-1-23).

Secondly, Brahman, by definition, is pure and free. Nothing affects it; in fact, its freedom is precisely that of immutability. There is nothing that obstructs its knowledge and power. (Therefore, creatorship, if at all it were real, belongs to Brahman alone, not to the embodied soul. The "embodied" condition is a product of ignorance (*avidyā*).

An objection now is raised as to how Brahman could create the world. Being defined as pure intelligence and one without a second, Brahman evidently does not have any instruments to work with. Things are produced in the world by craftsmen and artisans with the help of instruments and tools.

This objection, too, is invalid because instances are not wanting even in our everyday world where effects just take place spontaneously in the things by virtue of their own inner constitution. For example, milk turns into curds of its own accord by dint of its own atomic structure. Water, similarly, turns into ice spontaneously and naturally.

One cannot rejoin that in the cases of milk and water becoming curds and ice respectively, external factors like heat or cold as the case might be are at work. For, milk and water possess by themselves the power to change into curds and ice respectively. Such external factors like heat and cold only aid and accelerate the process. If milk and water did not possess the power intrinsically, no outside agency whatever its magnitude, can make them change into curds and ice. Can heat and cold make air change into curds and ice? The heat etc., are only cooperative auxiliary causes that quicken and complete the causal transformation.

If this were the case with the natural objects like milk and water, the possibility of Brahman being independent of any external instrument as aid to it can easily be imagined.²⁵

But has Śaṅkara succeeded in his attempt by using the above examples? Are they examples at all? Milk turning into curds or

25. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* declares: "There is no effect, no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better, his high power revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge." (VI-8).

water turning into ice are mechanical events taking place according to the laws of physical nature. Because the things involved are material. But the case of Brahman is vastly different because Brahman is intelligent. And intelligent beings are well known to employ implements. For instance, the potter starts his work with the appropriate instruments. Such an aid of instruments is unthinkable in the case of Brahman which does not admit of an other.

Śaṅkara's reply to this is that Brahman is such an intelligent being that it can create without implements. Such a thing is not inconceivable because even Yogins with great spiritual power are able to produce things by the exercise of their mere will without any external aid. Even a spider is seen to be capable of weaving a web from out of itself without requiring any instrument outside it. The female crane is seen to conceive without a male. The lotus creeper passes from one pond to another without a means of conveyance. Such could be the power of Brahman also which is incomparably greater than any of these.

But are Śaṅkara's examples free still from difficulties? All of those beings which are supposed to create by sheer will without an extraneous aid are using their bodies with which they are endowed. Even the Yogis are not disembodied spirits. The spider weaves its web with its saliva. The female crane conceives by the sound of thunder. The lotus creeper is able physically to move just like any other creeper which winding itself round a tree climbs it, but not as a mere disembodied intelligence. But Brahman is, unlike any one of these instances, disembodied pure intelligence. Hence what is true of them cannot be true of Brahman.

Śaṅkara tells us in answer that the examples cited are intended to show that all cases of creation are not on a par and that there may be instances where the external implements need not be used as they are done by a worker like a potter. And we must remember that we are treating of the highest spiritual reality. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to assume such extraordinary powers in the case of Brahman creating the world. That is all what the examples seek to show.

Yet another criticism of the doctrine of Brahman being the creative intelligence is offered now. Granting that Brahman is the cause

of the world, it follows that Brahman must wholly transform itself into the world as Brahman does not have parts. If it had parts it will be subject to mutation. If, on the other hand, Brahman wholly changed into the world, it will cease to exist. Moreover, if Brahman wholly transformed itself into the world, it can be known easily in the form of the world and the exhortation of the scripture addressed to men to seek it is purposeless.

The reply is : Brahman is the cause of the world and yet it does not change into the world either in parts or as a whole.²⁶ The argument that if Brahman is wholly transformed, it will be open to perception is unwarranted because while the effect is perceived, the cause may remain unperceived.

While it is solely on the authority of the scripture that Śaṅkara bases his doctrine that Brahman is partless and that yet creation proceeds from Brahman alone, he tries to show by reasoning based on experience that it is not mere faith to be blindly accepted. For instance, gems, spells, herbs and the like are observed to have powers which produce diverse and even opposite effects even as time place and occasion differ. And a bare reasoning independent of an authoritative instruction will not be able to discover the why and the wherefore of such phenomena. If it were the case even with ordinarily observable occurrences, it is much more difficult to fathom the mysterious powers of the highest reality except through the insights of the scripture.²⁷

The crux of Śaṅkara's understanding is that the so-called creation of the world is not a real transformation at all. Only if it were so, the question whether Brahman changes into the world

26. This is borne out by ever so many scriptural passages, to wit, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III-12, 6 which says: "One foot of Him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven". Also, passages telling us that in the dreamless sleep, the soul is united with Brahman residing in the heart will be inexplicable except when the soul is different from Brahman.

27. Śaṅkara holds that while reason has its own legitimate area of use and application, it is futile in some other areas as an instrument of knowing. Reason has its own limits beyond which it lands us in "transcendental illusions". Śaṅkara quotes a verse with approval. "Do not apply reason to what is unthinkable". Evidently, there are ways of knowing other than reason and sensory observation.

either wholly or partly is legitimate. And material transformation is not the only way of producing a phenomenon. Brahman is not so much the cause of an effect as the substrate of an illusory manifestation of the world in it. Just as a winding piece of rope appears as a snake, Brahman appears as the world. Just as the rope is just the substrate of the snake-illusion and, so, remains unaffected by the snake-illusion in it, Brahman, being merely the substrate of the world-illusion it, remains unaffected by the appearance and disappearance of the world in it. Again, just as it is the ignorance of the rope lying there is the stuff and substance of the snake-illusion in it, the ignorance of Brahman is the stuff and substance of the world-illusion. When the rope is known, the illusory snake is dispelled. Similarly when Brahman is known, the world-illusion is destroyed. This is the meaning and message of the text "not this, not this".²⁸

To take another example, it is ordinarily known to everyone that in dream one creates objects of experience²⁹ which are but illusions since they disappear on waking. All the same, the dream visions appear so concrete, substantial and real. The seeming reality is thus no proof for true reality.

That creations are possible without any real change in the locus is further shown by the instance of a magician who juggles out objects without anything taking place really under the sun at all. Unity and identity of Brahman, therefore, may remain undisturbed even as the world of the manifold variety is concretely presented.

Yet another objection to the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world arises on the ground of the creation having a purpose. What could be the purpose of creation? If Brahman had any purpose to be achieved by the process of creation, it ceases to be independent and self-sufficient. If it had no purpose, then creation will be motiveless. Without a motive or a goal to be realized, creation itself will not have even an initial impetus. If creation is,

28. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV-2, 4.

29. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* puts it: "There are no chariots (in dream), no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads." (IV-3.10).

nonetheless, said to be motiveless, that will harm the concept of Brahman as the omniscient reality. Unthinking activity will be the very antithesis of Brahman's own description.

Śaṅkara answers this objection in accordance with the *Brahma-sūtras* (II—1—33) that creation is but a play of the Lord (Brahman). It is a matter of common observation that princes, for example, who could obviously afford the luxury of sport, take to it, not out of any compulsion but out of free sense of a play. Śaṅkara then compares this creative act of God to the natural event of breathing. Creation proceeds out of God's own nature.³⁰ Beyond that, no particular reason could be given.³¹ It is beyond inquiry and as such should be considered a mystery to the human imagination. The nearest analogies are sport and breathing. Considering the fact that we are dealing with the creator of the universe, nothing should be impossible to Him and nothing of His activity could be explicable as ordinary works of man are in terms of their antecedent conditions and causes. The sheer magnitude of the architectonic of the world defies conventional explanation. The world is there we know not how or why. We are left with only frail imageries and inane analogies. Our moulds of understanding are completely inadequate and unequal to the stupendous task. Even in the activities like the sport, we could, if we would, discern some motive or other in terms of entertainment or health. But in God's activity, we are left with no clue for, there could be, so far as we could see, nothing that He wants and that He does not possess.

Again, when all is said and done, says Śaṅkara, creation is not strictly the truth. On the contrary, that it is not real is the truth. Even scripture talks occasionally of creation only to make us enquire and lead us on to the truth of no-creation or Advaita.³² The notions of creation are relegated to the limbo of *avidyā* or ignorance.

We shall now notice yet another objection. This time it refers to the contingency of partiality and cruelty that would befall God if he were the creator of the world.

30. *svabhāva*. S.B., II-1-33.

31. S.B., II-1-33.

32. S.B., II-1-33.

The world does not offer the same fare to everyone equally. Some are happy; some are unhappy and some others are swinging from one to the other uncertainly. If God were the source of these situations, He must be declared to be partial to some with no ostensible reason. He seems to rule like an arbitrary despot. To him should then be ascribed malice and passion, like and dislike which qualities rebel against His overpowering goodness. He is supposed to possess by definition. Moreover, He is the cruellest person inflicting pain and sorrow all round on innocent and unsuspecting souls with least justification. Hence it is better not to involve God (Brahman) in this creation of dubious virtue.

Śaṅkara's answer to this objection is based on a moral argument. The creaturely beings of creation are morally responsible for their own doings for ill or well. Creation is God's own handiwork but the world set for the stay of the souls is what the souls themselves make or mar. God dispenses an initial freedom to all to use that freedom as they will. The joys and sorrows of the souls, then, are what they bring on themselves. The inequalities are the soul's own making. God's function is limited to apportion and award the just results weighing the virtue of actions in the balance of justice.

The rainfall is a common source of sustenance for a variety of plants to grow on the soil like rice and barley which grow differently according to the individual potencies of their seeds. Similarly, God is common to everything. The differences arise determined by the free acts of the souls.³³

But, how, it may be asked, and why were there differences among the souls at the very commencement of creation when there could have been no earlier free acts of the souls meriting inequality among them? Śaṅkara's argument thus suffers from the logical fallacy of circular reasoning. Inequality is caused by the works and works are caused by inequality.

To this, Śaṅkara replies that the question of beginning can never be settled. We can only speak of acts and their results as we

33. cp. *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*, III, 8. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: III-2. 13. *Bhagavad-gītā*: IV-II.

observe them. We can only say that the seed and the sprout, acts and their results are there beginninglessly. Which is first, hen or the egg is a conundrum as old as the hills.

If anything, it is a puzzle which human reason can never hope to solve. It is an instance of the signal failure of human reason. Śaṅkara would urge, as he has repeatedly done, that the puzzle is not solved in terms of an answer on the plane of reason but dissolved as something that is born of the notion that creation and all its inequalities are real to contend with. This notion is the child of ignorance. Brahman alone being real, the creation is illusory presentation. Questions regarding the details of this phantom are bound to remain unanswerable. Outside this charmed circle of this phantom there are no questions to be answered.

That the world is beginningless can be shown by reasoning. If the world has a beginning, such a beginning will be *de novo*, an absolute novelty having no antecedent conditions and causes. If it had such conditions and causes the series will reach back to an infinite past and then the world will be beginningless. If the world were, therefore, *de novo*, one consequence of all this will be that even the released souls that exist already will lapse back into bondage. This is because the world scheme is causeless. A causeless creation will be chaos wherein anything can happen without law.

Again, the unequal experiences of pleasure and pain will be rendered causeless. We are led into a logical seesaw if we probe into the beginning of things *de novo*. Hence we must be satisfied with saying that the world is beginningless series like seed and sprout. For the rest of it, we are constrained to say that the entire notion of creation is born of *avidyā* or ignorance.³⁴ Creation being a mystery and a wonder, nothing short of a power of *māyā* which defies description could do justice to the problem of world creation.³⁵

34. See *Bhagavad-gītā*: XV-3. The *Ṛg Veda Saṁhitā*: (X, 190, 3) says "The creator earlier created sun and moon", showing thereby that there was always an "earlier".

35. See *S. B.* II-1. 3.

CHAPTER VI

Refutation of the Sāṅkhya System—II

Objects of the world having a common property are seen to be produced from a common cause. Pot, jug and jar exhibiting in their make the characteristics of clay are traced to clay as their common material cause. The worldly objects similarly display the common characteristics of pleasure, pain and inertia (dullness). This fact indicates that the world is the product of a common cause which has in it the possibilities of pleasure, pain and inertia. Since the world is an inert physical system, its cause also must be physical in nature, constituted by the above three characteristics. According to Sāṅkhya, this physical material cause of the world is *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*.¹

Śaṅkara's criticism

(1) The inert Pradhāna can never evolve on its own accord and, what is more, can never work with a specific purpose of serving the ends of the souls, which according to the Sāṅkhyas is the case. An inert object with a definite purpose and a structural design governed by that purpose is never observed to have come into being without an intelligence behind it. Dwelling places, pleasure-gardens and beds, for instance, which subserve the purposes of living or playing or sleeping, are with foresight planned by the calculating intelligence of man.

If we look into the world stretched out before us, it falls into two classes of the physical objects with no life in them and physical bodies in which life is present. In either of these classes, there seems to be a design and a structure which are ingenious and in many cases beyond the comprehension of the best of the scientists. Such

1. See Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 12, 13, 15. See also *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra*, I, 129 ff.

a wonderful architectonic cannot be the work of a blind materia force organising itself by blind chance mechanical automatism.

Stones and clods of earth are not observed to have this power of self-organisation. On the contrary, they themselves are the result of a prior organisation of forces like *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in terms of Sāṅkhya. Any organised matter (and all matter is organised) presupposes a plan. Plan is always the act of an intelligence. Material forces as well as efficient causes must be taken together in giving an account of an organised physical object.²

(2) The argument of the Sāṅkhya that Pradhāna constituted by the three *guṇas* must be the cause of the world because everything in the world exhibits these three *guṇas* carries no conviction. It cannot be maintained that all the classes of objects of the world share the same three *guṇas*. Some classes of things are internal states of mind while some others are external objects. Pleasure, pain etc., are *internal* experience and states of the mind while the sense objects that produce them like sound and colour are *external* in space and time. The latter, thus, are the operative causes of the former. Hence to class them together as though their natures are one and the same and then to conclude that their cause, therefore, must be common and the same is false.

What is more, the same sense-object like sound is found to produce different, nay, even opposite effects in different people. One and the same sound, for example, excites pleasure in one and produces the opposite reaction in another.³ As Vācaspati puts it in his *Bhāmati*, the same sandal paste gives an agreeable feeling in the hot summer but causes a disagreeable chill in winter. It is evident, therefore, that objects are not inherently endowed with the characteristics of pleasure and pain. Otherwise, pleasurable objects will be pleasurable always irrespective of time, place and persons. This goes to show that the so-called characteristics of pleasure, pain etc., are not in the objects. That means that they are not shared by every-

2. S. B. II-2- I.

3. As Vācaspati puts it, man also like the camels could eat thistles and thrive, on the Sāṅkhya hypothesis. Because, on that hypothesis, to be a man or a camel does not make a difference to the thistles being food.

thing in common with the result that we cannot infer Pradhāna as the common cause for all the world.

(3) The Sāṅkhya infer the existence of Pradhāna from the limitedness of things. Anything that is an effect is an aggregation of several causes and conditions. Since the world is observed to have this finite character of a product, there must be, the Sāṅkhya says, an unlimited cause and that is Pradhāna.

But Śaṅkara asks whether the Pradhāna itself is not constituted by the three *guṇas*. If so, since the *guṇas* themselves are not one but three, they must be supposed to be inherently limited products, which admission will involve the limitedness being carried into the very heart of Pradhāna.

(4) Further it is not necessary to assume that non-intelligent effects must be solely produced by non-intelligent causes alone. For, objects like houses, beds and gardens are, though non-intelligent, are produced with some intelligence presiding over the production.

(5) The Sāṅkhya doctrine believes that once the constituent *guṇas* are disturbed out of their equilibrium, evolution proceeds and specific effects begin to appear. But, Śaṅkara asks, how could the equilibrium disturbed of its own accord? If there were no specific reason for the disturbances it may always be disturbed or may not be disturbed at all⁴ as a result of which specific effects are evolved. And again, specific effects are seen in the world to be produced only by some intelligence, as for instance, in the pot made from clay by a potter or the chariots drawn by horses. The seen is the clue to the unseen.⁵

(6) It will be rewarding to ask the question here: (a) Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed, or (b) to that due to the conjunction with which it is observed?

The Sāṅkhya position is that activity should be attributed to that in which it is seen. The activity and the locus in which it is seen are matter of direct observation. For instance, both the chariot and

4. S.B. II-2-4.

5. S.B. II-2. 2.

its movement are seen in direct perception. But mere intelligence is never observed as the locus of any activity as the chariot is.⁶

To this Śaṅkara replies taking the second of the above two alternatives first. It is not as if activity does not belong to the physical object. The chariot, for instance, certainly moves. But the Advaitin's contention is that the movement of the chariot with a specific purpose of reaching a place is caused by an intelligence. This purposeful movement takes place when there is an intelligence present and does not take place when there is no intelligence present. By the application of this method of difference, it is well established that intelligence is necessary for any purposeful movement of a physical object like a chariot or a human body. For another instance, fire as such is nowhere seen; but without that fire, no object could burn or shine. Burning is present or absent as the fire is present or absent. Fire is not said to be the property of the burning material like wood even by the materialists. In the same way, they should admit that, though mere intelligence as such, unembodied, is not seen directly but only through some body that is physical and acting, intelligence as such exists apart from that physical body which it actuates.⁷

(7) Consequent on the above conclusion, the further question arises how the mere intelligence is capable of acting on a body. Mere intelligence is devoid of an activity like motion. It has to be explained how a motionless intelligence can impart motion to a physical object.

Śaṅkara answers this by affirming that motionless cause is observed importing motion to objects. For instance, the magnet gravitates the iron and makes it move without itself moving. Colours, for another instance, cause movements in the sense-organs though

6. The existence of the intelligent soul is a matter of inference only. What we observe is only the body acting. Only living body acts; not the non-living. From this difference we make the inference. Hence, the materialists urge, when there is a body in action intelligence is observed through that and is never observed like that except through some body in action. If anything, therefore, intelligence is an attribute of the body.

7. The refutation of the materialists by Śaṅkara is rather incidental. But it is important since sometimes Sāṅkhya is poised on the verge of materialism, which it certainly is not. A criticism of materialism by Śaṅkara is given in some other part of this monograph.

they themselves are motionless. Hence, there could be an unmoving mover, who is God.⁸

(8) The difficulties are not over yet because there are instances where non-intelligent entities are seen to work for the benefit of something else. Milk flows from the body of the cow for the nourishment of the calf; water flows on its own accord nurturing the trees and plants. Hence, to do an act, a thing need not be intelligent; nor need it be aware of the purpose. Hence Pradhāna may function in a similar fashion.

Śaṅkara makes a short work of this analogy by saying that milk from the body of the cow flows only because the cow is an intelligent being and secretes milk out of love for her calf. Similarly, water flows, not of its own accord, but because of the unevenness of the ground.⁹ In even surface it stands still.

(9) To continue the illustration of the cow, when the cow eats the grass, it turns into milk. There is no known means of converting the grass into milk. But it takes place in the bodily chemistry of the cow. Therefore, we should assume that the inert grass turns into milk by an automatism requiring no aid or interference from any intelligent source. Similar could be the evolution of Pradhāna, so contends the Sāṅkhya.

Śaṅkara points out that grass turns into milk only when eaten by a cow or some other female species of animals. It is not seen to happen in the case of a bull. This very fact of cow or the mother alone being able to get the grass transformed into milk which is in coordination with the needs of the life and growth of the calf

8. Strictly speaking, such questions as these belong, to the realm of *māyā*. Reality does not have room for any such questions for the simple reason that creation is an illusory process. One does not have to wrestle with such problems as that of the Prime Mover.

9. Strictly this is not an act of the water at all. By an act, we should understand a function with a purpose. Water itself does not have a purpose. Here "use" and "purpose" have been confused by the Sāṅkhya. Water has a use but it is for an intelligent being or a live being. The plants make "use" of water. Such purposes of plants being nourished by water falls under the general plan of creation. Hence there is nothing in the world, says Śaṅkara, that is not in one way or another subservient to his design and purpose.

demonstrates, according to Saṅkara, the master - plan of an omniscient God. There are in God's scheme things which men will not be able to do or even to understand.¹⁰

(10) Granting for the sake of argument that Pradhāna is spontaneously active without requiring any intelligence, it has to be shown whether it has any purpose to fulfill. The Sāṅkhya believes that the Pradhāna evolves only for the purpose of the Puruṣa or the soul. What could that purpose be? Either (1) it is enjoyment of the soul or (2) its release or (3) both or (4) satisfaction of desire or (5) the usefulness of the powers of Puruṣa and Pradhāna.

It is not the first because the soul, *ex hypothesi*, is essentially indifferent and no pleasure or pain could in the very nature of its case accrue to it. Pradhāna at best can provide only a source or a theatre of enjoyment for the soul with the result that the soul will have no chance of getting release. It is not the second because the soul is essentially pure and eternally released. Moreover, the supposition that Pradhāna supplies the objects of experience to the soul will have to be abandoned.

If the third, since the objects of the Pradhāna are infinite in number and variety, there will be no end to enjoyment and no chance of release. If it were the case that even a little enjoyment will do in order that one is released, then all will be released at the same time.

If the fourth, no desire could possibly exist either in the Pradhāna which is unintelligent or in the Puruṣa which is pure.

If the fifth, that is, if Pradhāna were not active, as otherwise its blind creative power and the guiding power of intelligence will be profitless, both the creative power of Pradhāna and the guiding power of Puruṣa's intelligence are eternal and consequently, the process of evolution will never cease. No release of the soul could be visualised.

10. Even the digestive system is adapted, not merely to the nourishment of the mother - cow, but also to that of the calf that is going to be born. It is part of the life-scheme, not contemplated by man but only by the Creator.

(11) The Sāṅkhya compares the Pradhāna to a blind man and the Puruṣa to a lame man both of whom, having lost their way and meeting by chance, come to an understanding that the blind man will carry the lame man on his shoulders and the lame man on his part will lead the blind man showing him the road to reach their destinations. Similarly, Pradhāna though active lacks vision and Puruṣa though intelligent lacks the power of action. Cooperating with each other, both realise their goals.

Śaṅkara's criticism of this analogy is that the Sāṅkhya here has abandoned its original stand that Pradhāna does not require any intelligence as its aid. It has also abandoned the stance that Puruṣa is inactive and indifferent.

The analogy itself is wrong. In the case of the lame and the blind man the lame can understandably guide the blind man by words. But Puruṣa does not have even this much of an action because by definition it is devoid of action and qualities. It cannot put forth any energy to impart momentum to the Pradhāna.

It cannot be suggested that Puruṣa moves the Pradhāna by its mere presence in the neighbourhood as the magnet does a piece of iron. For, the proximity of the magnet to the iron is occasional while the proximity of the Puruṣa to Prakṛti is permanent. This will mean that the evolution will be everlasting and, as a result, the Sāṅkhya system will lose its very basis which is that of release of the soul.

(12) The three *guṇas* of the Pradhāna have no particular reason to lose their independence and fall into relative subservience or inferiority. If, for the sake of an argument, it is supposed that even in their state of equipoise, the *guṇas* enter into relative subservience of one to the others, being essentially unsteady, even then, the orderly way in which the *guṇas* develop will not be possible without a superintending intelligence. Since no such intelligence is present or admitted in the Sāṅkhya, the supposed inequality of the *guṇas* will be there always or not at all.

(13) Śaṅkara now presents the inner contradictions in the system of the Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya is not consistent in the enumeration of senses. Sometimes it is said that there are seven senses

sometimes eleven. In some places the system tells us that the subtle elements evolve from the *mahat*; in other places, from *ahaṅkāra*. Again, the internal organs are said to be three, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*; sometimes one only, namely *buddhi*.

(14) The very possibility of release on Sāṅkhya account becomes dubious because, according to them, the cause of bondage is delusive power of *tamas*. If this were so, since *tamas*, the germ of non-discrimination, is one of the triune *guṇas* and thus eternal, bondage will be eternal. If it were suggested that this *tamas* can be overcome by the *śatva* power of wisdom, there is no particular reason adduced by the Sāṅkhya why any *guṇa* should at any time rise or fall in dominance.

(15) Pradhāna being after all real and eternal, the cause of suffering and bondage can never be removed.

CHAPTER VII

Refutation of Sāṅkhya—III

The Sāṅkhyas claim that Pradhāna is the cause of the world. This Pradhāna, the Sāṅkhyas say, is inferable by reason. Sometimes they also claim that Pradhāna is taught in the scripture as the cause of the world.¹ Certain statements of the scripture which the Advaitins think declare Brahman as the cause of the world really refer to Pradhāna and must appropriately be construed thus. Brahman is said to be omnipotent but it is a description which will suit Pradhāna very well. Pradhāna is the potential cause, contains all the effects within it germinally and therefore can be said to be omnipotent.

Similarly, omniscience also can be attributed to Pradhāna. Omniscience is perfect knowledge. Knowledge is born of *sattva* quality.² Only because they possess such a knowledge, the Yogis are famed as omniscient beings living in a body. When *sattva*-quality is excellently in abundance, unlimited knowledge comes to be possessed.

A disembodied being can have no knowledge at all, whether omniscient or no. A body with the instruments of knowing which are the products of Prakṛti is alone capable of knowing. And Prakṛti is constituted by the three *guṇas* known as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So knowledge which is the product of *sattva* belongs to Prakṛti alone; not to the Self (Puruṣa) which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness cannot be the seat of knowledge unless it is associated with the Prakṛti with *sattva* as one of its constituents.

It is for the above reasons that the scripture calls Pradhāna as omniscient figuratively, though Pradhāna is in itself inert.

1. for example *Chāndogya* : VI-2.1

2. See *Gītā* XIV, 17: *sattvāt saṁjāyate jñānam*.

Even the Vedāntins who hold that Brahman is omniscient should grant Pradhāna to be omniscient since it is, as shown above, the seat and source of omniscient knowledge. Again, if Brahman is omniscient, the question arises whether such an omniscient knowledge as that of Brahman is eternal or non-eternal. It cannot be the former because an eternal knowledge will not be in need of a function for it to arise. This will entail the consequence that Brahman will not have the choice and the initiative to acquire the omniscience by a special exercise of its cognitive faculties. If, on the contrary omniscience were non-eternal, there will be times when Brahman will be devoid of omniscience. If Brahman at those times were said to be *potentially* omniscient, though not actually, Pradhāna stands a better chance because it is the seat of *sattva* and therefore, it is potentially the seat of omniscience.

Further, the Advaitins urge that prior to creation, Brahman does nothing and is bereft of all changes. At that time, there is no conjunction with body, mind etc., which are products of creation. When thus the cognitive apparatus is absent there can be no genesis of any knowledge, not to mention omniscient knowledge. Again, Pradhāna is admittedly subject to change and consists of parts and therefore there is no difficulty in its being the cause of the world. Brahman cannot be thus, being partless.

Sāṅkara's Criticism

The cause of the world stated in the scripture cannot be the inert Pradhāna. However much Pradhāna is sought to be established by reasoning and inference, it certainly does not have the sanction of the scripture.

The expressions '*sat*' etc., in the scripture do not refer to Pradhāna,³ for the simple reason that Pradhāna is not compatible with the expression "It contemplated".⁴ In "All this was existent in the beginning" the expression 'this' refers to the world and this world is said to be the existent Brahman before name and form were evolved.

3. The *Chāndogya* states that one should know the *sat* as the cause from fire, the effect: *tejasā śuṅgena san-mūlam anviccha*. Again: *sadeva somya idam agra āsīt*. (*Chāndogya*: VI-2,1), "Only existent was in the beginning." The "*sat*" here is said by the Sāṅkhya to be Pradhāna.

4. *Chāndogya*: VI-2.3.

The same existent reality (*sat*) is then said to create fire etc., after a contemplative act (*īkṣāṇa*).⁵

The argument advanced by the Sāṅkhya that Prakṛti can be omniscient because one of its constituents is *sattva* is also wrong. Prakṛti is constituted, not only by *sattva*, but also by *rajas* and *tamas*. And, Prakṛti is nothing more than the state of equilibrium of these three elements. Evidently *sattva* in this state is offset by the other two elements. So knowledge and omniscience due to the overwhelming force of *sattva* cannot take place. In other words, *sattva* does not have a prerogative over the other two.

Moreover, omniscience is a special function of cognition and a cognitive act can never occur without being associated with a basic consciousness. Mere physical matter is blind.

The omniscience of the Yogis is accountable by the fact that they are conscious and intelligent beings, though possessed of a body.

If it were said that an intelligent act like that of contemplation is intelligible on the analogy of the iron ball becoming hot by being heated, though heat belongs to the fire, it is replied that in that case the primary principle of consciousness is of the Self only and it is borrowed as it were by the Pradhāna. Hence the Self or Brahman is omniscient and it is the cause of the world.

With reference to the Sāṅkhya statement that if omniscience were eternal then Brahman need not exercise any cognitive activity and that if it were non-eternal, there will be times when Brahman will not be omniscient except potentially and that Pradhāna is fit to be that potential power of intelligence being possessed of *sattva* quality, it is replied as follows:

It is not quite clear how omniscience is compromised if omniscience is a cognitive activity of Brahman. It is a contradiction to say that someone who is omniscient does not possess that omniscience eternally. On the contrary, no loss of cognitive exercise on the part of Brahman is entailed by the fact that omniscience is eternal. Heat

5. See also *Praśna*: VI, 3. *Aitareya*: I-1. *Muṇḍaka*: I-1.9.

and light are eternally the powers of the sun and yet it is common to say that the sun shines and that it heats as though the sun is an agent of such activities. In other words, the sun is hot and luminous by its own nature whether it is at any time involved in the act of shining and heating at all or no.

If it were countered that only when there is something other than the sun to shine on and to heat, one can say that the sun shines and heats; and that in the case of Brahman no other entity exists prior to creation, it is replied that even when there is nothing for the sun to shine on, yet it makes sense to say that the sun shines. Similarly, even when there is nothing apart from Brahman, yet its power of contemplation and the expression, "It contemplated" in the scripture are not meaningless.

To the question as to what it is that is the object of Brahman's contemplation, the answer is that it is the unmanifested, unevolved subtle name and form, indeterminate as either real or unreal.

Even Yogis are said to possess the power to see directly the past and the future. What shall one say of God who is the basic reality of all? What doubt could there be in his direct vision of all that constitutes the world process at the beginning, middle and the end?

It is not a grave objection to say that Brahman does not have the cognitive apparatus prior to creation and that, therefore, he cannot know anything at that time. Like the sun's luminosity, knowledge is natural to Brahman. It does not look to any means of expressing it. Simply because created beings depend upon the physical cognitive apparatus for knowing, it does not follow that the omnipotent Brahman, too, must have a similar limitation.⁶

It is the basic tenet of Advaita that the soul is not different from Brahman. Then how come that it is said of the soul that its knowledge is limited and that the knowledge of Brahman is unlimited? The reply to this is that while it is true that the soul is nothing different from Brahman, yet due to the limiting adjuncts one and the

6. Texts are not wanting which declare that God does not stand in need of bodily instruments and that His knowledge is unobstructed and limitless. See *Svetāśvatara*: VI, 8; III, 19; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: III-7, 23.

same Brahman appears as various souls. Ether which is one and unlimited appears variously as contained in a pot, a pitcher and so on. Hence, the limit and scope of human knowledge are conditioned by limiting adjuncts like the body which are in their turn the products of ignorance of the truth that is Brahman.

Another objection that was raised by the Sāṅkhya was that Brahman being partless it could not be the cause of the world and that Pradhāna being constituted of parts could easily change and evolve into the world. To this Śaṅkara replies that Pradhāna is not at all established by the scripture while Brahman is repeatedly declared by it throughout as the cause of the world.

Sāṅkhya asserted that contemplative intelligence (*ikṣitṛiva*) was declared in the scripture figuratively. Such figurative usage is not uncommon. When the bank of a river is about to collapse, one exclaims: "It wants to collapse" as if "wanting to collapse" is a conscious activity of the inert bank.

Just as a man plans to go to another village after bathing and taking food and does so by his cart, even so the Pradhāna evolves into the world in the form of *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* etc. Hence, there is the figurative usage of contemplation as in the case of an intelligent man going to another village. The *Chāndogya* text, for instance, says: "Fire contemplated"; "The waters contemplated".⁷ The fire and water are said to contemplate rather figuratively. Hence it is not a farfetched imagination to think that contemplation to create on the part of Pradhāna designated as *sat* in the scripture is just figurative. Hence reference to such intelligent contemplation need not mean Brahman as the Advaitin tries to make out.

Śaṅkara replies to all this in the negative. The expression '*sat*' is also said to be the Self (*Ātman*) which is of the nature of consciousness. The following is the statement of the scripture.

The concerned section is the *Chāndogya*⁸ beginning with "Somya, *Sat* was all this in the beginning.". It goes on to say, "It contem-

7. VI-2.3, VI-2.4.

8. VI.2.1

plated; it created fire"⁹. Then the creation of water and earth is mentioned. It then designates the "*sat*" which creates all these and the created products by the expression " "*devatā*" (deity). It goes on to say that the *Devatā* contemplated: "I now through the Self which is the soul will enter these three elements of fire, water and earth and evolve name and form."¹⁰

If it were the *Pradhāna*, as the *Sāṅkhya* seems to think it is, then there cannot be the description of the Self entering the elements in the form of the soul. In other words, the soul will not have been designated by the word "Self". The soul is commonly known as an intelligent being, presiding over the body and sustaining the vital airs.¹¹ Such an intelligent principle cannot be the Self of the *Pradhāna*. The Self is synonymous with one's essential nature. Hence an intelligent soul cannot be the essential nature of *Pradhāna*.

But if the word '*sat*' signifies Brahman, no such difficulty of its being the Self through the form of the soul is felt. And the declaration of *Uddālaka* that the *sat*, the Self, is the very self of *Śvetaketu*¹² becomes easily intelligible. Hence, '*sat*' cannot be *Pradhāna*, but only intelligent Brahman. The contemplative act in the case of Brahman which is *sat* is even in the primary sense reasonable. When such primary sense is available it is a strained interpretation to say that such a contemplative act is used with reference to *Pradhāna* and its products though in a figurative sense.¹³

The *Sāṅkhya* may persist still in saying that even the word "self" can be used with reference to *Pradhāna*. There are two senses, so the contention continues, in which the word 'self' can be used. The first one is when all the things needed are accomplished by, for instance, a servant who, therefore, is called one's own self. Since *Pradhāna* accomplishes everything, it can in this sense be called the Self.

9. VI.2.3

10. III-3.2.

11. Cp. *Pāṇini: Jīva-prāṇadhāraṇa*.

12. *tat-tvam-asī. Chāndogya*.

13. Since such contemplative act or *ikṣaṇa* is primarily that of Brahman which is the basis of fire etc., that act even with reference to fire etc., is also only in the primary sense. *S.B.* I-1-6.

The second sense is evident when one refers to the very self of a physical element or a sense-organ as "*bhūtātman*" or "*indriyātman*". If an example could be taken from the scripture, the word "*jyotis*", used to denote fire in the ordinary language, is also used to refer to the sacrifice called "*jyotiṣṭoma*."

For these reasons the Sāṅkya says, the term "*ātman*" meaning "Self" may be used both with reference to sentient and insentient entities like Pradhāna though figuratively.

These contentions, says Śāṅkara, are quite baseless. The scripture under reference speaks of the Self as "*sat*" and teaches the student Śvetaketu that by realizing that "*sat*" as his own Self, he is released from all bondage caused by ignorance.¹⁴ It will be strange if the scripture is understood to teach the intelligent soul that its own nature and Self is the unconscious Pradhāna and that he should realize this in order to get release. To say this is an offence to the faultless authority of the scripture.

When somebody talks of his servant as his own self because that servant fulfills all his needs, the difference between the servant and the master is well known and therefore the expression: "The servant is my self" may be said to be figurative. But here the difference between Pradhāna and the soul are not so perceptible because both of them are imperceptible entities. Hence, Pradhāna cannot, even figuratively, be said to be the self of the individual soul.

Similarly, with regard to the expression "fire"¹⁵ one cannot have more than one fixed meaning for a word in the primary sense. It cannot have the meanings of "sacrifice" and "fire" equally in the primary signification. In the case of the words "*bhūtātman*" "*indriyātman*" etc., the false identity of the Self with the respective adjuncts like the element (*bhūta*) and sense (*indriya*) is to be understood.

14. *Chāndogya*: VI-14.2.

15. The word "*jyotis*" is applied to *Jyotiṣṭoma* figuratively because of the similarity of illumining capacity. In that sacrifice the *ṛks* are said to be luminous and are called "*jyotis*".

The context is that of Brahman, the Self. The teaching is to the intelligent soul, Śvetaketu. Hence it is clear that the word "sat" refers only to Brahman.

The Sāṅkhya while finally agreeing to the proposition that it is only Brahman that is taught in the scripture may yet say as a last ditch argument that Brahman being very subtle, the teacher introduces it to Śvetaketu by initially teaching that Pradhāna is the Self only to transcend this later when finally Brahman is taught.¹⁶

But Śaṅkara shows that nowhere in the scripture is it suggested that Pradhāna is initially taught as Brahman and later transcended and abandoned in favour of real Brahman. The sixth section of the *Chāndogya* where the whole theme is taught ends with showing that Brahman alone is the sense of the word 'sat.'

Again, the *Chāndogya* in the sixth section has declared that by knowing Brahman everything is known.¹⁷ If Pradhāna were the express sense of the word "sat", then this promise will be rendered meaningless. How can one understand, for instance, the nature of the soul which is of the nature of intelligence by knowing Pradhāna which is an unconscious physical entity? Consciousness can never be understood in terms of matter.

Further, it is declared in the scripture that in deep dreamless sleep, the person becomes one with the "sat" and gets the name of "svapiti."¹⁸ The name "svapiti" has been given to the sleeping person because etymologically it means that he attains his own Self (*svam apito bhavati*).¹⁹ The word "svam" means the Self or Ātman, which has been earlier in the passages called consistently as "sat" in the *Chāndogya*.²⁰ So in sleep one returns to his own Self.

16. This is according to *sthūla-arundhatīnyāya* wherein a star that is not Arundhatī is first shown as Arundhatī thus leading the person to look for Arundhatī in a certain direction. But at once, this is denied and the real Arundhatī is shown.

17. VI. 1-1; VI-1.3. This is the *pratijñā*: "ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam".

18. *Chāndogya*: VI-8-1.

19. *Chāndogya*: VI-8 1.

20. "svapiti" implies the mergence of all the distinguishing *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts in sleep.

Even the heart is called "*hṛdayam*" because the Self exists in the heart.²¹ It is inconceivable that the soul becomes inert Pradhāna when it returns to itself in the sleep. There is also the text "Becoming one with the Self he does not know anything inside or outside"²², which shows the returning of the Self to itself in sleep.

In the various texts, it has been unequivocally declared that Brahman is the cause of the world. There is no uncertainty anywhere. There are no places where Pradhāna is taught as the cause of the world or the atoms as such. This unity of purpose in the Upaniṣads is one substantial reason to believe that Brahman alone is the cause of the world, and not Pradhāna or anything else. To clinch the issue, *Śvetāśvatara* explicitly declares this.²³

21. *hṛdy ayam iti tasmād hṛdayam iti.*

22. *Bṛh. up.* IV. 3. 21.

23. *Śvetāśvatara*: VI. 1.

CHAPTER VIII

The Statement and the Refutation of the Vaiṣeṣika

Vaiṣeṣika holds an atomistic pluralism. The physical world is constituted by four kinds of atom, *viz.* earth, water, fire and air, each possessing a specific quality of its own and of a sphericity (*pārimāṇd-alya*). These atoms are at rest during the time when no creation takes place. They do not combine to produce any effect till they are disturbed by the moral forces of the individual souls called the unseen potency (*adṛṣṭa*). This potency and God's activity are considered by the Vaiṣeṣika as the efficient cause of world-creation.¹ That causes the conjunction of atoms in a specific way, such a conjunction, being therefore, the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*)² of the atomic aggregation which is the world.

In the first instance, two atoms combine to produce a binary compound. When this happens, the qualities of the two individual atoms pass into the compound also except the sphericity.

While the Vaiṣeṣika holds that the specific qualities of the constituent atoms pass into the effect, he arbitrarily restricts it to qualities other than the sphericity. The extension of the binary compound is not sphericity but *aṇutva* and *hrasvatva*, or minuteness and shortness.

1. It is a moot question whether the system accepts God. Śaṅkara, too, does not make explicit mention of God in his statement of the Vaiṣeṣika doctrine. But his use of the word "etcetera" after "adṛṣṭa" is interpreted to mean God also.
2. An inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) in the system is the substance that enters the effect as its material stuff. The non-inherent cause is that which enters the effect indirectly through the inherent cause and determines the quality of the effect. For instance, the threads are the inherent causes of the cloth, while their conjunction and colour are the non-inherent causes. The efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is, of course, the weaver.

Similarly, when two binary compounds combine to produce a quarternary compound, their qualities like colour pass into the resulting compound also but their minuteness and shortness *do not*. The quarternary compound possesses largeness (*mahatva*) and length (*dirghatva*).

In this way, in every new resultant compound upward, the special extension-form of the cause is not repeated in the resulting compound, though other qualities like colour do. In other words, the extension-form of the effect is new. It is said that such novelty in extension-form is dependent on the number of atoms in the compound itself, not on the extension-form of the causal compound.

Hence it appears that the cause produces an effect which is not exactly the same as the cause. It contains new elements, contrary elements.

At this juncture, the Advaitin may take advantage of this position and may try to argue that even if, in their doctrine, they (the Advaitins) urge that an intelligent Brahman is the cause of an inert world which is very much unlike it, the Vaiśeṣika cannot object.

To this, the Vaiśeṣika may have an answer. The reason why the specific extension-form is not reproduced in the resulting atomic compound is that the resulting atomic compound has in it an extension quite contrary to it due to the number of atoms constituting it. But in the case of the world, there is nothing in the world which counteracts the production of the intelligence of Brahman. The non-intelligent character of the world is not anything positively contrary to the intelligence but the absence of it. So the case of the Vaiśeṣika account of the atoms combining into compounds is not exactly parallel to the account of the Advaitin regarding Brahman being the cause of the world.

But, the Advaitin may rejoin, the instances are exactly parallel in that something that is present in the cause does not pass into the effect and something that is not found in the cause is present in the effect. At least this parallel to the world having in it something which is not found in Brahman, its cause, and *vice versa* exists.

Since the cause along with *all* of its qualities must determine the nature of the effect, it is arbitrary to say that the sphericity of the

simple atom alone does not in anyway determine the corresponding extension of the resulting binary compound. It is not reasonable to imagine that any part of the cause is ineffective while other parts are.

Nor can it be said that sphericity, for instance, in the simple atom, is not ineffective but does produce an effect, though quite dissimilar and contrary to it in the binary compound, namely, minuteness and shortness. For, the Vaiśeṣika has admitted that such effects as minuteness and shortness are not due to sphericity in the cause but due to other factors.³

Even granting that factors other than sphericity produce the minuteness of the resulting compound (like the numerical property of being two in the two simple atoms determining the new quality of minuteness of the binary compound), what is the speciality in the numerical property such that it is able to produce an effect while sphericity, though present equally in the cause, is not able to do so? Both being inherent in the cause, they must be capable of producing the effects equally.

When this does not happen, only one conclusion is possible. That is, the nature of sphericity is such that it does not generate a like effect, but only an unlike effect. If such a conclusion is open to the Vaiśeṣika, it is also open to the Advaitin to say that the intelligent nature of Brahman is such that it produces an inert world quite unlike it.

3. See *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* : (VII-1-9): "Bigness is produced from plurality, inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation." (VII-1-10): "The contrary of this (big) is the minute". (VII-1.17): "Thereby length and shortness are explained." The minuteness (*aṇutva*) of the binary is caused by the numerical property of being two (*dvaitva*) that is inherent in the two simple atoms constituting the binary compound. Similarly, the property of largeness (*mahattva*) is caused by the manyness (*bahutva*) inherent in the constitutive atoms of two binary compounds combining to produce the quaternary compound. The same principle must be understood to operate in similar combinations.

4. It is futile to object here that Brahman is a substance while the instance quoted above is a quality and that therefore there is no parallel. There is no rule that only substances are to be quoted as examples for substances, qualities alone for qualities. If there were a rule like that, Kanāda himself has broken it in his *Sūtras* (IV-2.2) where he has drawn upon the case of a quality (conjunction) as an example for substance (body).

Again, more obviously, when atoms conjoin, their conjunction results in a compound which exhibits new qualities, by virtue of which the result appears as a class different from that of the cause.

Refutation of Vaiśeṣika Atomism

The Vaiśeṣika arrives at his atomism by the conceptual regressive analysis of a piece of matter into its constituent elements. The limit of division is the atom. Many such atoms combine by the process of conjunction and constitute the world.

Since according to the Vaiśeṣika four irreducible elements, earth, water, fire and air are to be discerned in nature, four ultimate atoms must have to be assumed. So there are atoms of earth, water, fire and air. When the atoms combine, it is creation. When they separate, it is dissolution of the world. From the atoms of air, conjoining by the moral force of the actions of the soul, the element of air is produced. In this way, all the elements, and out of them, the entire world is produced.

Śaṅkara thinks that the system bristles with logical difficulties. His strictures against the system are as follows:

(1) The atoms are by nature separate from one another in the state of dissolution. Only by the motion imparted to them by *adṛṣṭa* or the moral potency of the actions of the souls, atoms tend to combine. But in the state of dissolution (*pralaya*), there is no action on the part of a soul. Action involves a body with its instruments like the mind to which the soul must be attached. That is not there in *pralaya*. The body itself cannot be produced without the combination of the atoms; and conversely, the atoms cannot combine without the bodily action of the soul. Thus there is mutual dependence between the combination of the atoms into body on the one hand and the action of the soul on the other. In other words, creation is impossible without action; and action is impossible without creation,

(2) Śaṅkara takes up the postulate of *adṛṣṭa* next for scrutiny. Where does the unseen moral force reside in order that creation may start? Does it reside in the soul or in the atom?

If it lies with the soul, it is of no use in setting creation in motion because the soul is not connected with the atoms. If the soul with

adr̥ṣṭa in it were connected with the atoms, creation will be continuous with no end because of the continuity of everlasting connection between the soul and the atoms with no principle of restriction or regulation as regards the commencement or cessation of the creative process.

A similar fate will overtake Vaiśeṣika if the *adr̥ṣṭa* resides in the atom.⁵ That is, there will be no cessation of creation because two factors needed for that to start are there, namely, the atoms and *adr̥ṣṭa*. Consequently, the world will be everlasting which is repugnant to the Vaiśeṣika.

And thirdly, the principle of *adr̥ṣṭa* itself cannot bring about the the creation because it is an inert principle. It can, therefore, neither act nor make anything else act. Such a power belongs only to an intelligence.

(3) Moreover, the process by which the atoms are combined must have to be a little more acceptably explained by the Vaiśeṣika. How do two atoms combine? Is it total interpenetration or only partial conjunction? If the first, there could be no increase in magnitude as a result of the combination with the result that even after the combination, the two atoms will be of the size of a simple atom only. In other words, the combination brings about nothing except that one atom has been swallowed up by the other. The world-process becomes abortive.

If to avoid these difficulties, the atoms combine in parts only, it is to admit that atoms have parts, which is contrary to the Vaiśeṣika hypothesis that atoms are partless. We are thus stuck up in a logical see-saw. If the atoms are to combine, it must be only partially; but then, atoms will cease to be atoms because they have parts and are no more indivisible ultimate particles of matter.

(4) The Vaiśeṣika account suffers grievously from a *regressus ad infinitum* in its theory of the combination of atoms. According to the Vaiśeṣika, two simple atoms combine and produce a binary compound which is said to be related to the two simple atoms by the

5. Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on II-2-13 does not answer this alternative. But the answer is implied in his answer to the other alternative.

relation of inherence (*samavāya*) because they are the cause and the binary compound is the effect.

Śaṅkara asks : If the binary compound is related to its cause, the two simple atoms, by the relation of inherence, this inherence itself being a separate category must be related to the simple atoms on the one side and the binary compound on the other. (This is necessary because, on the Vaiśeṣika hypothesis, all these three, the elementary atoms, the binary compound and the relation of inherence are different from one another.) Evidently, this will land us in infinite regress.

If it is suggested by the Vaiśeṣika that *samavāya* does not require another relation because it is a relation, not a thing which it helps to connect, Śaṅkara urges that similar consideration should be shown to conjunction also which is also a relation. But the Vaiśeṣika cannot admit this because, to him, conjunction, though a relation, is yet a quality related by *samavāya* (as every quality is supposed to be) to the things which it relates externally. Not only quality, even an action is related by *samavāya* to its own substrate. So, conjunction being a quality does not make any difference between itself and *samavāya*.

If *samyoga* is said to be different from the things it connects and that it therefore requires a further relation, *samavāya* also is, on the Vaiśeṣika's own admission, different from the things it relates.

Because of this infinite regress, even the binary compound cannot be formed. Whence, then, the creation ?

(5) What, further, is the essential nature of the atom ? Is it (a) always active or (b) non-active or (c) both or (d) neither ? None of these alternatives is possible. If (a), there will be no cessation of activity and there will be no *pralaya* at all. If (b), there will be no commencement of creation at all. If (c), it is a self-contradiction for anything to be both active and non-active at the same time by its own nature. If (d), the activity or non-activity will depend upon a third factor external to the atom. If the *adṛṣṭa* were that factor, *adṛṣṭa* being permanently there, creation will be constantly there. If *adṛṣṭa* were not there, then permanent non-activity of the atoms will result.

(6) If the atoms have colour etc., as the Vaiśeṣika contends, the atoms will cease to be atomic. Whatever has colour etc., is observed to be gross admitting of parts. The most elementary particle cannot have qualities.⁶

Kanāda holds the atoms to be permanent on the premise that if there did not exist something eternal, the negation in the expression "non-eternal" will not be possible. Everything in the world is non-eternal; so there must be something eternal in contrast to this, both as a logical necessity and a physical fact. The construct that is the world must be based on elementary particles which themselves cannot be constructs. So says Kanāda.

Śaṅkara's observation on this is that even if there were no permanent and eternal things like the atoms, still the usage of the word 'non-eternal' will be impossible.

Even assuming that the word "non-permanent" implies as a polar concept something that is permanent, that need not be necessarily the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas; it may be Brahman of the Vedāntins. Hence, from usages or expressions, we cannot arrive at any fact. Reminding us of Kant's refutation of the ontological argument for the existence of God, Śaṅkara tells us that the factual existence of anything is not established by a usage. It must be established by other proofs so that words and their reference arise together on certain objective proofs.

Kanāda's third reason for the permanence of atoms⁷ that non-perception of cause whose effects are seen is nescience, also is beset with difficulties, more to him than to others. For in that case, even binary compounds will become permanent and eternal since they too are imperceptible.

If the proviso is to be added to the above criterion to make it more acceptable that not only the cause should be imperceptible but

6. Kanāda's dictum that that which is permanent does not have a cause (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: IV-1. 1), when applied to the atoms, will render them impermanent and caused.

7. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: IV-1.4.

8. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: IV-1.5.

also that it should be uncreate (which will naturally exclude binary compounds which are created by causes), then, Śaṅkara observes, only absence of a cause will be the sole criterion for deciding whether anything is eternal. But that atoms are not causeless has already been shown in the earlier alternatives taking the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, IV-1.1.

If the third reason is to be restated and reformulated to surmount this difficulty pointed out by Śaṅkara as: "the impossibility of bringing about the causal atoms being divided into further parts and thus being destroyed is to be understood in this aphorism"⁹ to be the hallmark of permanency, Śaṅkara declares that the destruction of anything need not be for these two reasons. In other words, a causal substance need not be destroyed by the division into parts; nor an effect need be produced by the arrangement and conjunction of parts.

For, a new object may be brought into being by the same cause just passing into a new condition. Similarly, the destruction may just be the dissolution of the new form and merging into the original cause. For instance, the hardness of butter is dissolved by the heat of fire. There is in this instance neither origination nor destruction of cause. To Advaita, things evolve out of *avidyā* and merge into it again. So, on the Vaiśeṣika supposition, atoms will cease to be the permanent causes.

(7) According to the Vaiśeṣika there are four elements, namely, earth, water, fire and air with their respective qualities. The question is whether these qualities are found in their corresponding atoms.

Earth has smell, colour, taste, touch and is gross. Water has colour, taste and touch and is still subtle. Fire has colour and touch and is still subtler. Air has only touch as its quality and is the subtlest of all. Do the atoms of these elementary particles also have such diverse number of qualities?

The difficulty with this theory is that with the increase of qualities, the atoms should be increasingly larger in size. It is absurd to speak of one atom being larger than the other. That

9. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: IV-1.5. See S.B. II-2.16.

will unsettle their atomicity. And, there cannot be an increase of qualities without a corresponding increase in magnitude. As an alternative to this difficulty, one should suppose that an atom can have only one quality or all the four qualities. But this is not what is observed as has already been noticed.

Refutation of Categories

Now, Śaṅkara turns to the categories of the Vaiśeṣika. Six of them are acknowledged in the system: (1) substance (2) quality (3) action (4) generality (5) particularity and (6) inherence. The Vaiśeṣika theory is that these categories are fundamentally different from each other. This is as it should be, as otherwise, if they overlap, the rules of division will be grossly violated. Thus far, the doctrine passes muster.

But the Vaiśeṣika goes on to say, rather inconsistently, that some categories depend on others. For instance, quality and action depend on the substance for their existence. Apart from substance, they cannot exist.

In other words, when the substance is present, quality is present; when it is absent, it is absent. From this position, it will be but reasonable to hold that substance alone exists and according to its various forms, is designated as quality, action etc. One and the same person, Devadatta, is the object of various conceptions and names according to the conditions in which he happens to be at the moment.

But, then, is not smoke, for example, independent of fire though it cannot arise without it? This is true; but smoke is perceptible apart from fire. Substance and quality are not so perceived at any time. A white blanket, a black cow or a blue lotus are objects identified in and through their inseparable qualities. This obliges us to consider the quality as something which has its very being, its very self in the substance.

The Vaiśeṣikas have a concept of *ayutasiddhi* or inseparability.¹⁰ between a substance and its quality. By virtue of such a relation,

10. Between two entities, there is this *ayutasiddhi* when one of the pair is depending on the other for its existence as between the whole and its parts.

quality and substance, though different, may yet stand in dependence. A close analysis of this concept will reveal its insufficiencies in the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Is this *ayutasiddhi* or inseparability in place or time or nature?

Not the first because as between the cloth and the threads related by *ayutasiddhi*, the cloth having threads as its material cause occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth, while the quality of the cloth like its colour occupies the place of the cloth only, not of the threads.¹¹ The threads, in other words, produce the cloth and the qualities of the threads produce the corresponding qualities in the cloth.

But this is clearly inconsistent with the Vaiśeṣika assumption of substance and quality being inseparable in place.

If inseparability is in point of time, any two things in the world will come under this relation. For instance, the two horns of a cow have appeared together, and they must be supposed to be inseparable, which supposition, of course, is absurd.

If as the third alternative, inseparability is with reference to the very nature of things, then, all distinctions will vanish altogether between substance and quality, for instance, since, on this account, the two features are identical.

(8) Again, the distinction which the Vaiśeṣika draws between an external relation and the inseparable relation is pointless. Cause, for instance, is related to its effect by the inseparable relation which is *samavāya*. According to the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, the effect cannot exist apart from the cause, though the cause can exist apart from the effect.

But, Śaṅkara urges that any connection, even though it be *samavāya*, requires two terms. As such, there is no meaning in saying that cause and effect are connected by *samavāya*, because cause can exist without the effect.

If it were said that the effect is related to the cause after it has come into being, this will mean that first the effect comes into being and

11. See the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: I-1,10. "Substances originates another substance, and qualities another quality."

connected with its cause. Consequently, one has to grant that there is no *ayutāsiddha* or inseparable relationship between the effect and the cause, since the effect exists *first* without being related to the cause and *then* gets connected with it ¹². At best it will be a case of *saṃyoga*, not *samavāya*. But this is repugnant to the Vaiśeṣika.

And, there is no proof, according to Śaṅkara, for the existence of either *saṃyoga* or *samavāya* apart from the terms that they are supposed to relate. Merely because there are concepts and usages in language of such relations as "conjunction" and "inherence", it does not follow that there are realities corresponding to them.¹³ One and the same thing is called variously according to its place among other things. For instance, a man, Devadatta, may be considered as a Brāhmaṇa when his caste is concerned; is called a father or a brother, son-in-law, or father-in-law etc., in respect of his son, or brother or father-in-law or son-in-law respectively. Here the relationships are only a way of designating one and the same individual. Apart from this, the relationships are not real.

For another instance, one and the same number juxtaposed with various numbers is said to be ten, hundred or thousand.

So two things standing together are not only conceived and described as connected things but also become the objects of ideas and names like "conjunction" and "inherence". Except this, there is no proof to show that there are relations existing in their own right apart from the things that they relate.

Moreover, the Vaiśeṣikas believe that in order that the atoms may move they must come into conjunction with the soul. Similarly, in order that knowledge becomes possible the soul must come into conjunction with the mind.

This, however, is impracticable. On their own premises atoms, soul and the mind are partless and non-composite. No subterfuge is possible to make them unite.

Similar considerations will show that even the binary compound that has parts cannot be connected with the simple invisible atoms of

12. It will be a case of *saṃyoga*, not *samavāya*.

13. S.B. II.2.17.

which it is constituted. A binary compound is a whole; the elementary atoms are its parts. The Vaiśeṣika holds that the whole is related to its parts by *samavāya*. Śāṅkara urges that this is plainly impossible because what is partless (the elementary constituent atom) can never enter into any connection with what is composite (the binary compound) any more than earth can be connected with ether (*ākāśa*).

The Vaiśeṣika may persist in arguing for the existence of *samavāya* on the ground that *samavāya* relation must have to be postulated to exist as, otherwise, the observed relation of that which abides and the abode becomes inexplicable. Cause and effect actually stand in this relation of the abiding and the abode.

Śāṅkara denies this by saying that such a postulation will involve the fallacy of mutual dependence. Only when the separateness of the cause and the effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established. And only when the latter is established the former will be established.

The Advaitin believes that the effect is merely a certain condition of the cause. And that will account for the so-called abiding-abode relation between them.

That the atoms cannot be eternal is patent to those who look closely into the matter. The atoms, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, are by no means infinite. They are finite and limited in extension. That means, they must have spatial boundaries, as southern end, northern end etc. But this will militate against the indivisibility and permanence of the atoms.

The Vaiśeṣika doctrine assumes that the increase in magnitude results in a new substance. A continuous growth of a body as that of a living animal will mean on this account a continuous creation of a new body and destruction of the old ones. This comes perilously very near the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.¹⁴

14. This is the reason why the Vaiśeṣika system is called *ardhavaināśika* or semi-nihilistic.

Refutation of the theory of Samavāya

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas assume that cause and effect, though different, are yet connected by a special kind of relation called *samavāya* which unites them inseparably and intimately. Such an intimate relation produces the impression of identity in our experience. Hence Śāṅkara's analysis of experience is, the Naiyāyikas contend, superficial and lacks depth.

But, Śāṅkara subjects the concept of *samavāya* to criticism to show that it is empty and riddled with contradictions.

It is admitted by the Naiyāyika that *samavāya* is but a kind of relation and, as such, it relates two terms in the minimum. It is obvious that a relation brings into connection two terms which would otherwise remain separate. The incidence of relation is numerically a third factor in the complex of the terms related by it. This will involve the relation of the relation itself to the terms related. The relation itself is not the complex. It is an additional factor according to the presupposition of the Naiyāyika. Hence, Śāṅkara feels obliged to ask: (1) Does *samavāya* relation stand itself in need of a relation to each one of the terms it relates or (2) Does it not?

Both these alternatives are dangerous to the metaphysics of the Nyāya. If the first alternative is the case, it lands us in an endless series, an infinite regress, *samavāya* requiring a further relation to relate it to the terms individually, that relation requiring another one and so on *ad infinitum*.

If it were the second alternative, it will amount to saying that the terms are not at all related which is self-contradictory. We will be saying that the terms are related by *samavāya* without being related.

Of course, it is open to the Naiyāyika to suggest that the *samavāya*, though a relation, does not stand in need of a further relation for itself. In other words, it relates but is not related.

Śāṅkara urges that this prerogative should be extended to other kinds of relation also. One such is *samyoga* or conjunction which they admit but only as a quality of the terms it relates, related to

the terms by a further relation of *samavāya*.¹⁵ Yet it cannot be denied that it is a relation.

There is no reason, then, why conjunction (*samyoga*) should require a further relation of *samavāya*, if *samavāya* does not require it. As a kind of relation it stands on a par with *samavāya*.

Further the claim of the Naiyāyika that cause and effect are related by *samavāya* must be closely examined from another perspective. The Naiyāyika contends that the effect subsists or inheres in its cause. What one would like to know is: (i) Does the effect subsist or inhere in all the constituent parts of the cause as a whole? or (2) Does it subsist in each of these parts severally or distributively?

If the first, then, the effect as a whole cannot be known since it is impossible that all the parts of the whole are in contact with the senses. It is not as if the whole is known through even *some* of the parts. Take, for example, the fact of "manyness". Manyness is found in *all* the things that are many. Such a manyness cannot be fully known except through knowing everyone of the many things in which it inheres.

Nor could it be presumed that the whole (i.e. effect) inheres in the constituent parts of the causal substance *through* some intermediary parts, (as, in that case, the whole can be known through some of the parts as in the case of the knowledge of the whole thread in the garland of flowers through the knowledge of some of the flowers.

For this would involve the assumption, which is but gratuitous, of parts other than the parts of the cause originating the whole of the effect. Something is always seen to abide in another only through parts other than the ones of that in which it abides, as in the case of the sword in its scabbard. But such an assumption will lead to infinite regress as each one of the parts in the intervening parts will need additional intervening parts for them to abide through.

15. *Samavāya* is a relation between a substance and its qualities, cause and effect, etc.

To take the second of the alternatives mentioned above, that the whole (effect) inheres in each one of the constituent parts of the causal substance, this presents its own logical difficulties because we will find that when the effect is wholly in any one of the parts, it will not be in the other parts of the cause. A thread alone will now constitute the cloth; the other threads are profitless. Either the cloth, the effect, is in *this* part or in *that* part, not in both, unless it is divided against itself. Devadatta cannot be both in the city of Srughna and in the city of Pataliputra at the same time, unless he ceases to be an undivided whole.

But cannot a whole be present in all the parts equally and at the same time? Cannot, for instance, the generic character 'cowness' be present in all the cows, whole and undivided?

To this Saṅkara's reply is that 'cowness' is a concept and as such could subsist undivided and whole in many cows. This is because cows are not parts of "cowness" in any conceivable sense of the term. Nor are the cows the effects of cowness. The relation between a generic character and the species is not one of cause and effect, nor whole and parts. So, the example is not suitable.

Therefore, the whole is not and cannot be perceived in its parts severally as cowness is perceived in cows. If the whole were fully present in every part wholly, there will be the ludicrous consequence of the whole functioning through the part in which it inheres indifferently. A cow, for example, will yield milk from her horns or tail. Again the view that the effect does not prefigure in its cause entails the position that the effect has no locus in which it could inhere prior to its production. Yet an effect is produced. Such a production is an action and should have a locus in which the action could inhere. As Saṅkara puts it, an action without its own locus is a contradiction in terms.

When a jar is produced, for instance, the action of production must have a locus. What could this locus be? Certainly it is not the jar, for it has not yet come into being. Could it be the case that when the production of jar is taking place, the material and the efficient causes of the jar also are being produced so that the production as an action can have a continuing and developing locus? But this will have to include the two halves of the jar (due to the conjunc-

tion of which the pot is produced) and also the potter and ever so many other things besides, helping the production of the pot. In other words, when we say "A jar is produced", we would have said that "the potter and the other causal conditions are produced." But this is never the sense of the statement "A jar is produced". For, the potter and the operative cause are already in existence making the subsequent production of the jar possible.

An alternative meaning for the word "production" can be suggested here to avert the above logical difficulties. It may be said, for instance, that the production of the effect means "its connection with the cause and thereby coming to have an existence". But even thus, we are not above difficulties. For, it is not clear how an effect that is yet to be can ever have a connection with its cause. A relation to a cause is logically and even chronologically a prior condition for the effect to come to exist. If the so called effect gets into connection with a cause after it has come to exist, why, then, should there be a cause at all for it to come to exist? If it had a cause prior to its production why should it be connected with it after it comes to exist? In other words, nothing is an effect unless it originates from its cause and is already vitally connected with it.

Moreover, one can talk meaningfully of connection between two things both of which exist; not between two things one of which alone exists and the other of which is yet to be, nor between two things neither of which exists.

The language of the *asatkāryavādin* is meaningless. If the effect does not exist already in one form or another, it is not even possible to speak about it and setting a limit to it in time. One cannot say that the effect is non-existent prior to its production. The words "effect" and "its" do not have any referents. There can be a talk of a general negation but not of anything in particular. That is, we cannot meaningfully predicate non-existence to anything. Mere non-existence does not have a limit.¹⁶

But it is incumbent on Śaṅkara to answer the doubt that, if what he asserts is true, there will be no need for any causal operation

16. No one says : "The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pūrṇavarman."

because the effect exists already in the cause as non-different from it. If the effect were as much an accomplished fact as its cause, where is the need for any causal operation by which the effect is produced? There should be none. But this is not a fact. People do endeavour to produce the effects that they want. This will not happen if the effect were already existent in the cause prior to its production. If we are not to declare that all human efforts are useless and vain, we shall have to subscribe to the *asatkāryavāda*.

Śaṅkara's reply to this contention is that the causal operation is useful and necessary in that it rearranges the cause in the form of an effect. Śaṅkara hastens to add that even this form is not non-existent earlier as that would militate against the principle urged earlier that the non-existent can never be the object of any causal operation, nor could it be brought into being.

Again: because a thing is shown under a different condition it does not follow that it has become different or anything new has appeared in the meantime. An entity may be the same even under diverse conditions. A person is the same whether he is lying huddled up with his limbs drawn in or stands up with his limbs stretched. Similarly, a man is a father to his son but is a son to his own father; is a husband to his wife. He is a subordinate to his boss but may be a boss to his own subordinates. His behaviour attitudes and responses will be different according to the different situations and relations. Yet it cannot be gainsaid that he constitutes, in spite of all this, the same self-identical individual.

However, a difference could be pointed out to exist between the above example quoted by Śaṅkara and the example of a jar being produced. In the above example, there is no interruption or destruction of the persons concerned. But in the case of pot, the clay of which it is made gets destroyed, as it were, as clay, before the pot could be made from it.

To this, Śaṅkara's reply is that it is not invariably necessary that in every causal production the material cause ceases to be before the effect appears. For example, milk when it turns into curds somehow persists. For, the curds exhibit the properties of the milk. In the case of a seed growing into a plant, we should say that the potential

energy that is called in that form a seed gets actualised and becomes manifestly visible. This happens by the accretion of similar particles of matter. Birth and death are to be understood to be due to this accretion and separation of material particles making the unmanifest manifest and the manifest unmanifest again respectively. What appears in these conditions of manifestation called birth and disappearance called death is the same which is never destroyed. Otherwise the factus in the mother's womb and the child when it is born will be different. One and the same principle appears in diverse forms and is named cause or effect accordingly.

In fact, the futility of causal operation besets only the *asatkāryavādins*. For, if the effect is not existent but non-existent earlier than its production, the causal operation will have no object. On what does one causally operate? What is it that one wants to produce! When this is not given, how is one to function towards it? One can as well cut the ether into pieces by swords.

If it were to be suggested that the object of the causal operation is the material cause itself (for example, clay in the case of the production of the pot), it will have the odd result that an operation on the clay will produce something different from it, that is the pot.

Śaṅkara concludes that one fundamental cause appears as the cause and as the effect as the case may be and compares this process to an actor on the stage in various costumes.

CHAPTER IX

Refutation of Mīmāṃsā — I

The Mīmāṃsā system enquires into and determines the nature of religious duty. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* of Jaimini starts with the avowed aim of investigating the nature of Dharma or religious duty which can be known only through the scripture. The Vedas are the highest authority for us. And the Mīmāṃsakas believe that there is no author for the Vedas. Vedas, therefore, are self-valid and give us the knowledge of what is to be done and what not. The essence of the Mīmāṃsā teaching is that by the diligent performance of religious duties as laid down in the Vedas one goes to heaven which is the abode of highest beatitude for the Mīmāṃsakas. The sentences of the scripture themselves are injunctions or commandments as to what ought to be done or not to be done. If there is descriptive information, that derives its meaningfulness only from the imperatives. They are not meaningful in themselves, but only as subservient to imperatives.

Śaṅkara, even at the very commencement of his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* makes clear the difference between the inquiry into *dharma* and that into Brahman. The very first point that he makes is of fundamental importance. He says that the inquiry into Brahman has no logical connection with the inquiry into the nature of duty with which Mīmāṃsā is wholly concerned.

Desire to investigate into the nature of Brahman (*brahma-jijñāsā*) can arise independent of or prior to the desire to know *dharma*. Not only is it the case that there is no cause and effect relationship; there is not even chronological sequence between them. This is because the agent is different for the inquiry into Dharma and inquiry into Brahman. For instance, in sacrificial rites, certain operations

are subsidiary to certain others which are principal and primary.¹ The same person who has competency for the principal rite has competency to perform the subsidiary also. The sequential relation between the desire to inquire into Dharma and into Brahman cannot be said to be one of principal and the subsidiary and one cannot say that one who has the competency for the one automatically has the competency for the other.²

Again, the (*dharmajijñāsā* and *brahmajijñāsā*) have different content and goal. The science of religious duty has the attainment of heaven and its pleasures as its supreme goal. The means to this is the performance of religious duty as laid down in the Vedas.

But contrary to this, the knowledge of Brahman has release (*mokṣa*) as its result. Except its own rise, this knowledge does not look to any performance of sacrificial duty. The religious merit arising out of the performance of duty is the content of the inquiry into religious duty. But that religious merit (*dharmā*) is not there at the time of the rise of the knowledge of *dharmā*, because *dharmā* or the religious merit is the product of the performance of the religious act. But in the case of an inquiry into Brahman or the desire to know Brahman, Brahman which is already an established fact and which is not produced by the act of the person is the content.

Again: the scriptural injunctions (called *codanā* or imperatives or commandments inducing the person to act) generate the knowledge of *dharmā* even while they command the person to do a particular act. The scriptural texts, however, which inform about Brahman, the reality, just inform without asking one to do any act. Knowledge of Brahman which is an established fact is not a matter for commandment. Given the conditions, one just knows it as it is, just as there is no need for an injunction to anyone to see a pot once there is a sense contact between the eyes and the pot.

Again: the result of the performance of sacrificial acts is only the pleasures of paradise which are but temporary, being produced

-
1. Just as rites called *Prayājas* are subsidiary to the main sacrifice called *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The same person is competent to perform the principal and subsidiary rites. This competency is called *adhikṛta-adhikāra*.
 2. Thus there is no place of *aṅgāṅgi-bhāva* or *adhikṛtādhikāra* here between the two.

artificially in time and, therefore, destroyed in time. But knowledge is the means to eternal freedom.

Yet again : in the matter of knowing what is *dharma*, scripture alone is the only authority. But knowledge of Brahman is based not only on scripture, but also on personal experience since knowledge of Brahman reaches its fulfilment in experience of Brahmanhood. This is because Brahman is an established fact.

Moreover, action is dependent upon the agent's freedom and choice. For instance, one can travel either on foot or on horse or even may decide not to travel at all. To take another instance, from a religious act, in the sacrifice called *atirātra*, one is given an option to use the vessel *śoḍaśī* or no for the purpose of oblation of the *soma* juice into the fire. Yet, again, *agnihotra* oblation can be performed either before sunrise or after. These two examples show that one may do an act or may not and one may do it differently respectively. The feature of an act to be performed is that it admits of rules and exceptions and alternatives.

But knowledge is not of this nature. It has to follow the nature of the object as it is itself and given. Object A cannot be called B simply because one would have it so. One has no freedom of choice in identifying an object as this or that. To misrepresent an object is to commit an error. The object is independent of our knowing it as it exists even prior to our knowing it. In the same way, knowledge of Brahman should accord with the nature of Brahman which is already established independent of anybody knowing it.³

Do the Vedas teach only acts?

The Mīmāṃsakas believe that all the texts of the Veda have only one purport and that is to enjoin actions. Such injunctions to act may be either positive imperatives or negative prohibitions, *vidhi* or *niṣedha* respectively. Texts which do not prescribe either of these

3. Yet the knowledge of Brahman arises only through the Vedānta texts (*vedai-kavedya*) as it is not a sensible or even thinkable empirical object. Such a textual knowledge, however, must become direct realization and an intimate experience.

two are just meaningless.⁴ But it cannot be that Vedic texts are meaningless.

Hence, we can distinguish in the scripture the texts which are prescriptions from those which are descriptions of existing states of affairs. The latter may be names and consequences of Vedic acts or their agents or their deities and so on. As such, they are subordinate to and must be syntactically related with the texts which are directly prescriptive. Or else, such descriptive texts may derive their sense by prescribing meditation which is a mental act.⁵

For instance, the text "He cried" (*sorodit*) states of Agni that he cried because he was prevented by other gods. This is just a descriptive statement of what in fact happened. It is then a *siddhavākya*. But this has no meaning in itself taken in isolation, as there seems to be no use for it. The question "What if?" arises and must have to be answered. The answer is given by the scripture itself. There is a prescriptive prohibition that one should not offer silver as gift in a sacrifice. This is the intent of the Veda. The reason why silver should not be given as gift is that when Agni cried in anguish his tears turned into silver. In this way, the descriptive narration of Agni crying must get its meaning by being related syntactically to the prescriptive text prohibiting gift of silver in a sacrifice.⁶ Such texts as "*ātma ityeva upāusita*" (Meditate as the Self), prescribe meditation as an act.

The Mīmāṃsakas further state in support of their doctrine that since Brahman is an established fact and not one accomplished by an act, there is nothing that one could do or need do about it; there is nothing that is to be abandoned or acquired. As such, any teaching with reference to it is a wasteful exercise. A meaningful teaching must enable us to abandon or acquire by a purposeful act.

4. *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyaṃ atadarthānām.* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra*: I-2.1).

5. Hence, the Mīmāṃsā thinkers contend that Brahman which is a matter of established fact cannot be the teaching of the scripture. Established facts can be known even by *pramāṇas* like perception.

6. Such texts in praise or condemnation of an act are called '*arthavādas*'. Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that in order that a statement is to be meaningful it should be either directly a prescription or prohibition of an act or a statement connected with it as a praise or condemnation thereof respectively. In other words, all statements get their meaning only in relation to an act.

Śaṅkara's Criticism

First, it is not simply true that the Vedānta texts do not teach Brahman. There are numerous texts to prove this.⁷ By the application of the six criteria of meaning,⁸ it is well determined that Brahman is the content of the teaching of the upaniṣadic texts. It will be farfetched to assume that these texts talk about acts. When there is explicit reference to Brahman in these texts, one should not unwarrantedly understand any other meaning by twisting the text.

Nor can it be said that the texts refer to an agent because they explicitly deny the possibility of agent, act and instrument. The text: "With what would he see what?"⁹ repudiates all distinctions at the time of the realization of the unity of the Self.

It is true that Brahman is an established fact. But this alone cannot be the reason why it should be perceived by the senses and other *pramāṇas*. An established entity may be perceptible or may not. Perceptibility is not the criterion for an established fact existing prior to the operation of *pramāṇas*. Both Brahman and Dharma are imperceptible. Yet Brahman is an established fact but *dharma* is the result of an act. Something may be an established fact and yet may be imperceptible or unknowable by the *pramāṇas* like perception for the reason that it has no ordinary marks, is exceedingly subtle, is one and non-dual, and is the very Self of all things. This truth is learnt only from the scripture.¹⁰

The argument of the Mīmāṃsakas that Brahman being an accomplished fact existing in its own right independent of anybody

7. See for instance: *Chāndogya*, VI-2-1; *Aitareya*, II-1-1.1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II-5, 19; *Muṇḍaka*, II-2-11.

8. The six criteria are: (1) *upakrama-upasaṁhāra* (2) *abhyāsa* (3) *apūrvatā* (4) *phalam* (5) *arthavāda* and (6) *upapatti*. The beginning and end of a passage, repetition and emphasis of an idea, novelty, the declared fruit, praise or criticism of an idea and intelligibility in the light of reasoning are the determinants.

9. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-4, 13.

10. While *dharma* is learnt only from the scripture, Brahman is also realized in experience as one's own Self. Hence, *anubhava* also is a testimony in the matter of Brahman, as has already been stated.

knowing it, there is nothing to be done towards it and that, therefore, the texts supposedly teaching such a Brahman are rendered meaningless is patently fallacious. It is gratuitous to suppose that knowledge about an established fact is meaningless and that only a knowledge that leads to an act is meaningful. It cannot be denied that knowledge of Brahman, though not an act, removes ignorance and thus puts an end to the ills of life and death which is the greatest of all uses. To know that something is not a serpent but only a rope is indeed a great result since it puts an end to all fears.

Strictly speaking, knowledge through scripture does not so much teach us Brahman as it removes all that conceals the truth from vision.¹¹ Thus the scripture does not teach Brahman as 'this' or 'that'. Rather, it shows that Brahman is the Self of all and that it is not an object of any kind of knowledge. It seeks to destroy all the distinctions of the knower, known and the knowledge in the Self.¹² When such distinctions are rooted out by knowledge, Brahman which is the very Self of all, is self-luminously present. Brahman does not presuppose its own possibility. It is the presupposition of all that is possible. It is self-manifestly real. Therefore anything but itself is alone the object of knowledge. It makes even this knowledge possible.

The Mimāṃsaka view implies the transitoriness of all the fruits of its discipline. It believes that a heavenly state of bliss is obtained as a prize for the diligent performance of religious duties as enjoined by the scripture. But, Śaṅkara points out that all actions take place and produce their results in time. These results cannot but be ephemeral because of their temporality.¹³

11. *avidyākalpita-bhēdanivṛtti-paratvāt śāstrasya*. S.B. I-1.4.

12. *pratyagātmatvena aviśayatayā pratipādayad avidyākalpitam vedyā-veditṛ-vedanādi bhēdam apanayati*. S. B. I-1.4, See also *Kena*: II-3; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: III-4,2. Brahman cannot be the object of mind, according to these texts.

13. A result can be produced in four ways: (1) *prāpya* (2) *utpādyā* (3) *saṁskārya* and (4) *vikārya*. When one travels from one place to another, when one grows grains in a field, when one cleanses a mirror and when milk turns into curds by a natural chemical process, the results are but temporary and imply some need or want or modification. But release (*mokṣa*) according to Śaṅkara is eternal, pure Brahmanhood (*brahmabhāva*). Hence none of these four varieties of action is relevant there.

Action as a rule produces some change unthinkable in Brahman, the Self of all, as it is eternally pure. Even the so called purificatory rites (*samskāras*) do not produce any excellence in the Self. It is because the Self is identified with the body-mind complex by a false superimposition that it seems that the Self is purified. Really the so called purification belongs to the body.¹⁴

It may be asked here whether knowledge itself is not an activity of the mind. Śāṅkara answers that it is not so. There is a difference between knowledge and meditation. It is meditation that is a mental activity. We can look into this little more closely.

An act is defined as (1) the result of human free will and (2) as that which is laid down irrespective of the nature of the object towards which an act is prescribed.¹⁵ Meditation which is a mental act is of this character. As it is so, it is dependent on the free will of the person who does it. But knowledge, as it has been stated earlier, is independent of the human will. It results from the means of right knowledge which, in its turn, reports the object as it is in itself.¹⁶

Pañcāgnividyā is a classic example of meditation¹⁷. Therein things like ether, rain, earth, man and woman are meditated on as fire. This is only imagination and has nothing to do with the natures of these factors. Ordinarily, they are not considered as fire which has its own nature. Hence, it is possible to ask one to meditate on ether etc., as fire. But it is idle to ask one to meditate on fire as fire. We must know fire as it is. There could be no injunction regarding this in the form: "Know fire as fire". Nor can one say that he has chosen to see fire as fire or as something else as though he is free to take objects as this or that according to his whim.

14. *sa ca dehena samhata eva. S. B. I-1.4.* All actions are appropriate only when there is mistaken identity with the body-mind complex.

15. *kriyā hi nāma sā yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣa-citta-vyāpārādhi-
natvācca. S. B. I-1.4.*

16. *pramāṇatva yathābhūtavastuviśayam,*

17. In the Pañcāgnividyā, the five factors in the soul's journey viz. (1) ether (2) rain (3) earth (4) man and (5) the woman are meditated as Fire into which the soul is offered as oblation. See *Chāndogya: V-7, 7-1.*

To know fire is knowledge. To imagine ether or woman as fire is meditation. The latter is a mental activity while the former is not. Hence, Brahman-Knowledge is not and cannot be a matter of injunction (*vidhi*) or an act that follows it. Nor is it a mental act like imagination or meditation,¹⁸ because none of varieties of meditation is adequate to the concept of Brahman in Advaita. It is taught in the Upaniṣads that the individual soul *is* Brahman, not that it has to be imagined or meditated on by a fancy of the mind as Brahman. The statement like "That art Thou" is a cognitive one stating what it means. It is not a metaphor, nor symbolic. If it were a metaphor or a symbol, it cannot be claimed, as the Upaniṣads do, that an understanding of their meaning destroys the ignorance by the roots along with all possible doubts and uncertainties. In other words, the statement is cognitively and literally an assertion. It is declared time and again that one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman which will be impossible on a metaphorical or symbolic rendering of the identity-texts like "That art thou".¹⁹

Śaṅkara shows how then the texts like "The Self is to be seen", "Thou shalt know Brahman" etc., are to be interpreted. These

18. Brahman-Knowledge cannot be anyone of the following meditations. (1) *samṣat* (2) *adhyāsa-rūpa* (3) *viśiṣṭakriyāyoga-nimitta* and (4) *saṁskāra*. The first one is practised when *agnihotra* is meditated on as *aśvamedha* or when mind is meditated on as the *Viśvedevas*, for getting the same results. Similarly, if the Self is meditated on as Brahman it is *samṣad-upāśana*. Here the importance is to *aśvamedha* and *Viśvedevas*. The second one is practised when mind is meditated on as Brahman or the sun is meditated on as Brahman. Here the importance is to the mind or the sun. The third one is practised when *Prāṇa* in the body is meditated on as one with *Vāyu* as they have the common character of withdrawing other elements into themselves. *Prāṇa* withdraws every other vital air and senses into itself during sleep. *Vāyu* withdraws every other element into itself at the time of the world-dissolution. Applied to Brahman and the soul, the soul energises and makes the body grow as Brahman does the worlds. Hence the soul is meditated on as Brahman. The fourth one is where the person performing a sacred rite meditates on himself as Brahman to get qualified, just as the ghee to be used in a sacrifice is purified and becomes fit to be used by the look at it of the master's wife.
19. Cp. the *Kena* text: (1.3) where it is declared that Brahman is other than what is known and what is unknown alike. This means that Brahman is not an object of the act of knowing. Hence, in the expression "one who knows Brahman", the word "knows" does not signify a mental act. That which speech cannot express but that which makes speech possible cannot be an object of mind. (See *Kena* I. 4) It is the logical prius of mind. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-4-13.)

texts appear to be commandments or prescriptions or rules (*vidhis*)²⁰ Really, these apparent imperatives indicate how the Self is the object of supreme value. They praise the Self as the *summum bonum*. The use of such a praise is that man's mind is drawn aside from natural diversions to the Self. Man desires naturally his own happiness but runs after objects that are really a source of pain. He does not know where the source of happiness lies. To turn his mind towards the Self which is the seat of happiness, the scripture declares that Self is to be meditated on or seen. Hence it is not an injunction, though it appears to be one in grammatical form.²¹

Further, the Mīmāṃsaka claim that in the scripture statements that refer to action or subservient to such statements alone are true cannot be maintained. Even statements of matters of fact without any reference to a specific act are meaningful. For instance, in the texts like: "Sacrifice with Soma", "Offer curds", the words "Soma", "Curds", are nouns standing for specific objects. They have their own meanings whether the objects denoted by them are used in any action or no. Objects must first be known before they are used for any purpose. For instance, "What is Soma?" is a question that has a sense. To be used or not to be used for any purpose is a subsequent issue, having nothing to do with the knowledge of the objects. Hence, existential statements also are significant.

Just as the objects are first known as "this" or "that" though they are put to some use, so also Brahman-Knowledge is useful in destroying ignorance that is the cause of birth and death. This shows that existential statements have not only significance but also a use.

The negative texts bring this out very clearly. For instance, the prohibition; "X ought not to be killed" does not induce one to act. There is here neither an action nor a means to action. The import of the statement is that abstinence from killing is the cause for the absence

20. In Sanskrit the verbs like "draṣṭavyaḥ", "viddhi" "paśyet" have endings which indicate imperatives, the *tavya-pratyaya*, the *loṭ pratyaya* and *liṅ pratyaya* respectively. Sentences with such verbs and verbending must, according to rules, be taken as imperatives.

21. *hanana-abhāva* is the cause of *duḥkḥābhāva*.

of evil.²² There is no injunction or moral commandment to act, because there is no act involved. If anything, only abstinence from act is emphasized. That is the significance of the word "not" in "do not kill."²³ It cannot have the meaning of imperative to act. It serves to show the non-existence of the thing with which it is associated. Non-action is then the meaning of such negative texts. Yet if they are meaningless, many Vedic injunctions will be rendered null and void. Prescriptions are as much essential parts of the scripture as are prohibitions even according to the Mīmāṃsakas.

Jaimini's intention in saying that statements in the Veda not referring to any act are meaningless is only to show that the *arthavāda* like the stories and myths that have no cognitive meaning in themselves must be related to texts prescribing acts to acquire meaning. He does not refer to existential statements and negative statements (*siddha-vākyas* and *niṣedha-vākyas*) which have their own meanings independently of any act.²⁴

The Mīmāṃsaka's doubts whether there really follows the destruction of ignorance and the ills of birth and death after knowledge has arisen are baseless. Śaṅkara asserts that after realization there could be no recrudescence of the old life. A person who has renounced the attachment to objects cannot be governed by the pleasures of the objects any more. That is what the scripture intended to show by the statement: "To one who has lost the sense of attachment to the body, there is neither pleasure nor pain."

This "bodilessness" (*aśarīratva*) is possible because the body is after all the result of ignorance. When that ignorance is removed,

22. *hanana-abhāva* is the cause of *duḥkhābhāva*.

23. The negative sign "nañ" (not) has several meanings like non-existence, dissimilarity, smallness, absence of excellence and contradiction. The meaning here adopted appropriately is "non-existence".

24. Even the statement of Śabara "*dr̥ṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāboddhanam*" (Its meaning is clear; it is only teaching *Karma*), refers to the section of the Veda dealing with *dharma*; it does not apply to the entire corpus of Vedic literature. *tad-dharma-jijnāsa viśayavāt vidhi-pratiśedha-śāstrābhiprāyam*. Again: *tasmāt puruṣārthānupayogy-upākhyanādi-bhūtārthavāda viśayam anarthakya bhidhanam draṣṭavyam*. S. B. I-1.4.

the body-sense is removed. Bodilessness is the natural condition of the Self. It cannot even be said that the body comes to be possessed by the Self by the performance of action in the form of virtue and vice. For, such a position will involve a fallacious vicious circle. When there is a body, actions are done; body is produced when actions are done. This logical difficulty is a clear proof that the possession of body and performance of actions through it are illusory phenomena brought about by an initial ignorance.

The Self is essentially actionless. It is not possible to argue, as the Sāṅkhya does, that even by the very presence of the Self, a sort of agency accrues for the Self just as the very presence of the king is enough to make the servants act. Śaṅkara shows in reply to this argument that the analogy of the king is unsound since the Self does not have the appurtenances like the body, physical wealth and the team of servants as the king has. In fact, it is non-dual and does not have an other to it. The possession of body is thus the product of ignorance.

It may be objected that the sense of the attachment to the body is to be considered as *gauṇa* and not *mithyā*. While the latter will mean that the body is just an illusion, the former will mean that both the Self and the body are separately real and that yet the body will be figuratively attributed to the Self. An example of a *gauṇa* usage is the statement: "This boy is a lion," wherein it is known that the boy is not literally a lion. The difference between the boy and the lion are quite well understood here. But it is suggested by such a usage that the boy has some qualities like ferocity and fearlessness which are possessed by a lion. A person who does not, therefore, know the difference between a man and a lion the usage "This boy is a lion" will not be *gauṇa*. It will be an error and an illusion where one thing is mistaken for another. In other words, it is *mithyā-jñāna*. Therefore, the bodilessness (*aśarīratva*) of the realized souls is possible even while living in the body as the attachment to the body is the result of false knowledge, (*mithyā-jñāna*).²⁵

25. *jīvatopi viduṣaḥ aśarīratvam*. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV-4. 7. where body of the released soul is compared to the abandoned skin of the snake. Also *Gītā*: II-54. where *sthītaprajña-lakṣaṇa* is described.

Hence it is not at all possible to say that Brahman is taught in the Upaniṣads only as an object of meditation which is a mental act.²⁶

-
26. Thus, two views have been noticed and discarded here. The first view is of those who hold that the scripture teaches only religious act, not Brahman. The answer to this has been given by saying that by the application of the sixfold criteria of meaning and by the fact that Brahman-context is different from Karma-context, Brahman is taught in the Vedānta. The result of Vedānta is the destruction of ignorance and here there is no act to be performed at all. The second view is that though Brahman is taught in the Upaniṣads, it is only as subsidiary object of meditation or *upāsana* which is an act. To this it is replied that Brahman is not an agent nor an object of an act, being an established fact. The texts of the scripture are meaningful even when they state the existent fact. Contemplation and reflection are enjoined prior to realisation, not after. So the Upaniṣads teach Brahman only.

CHAPTER X

Refutation of the Mimāṃsā—II

Jaimini has said that the Self is an agent and as such, he is connected with religious act. Hence the knowledge of the Self also is subsidiary to action. Declarations otherwise that the knowledge of the Self is the direct means to release are mere praises (*arthavādas*) and nothing more. Such praises are common in the scripture.¹

An objection may be raised against Jaimini's position on the ground that the sacrificer is performing not only religious duties but also secular ones. He is a common agent of both sacred and secular obligations. Hence, it is not justifiable to connect him as a Self with sacrificial act alone and to further say that the knowledge of the Self of the sacrificer is only subsidiary to the religious act. Only something that has no place anywhere except sacrificial act must always be related to that sacrificial act as a subsidiary to it.

Jaimini's reply to this objection is that the knowledge of the Self as different from the body is not at all relevant or useful except in sacrificial act. It has no use in the performance of secular acts. Whether there is a Self as different from the body or no, the worldly activities are carried on by men for the realization of material ends in the world.

But sacrificial acts have their use in an after-life. They have an eschatological significance. Without a knowledge of the Self as

-
1. The vessel called *juhu* must be made of a specific wood (*palāśa*) and used in the sacrifice. Only then, the sacrificer will not bear anything like a blame. This latter statement is a praise for the use of a vessel made of a specific wood. It is an *arthavāda*. Its meaning and use lies in the injunction that only the vessel made of *palāśa* must be used in a particular sacrifice. Hence it is subsidiary to religious act. Similarly, the soul which is different from the body is related to sacrificial act and as such the knowledge of it is a part of religious act.

different from the body the conception of a life after death is meaningless. Such a life is gained only by the sacrificial acts.²

Again, scripture unequivocally declares that knowledge is a subsidiary to religious act. Whatever religious act is done with knowledge and faith is said to be of great power.³ It is again said that knowledge and act follow one to the other world.⁴

There are again texts that show that only for one who has acquired the knowledge of the Self there is full eligibility for the performance of religious act. It is said that after completing the studies with the teacher, one enters the married life, duly performing the ordained religious duties. Eventually he goes to the Brahmaloaka.⁵

That one should perform the religious duties as ordained in the scripture till the end of life is also the imperative command of the scripture.⁶

Śaṅkara's Criticism

Śaṅkara refutes the above arguments on the following grounds.

(1) If the soul that is the agent, enjoyer and transmigrating had been taught in the scripture as different from the body then it is possible to say that the knowledge of the Self is merely praised as an independent means to release.

But the fact is that it is the supreme Self (Brahman) which is greater than the transmigrating and conditioned soul and which has no need to act and which is stated as free from all defects and blemishes is taught in the Upaniṣads. A knowledge of such a supreme

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* states that Janaka performed sacrifices. (III-1.1.). See *Chāndogya*: V-II.5. Janaka was a person who had gained knowledge of the Self. Yet he performed sacrificial act. Uddālaka taught the knowledge of the Self to Śvetaketu. This shows that teachers who were householders had knowledge of the Self. If mere knowledge unconnected with religious act could yield release, why should Janaka, Uddālaka and others perform sacrificial acts that involve so much of labour? If one could get honey at one's own feet, why should he climb the mountain?

3. *Chāndogya*: I-1.10.

4. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-4.2.

5. *Chāndogya*: VIII-15.1.

6. *Iśa*: 2.

Self cannot be pressed into the service of sacrificial act. In fact, such a knowledge nullifies the very possibilities of such acts.

(2) Great sages have denounced the need for religious act. Knowledgeable Kāveṣayas saw no need for sacrificial and religious act including the study of scripture. Knowing the Self, the Brāhmaṇas abandon their earthly mode of life with family and become mendicants. Even Yājñavalkya after teaching to his wife the pathway to the felicity of immortality walked out of the house renouncing the worldly attachments.⁷

Janaka performing the sacrifice is mentioned in the context of meditation on a personal God. Act is intelligible in that context, but not in the context of the attributeless Brahman.

(3) The text quoted in support of the contention that an act along with knowledge is more powerful and quicker in its results refers, not to all meditations, but only to one *vidyā* or meditation known as the *udgītha vidyā*, meditation on Om.

(4) It is not true that knowledge and act follow a man into the next world because it is not the same man whom they are said to follow. Act follows one and knowledge follows another. One who is eligible for knowledge cannot be the same as one who is eligible for act.

Strictly speaking, this talk of knowledge and act in the context does not refer to one who desires release (*mumukṣu*). They rather refer to the one who is still bound by ignorance.

(5) The statement⁸ that one who practises the study of the Vedas and other religious duties leading the life of a householder goes to Brahmaloka must be understood only with reference to the study of scripture and religious act. It cannot be taken to comprehend the knowledge of the Self which is an independent means to release.

(6) The rule for performing one's religious duties till the end of one's life as laid down in the *Īśa upaniṣad* does not specially mention

7. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: III-5.1; IV-5.15.

8. *Chāndogya*: VIII-15.1.

the realized soul. It is a general statement. From that, therefore, one cannot conclude that the released soul also should perform acts. Or else, if the released soul is thought to be connected with acts, it should be understood that such a statement is a praise of the knowledge of the Self. Though a released soul performs acts till the end of life, the acts do not bind him by virtue of his knowledge.

(7) The released souls experiencing the fruits of knowledge do not feel any interest in any act that will fulfil any other wants.⁹

(8) The result of knowledge is immediately, here and now, experienced. The result of acts is in the future. For this reason also, knowledge is an independent means to release.

(9) The scripture declares that the illusion of the world of plurality is destroyed by right knowledge. When everything has become the Self, with what will one see and what will he see?¹⁰ When all differences have been removed, there is no possibility of any act.

(10) Knowledge is mentioned with reference to Sannyāsins who have renounced all acts. At least here, there cannot be any doubt whether knowledge is not subsidiary to act. It is clear then that knowledge is an independent means to release.

Knowledge and Religious Act

Does the knowledge of the Self depend on the religious act for the production of the result of release? Or is it independent? This question is repeatedly taken up by Śaṅkara with an emphatic reply that it is independent as the direct means to release. However, he points out that religious act is helpful in the generation of knowledge. Śaṅkara, following the *Brahma-sūtras*¹¹ explains his stand as follows.

Knowledge is the sovereign independent means to release and to the destruction of ignorance just as a lamp is the only means of

9. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-4, 11. "What are we going to do with progeny when the Self is immediately experienced?" is the attitude of the released souls. Thus they do not do anything to fulfill a wish.

10. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-4, 14.

11. III-4, 25-7.

dispelling darkness. But this does not mean that there is no place for religious act at all. They do have a role to play in bringing about the appropriate conditions for the rise of knowledge. The scripture itself makes this clear.¹²

Just as the horses are used only in drawing the chariots but not in ploughing the land, so acts are useful only in the origination of knowledge, not in the removal of ignorance and attainment of release. Even control of the mind and the senses are the conditions for the origination of knowledge. But they are the more intimate means (*antaraṅga sādhana*), while the religious acts like sacrifice are external (*bahiraṅga*) conditions for the desire to know (*vedaneccā*),¹³

Śaṅkara says in one place that though curds and poison cause fever and death respectively, they afford satisfaction and health when they are combined with jaggery and mystic chants respectively. Similarly, religious act as a means to the desire for knowledge may be the cause for release through knowledge indirectly.¹⁴

Even here, religious acts that are conjoined with meditation are much more potently instrumental in the production of the desire for knowledge than the ones which are routine physical repetition of religious acts. But all acts whether informed by meditation (*upāsti*) or uninformed are instrumental to the production of the conditions for the rise of knowledge. They differ only in the quickness or slowness in point of time.

Some people argue that the performance of the obligatory religious duties that are to be done daily or on prescribed occasions¹⁵

12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: (IV-4.22) declares that "the Brāhmaṇas desire to know the Self by the study of the Vedas, sacrificial offerings, gifts, austerity and dispassion". The desire to know the Self is generated by such religious acts and therefore, there is instrumentality for such acts in producing the conditions for the rise of knowledge. Brahmacharya is praised as a sacrificial act. (*Chāndogya*: VIII-5.1). Sacrificial act is thus shown to be instrumental in the rise of knowledge. See also *Kaṭha*: II-15. Religious act results in pure character and cleanliness of mind in which knowledge arises.

13. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-4.22 and IV-4.23. Both the religious acts and the cardinal virtues are laid down as imperatives for the rise of knowledge.

14. *S. B.* IV.1.16. *ārādupakāraṇatvāt karmaṇaḥ*.

15. *nitya-naimittika-karmas*.

nullify the sins (*pratyavāya*), the religious acts that are done with a selfish motive and acts that are prohibited.¹⁶ The acts done in the past that have produced the present body are exhausted and neutralised by enjoying and experiencing them in this life. In this way when the present body has fallen on death, no fresh body is produced as there are no *karmas* left over that cause a body. Such a liberation which is returning to one's selfhood does not, therefore, require any knowledge as its means. It is done automatically by the exhaustion and elimination of all *karmas*.

But this, Śaṅkara points out, is wrong. In the first instance, there is no proof or authority for the above view. Certainly, the scripture does not mention any such view. It seems to be rather the conjecture of the human reason. The reason seems to be that since birth is caused by *karmas*, there will be no birth if *karmas* are neutralised.

Secondly, the future possibilities and potentialities of the stock of *karmas* are incalculable. *Karmas* do not produce their results all at the same time. Some produce the results at some time, others at other times. Hence, the experience in the body in the current life does not exhaust all the *karmas* in one lifetime. One can have no conception as to the remnant possibilities and the number of future births and bodies. Such remnant *karmas* are stated to exist by the scripture.¹⁷

It cannot be said that the *nitya* and *naimittika karmas* (daily and occasional obligatory duties) will nullify and neutralise those remnant possibilities of the future also. The reason is that these obligatory duties are not incompatible with those remnant possibilities of *karmas* in the future. The religious acts of the past with their consequences are auspicious (*puṇya*) and can never be counteracted by other auspicious acts, though the inauspicious acts, perhaps, can. But a body and a birth are caused, not only by bad acts, but also by good acts.

Even the bad acts cannot be known to have been totally destroyed by the performance of the obligatory duties.

16. *kāmya* and *niṣiddhakarmas*.

17. *tadya iha ramaṇiya caraṇāḥ*. *Chāndogya*: V-10.7.

Moreover, there is no proof for saying that by the performance of the obligatory duties nothing more happens than the non-production of sins. It is possible that from such a performance of obligatory duties, other results, too may follow.¹⁸

No one can say with certainty or authority that except in the absence of the knowledge of the Self, the motivated and prohibited acts could be said to be absent or impossible. Even the subtlest of intellect commits subtle errors.¹⁹ If Brahman-Ātman identity is not accepted along with the fact that knowledge is the means to realize that identity, there could be no expectation of release. Like the heat of fire which is its natural property, bondage to *karmas* will be unredeemable because *karmas* are always bound to produce their results.

18. Āpastamba has said that though the mango tree is grown for the sake of the mango fruit, the tree incidentally gives shade and fragrance. Similarly by the performance of the duty certain other incidental results may be produced.

19. *sunipūṇānāmapi sūkṣma-aparādhadarśanāt.*

CHAPTER XI

Refutation of Mīmāṃsā III

God and Karma

Do the *karmas* produce the results on their own accord or are their results judged and apportioned by God? To this question, the Mīmāṃsakas answer that the *karmas* produce their own results in the fulness of time. No God need be postulated for this purpose. What, of course, is generated when a religious act is completed is a moral potency called *apūrva* which in its turn produces results as and when the proper time for fructification has arisen.

This position of the Mīmāṃsā is refuted by Śaṅkara.¹ It is only reasonable that the moral acts wait for God's decision on them for proper distribution of results. Only an intelligence of the dimension of God's that has created the world can also conceivably effect the distribution of results according to one's deeds.

Karmas perish and are momentary and, hence, cannot be expected to produce results at a later time. That which is extinct cannot be productive of results after a lapse of time. It cannot be argued that the *karmas* perish but not before producing their results which are later experienced by the agent. For, prior to getting related to the experiencing subject, it is meaningless to talk of a result. If it is said that the *karmas* produce, not the results, but only the moral potency (*apūrva*) which alone yields the results at the appropriate time later, this also is not reasonable. *Apūrva* is an inert principle and as such cannot function in an intelligent way without being superintended by an intelligence.

Moreover, there is no proof for the existence of *apūrva* at all. If it is said that without the postulation of *apūrva*, the production of

1. *S.B.* III. 2. 38, 41.

results and consequential experience of pleasure and pain at different times is unintelligible and that, hence, *apūrva* is established by the proof of *arthāpatti*, that, too, is hard to maintain. *Apūrva* is not the only explanation available. Even the postulation of God fully explains the distribution of the fruits of *Karma*.

Scripture, too, is an authority in this matter.²

An incidental question is to be answered here. If God is the distributor of the results of the acts of man, would not the charge of partiality and cruelty on the part of God become unavoidable? Some people are all the time enjoying wealth and pleasure while others have to their lot both pleasure and pain alternately,³ if not unredeemed misery all through. Could a just and all-merciful Providence be the author of such cruelty and partiality?

Śaṅkara answers⁴ that no charge of the above crimes could be brought against God because He creates only according to the deeds of the souls. God is comparable to the clouds in this respect. Clouds are responsible for bringing rain that helps the growth of grains like rice and barley - But their growth is not everywhere the same. Individual differences are there which must be traced to the respective potencies of the deeds.

Similarly, God is but the common cause for creation. The individual variations are caused by the respective merits of the souls acquired by their own acts.⁵

But there is a snag in the above argument. No acts and, therefore, no merits are present prior to creation and therefore, at the first creation all must have been created the same. The problem remains how the souls could have acted differently when there was nothing to produce the individual variations at the beginning.

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-4. 24. "The Self distributes food and wealth." See also *Gītā*: VII-21.

3. Śaṅkara puts this argument in the mouth of Jainism. See III-2. 40.

4. *S. B.* II-1-34.

5. See *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*: III.8; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: III-2. 13, *Gītā*: IV, 11.

Śaṅkara does not find this a difficulty because the series of birth is beginningless⁶ and it is impossible to say when creation started. What we can say is only that the acts of the souls determine their merits according to which their lot is determined by God.

-
6. See *Gītā* XV-3; *Ṛk-saṃhitā*: X-190, 3. If the series had a beginning, that means that creation with all the souls and objects in it would have been non-existent earlier. Its taking place at a time would have rendered it causeless. In that case, even the released souls will revert to bondage. Pleasure and pain will arise without any reason. All this will happen because no cause could be ascribed to the individual variations.

CHAPTER XII

Refutation of the Pāśupata view

The Pāśupata religion holds that God is only the efficient cause and not the material cause also for the world. Śaṅkara refutes this view, thereby refuting all those who aver that God is the efficient cause alone, to wit, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas,¹ Pātañjala Yogins. The Māheśvaras who are of four classes viz. Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Kāruṇika Siddhāntins and Kāpālikas are also of the view that God is the efficient cause alone.²

The view is now refuted by Śaṅkara. God cannot be the cause of the world at all on the account of the Pāśupatas and others of their ilk since, according to them, God is only the *adhiṣṭhātā* or efficient cause of the Pradhāna as well as the Puruṣa. As mere efficient cause, God is open to several charges. If God assigns to souls diverse positions as high, low and middle arbitrarily as the efficient cause he will be guilty of partiality and preferential treatment to some. Such a bias makes God like an average human being. Man, in that case, creates God in his own image. But this is hardly acceptable.

It cannot be maintained that the various positions are governed by the moral acts of the souls themselves and that, therefore, the positions are the deserts that the souls themselves deserve by virtue of their moral worth. For, such a contention will land us in the fallacy

-
1. The *Brahma-sūtras* (I-4-23, 24) teach that God is both the material and the efficient cause. As such, any view that limits God to being the efficient cause alone of the world is repugnant to the Vedānta and its view that the individual Self is substantially Brahman alone.
 2. Śaṅkara says that the Māheśvaras teach five categories as given by God himself to the souls. 1) Pradhāna and Īśvara who are causes 2) The evolutes of Pradhāna which are the effects 3) Yoga or the meditation etc. 4) the daily discipline or *vidhi* and 5) Release or (*duḥkhānta*).

of mutual dependence. God will require the moral worth of the souls for awarding them positions in life and moral worth will have, in turn, to be determined by the moral acts to which the Lord impels them according to their respective positions.

Nor can it be said that such a dependence is not a serious fallacy since these two factors *Karma* and God, are beginningless. At all times, this mutual dependence also is beginninglessly present, and hence, besets the scheme of things inexorably.

Again, even as the Naiyāyikas say, all activity starts from some selfish motive for the fulfilment of some self-interest.³ If this were so, their own concept of God in action will make their God motivated by self-interest. A defectless person never proceeds to act either for himself or for others. This will, therefore, reduce God to the status of an average human being.

This defect becomes particularly pronounced when we take the Yoga system wherein God is but the most excellent soul and is unattached and indifferent. Such a God has no reason to act.

Again, a God who is different from Pradhāna and the soul or who has relation with them cannot be the inducer or the efficient cause towards them. He cannot be conjoined with them by *samyoga* because neither He nor they have parts and all the three of them are all—pervasive. Nor can He be related to Pradhāna and to the soul by *samavāya* because there is no proof to say that God is the locus (*āśraya*) and that they are located in them. Nor is it possible to conceive of a causal relation because that is precisely the question at issue.⁴

If it were said that even for people like the followers of Yoga, there is the authority of omniscient beings like Kapila who have

3. *Nyāya sūtra*: I-1. 18. *pravartanā-lakṣaṇā doṣāḥ*.

4. On the Advaita theory, on the contrary, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause (*abhinna-nimitta-upādāna-kāraṇa*). The so called relation between Brahman on the one hand and the world and the soul on the other is one of identity or, preferably, non-difference (*tādātmya*). Moreover, Advaita bases itself on scriptural authority and hence can overrule the empirical considerations if they are contrary to scripture. The others like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believe in the power of reason and they must not deviate from the experiential proof.

given the schools their scripture, this will involve mutual dependence. The omniscience of these teachers like Kapila is established by the texts of authority they have created and the authority of their texts is established by their omniscience.

The believers in the efficient causality alone of God draw upon the analogy of the potter making a pot with clay. The potter uses the clay at his disposal because clay is a material substance with form and extension. But one cannot compare the Pradhāna with clay and, God with potter. Pradhāna is formless and invisible and therefore cannot be the material means to make the world with.

But does not the soul make use of the sense-organs which do not have form and are imperceptible? Similarly, God also can use the material of Pradhāna which is formless and imperceptible. But this contention is wrong. That the senses are used by the soul is inferred by the fact of enjoyment. But there is no such enjoyment found in the case of God from which we can make a similar inference regarding Pradhāna being used. Besides, if God were possessed of senses, as in the case of man, he will become indistinguishable from man.

If God were supposed to be the ruler of the world as a king with a body is a ruler of his kingdom, God must be endowed with a body. This is plainly wrong. Bodies come into being after creation. If, on the contrary, God has no body, He can never rule or make things act. With the body He becomes like a created being. Without a body, He cannot act.

Again these philosophers who argue that God is the efficient cause and ruler of the world also say that He is omniscient and eternal. They also hold that Pradhāna and the souls, too, are eternal. All these three, God, world and the souls are different from one another.

The question now is: Does the omniscient God determine the number and magnitude of the Pradhāna and the souls or no? On both these alternatives, there are difficulties. If yes, it will entail limitedness of God, Pradhāna and the souls because the number and magnitude are determined and known by God.

The very fact that there are three categories, God, Pradhāna and the souls shows that they are limited by each other. Again, God

knows the number of souls. He knows how many are liberated at any time. So the souls are known to be limited.

Pradhāna is intended for the soul's enjoyment and for God's use in creation. It also is limited and thus has an end. If, accordingly, Pradhāna has come to an end, what will God use and control? Of what will He be the 'Lord? Of what will He have omniscient knowledge? Since there is no Pradhāna of which God is the Lord and the knowledge of which is omniscience, God's Lordship and his omniscience will be at an end. Similarly when all the souls are liberated, God will have no cause to act. His so-called Godhood will come to an end. In this way, God, Pradhāna and the souls will come to an end. Whichever has an end will have a beginning also. If the three ultimate categories have a beginning and an end, nihilism will be the result if we answered in the affirmative to the question whether God knows the number and the magnitude of Pradhāna and the souls. If the answer is in the negative, God will cease to be omniscient. This is the dilemma that the philosophers like the logicians will have to face.

CHAPTER XIII

Refutation of the Pāñcarātra or the Bhāgavata Doctrine

Śaṅkara, after rejecting the view that God is only an efficient cause and not the material cause also, now proceeds to consider the Pāñcarātra view. It is true that the Pāñcarātra view is the same as that of Śaṅkara in so far as the causality for Brahman is concerned. That is, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world.

But there are the other parts of the Pāñcarātra system which raise doubts. The doctrines of the system are as follows:

Bhagavān Para Vāsudeva alone is the reality (*paramārtha-tattva*). He is of the nature of pure consciousness. He manifests Himself in four forms or *vyūhas* which are: (1) Vāsudeva (2) Saṅkarṣaṇa (3) Pradyumna and (4) Aniruddha. Among these, Vāsudeva is the Supreme Lord. Saṅkarṣaṇa is the soul. Pradyumna is the mind. Aniruddha is egoity (*ahaṅkāra*). Of these, again, Vāsudeva is the cause while the other Vyūhas are the effects thereof. Vāsudeva is not only the supreme reality but also the supreme goal. One has to endeavour to reach him.¹

Now, that one Vāsudeva manifests Himself as four is a doctrine that is acceptable to Śaṅkara. But Bhāgavata theology says a few more things which are not at all reasonable. According to them, from Vāsudeva Saṅkarṣaṇa appears, from Saṅkarṣaṇa Pradyumna appears, from Pradyumna Aniruddha appears. The difficulty is in accepting that Saṅkarṣaṇa, the soul, could have a beginning. If it

1. The means are fivefold: (1) *abhiḡamana* or attendance at the temple with the purity and concentration of body, mind and speech. (2) *upādāna* or preparing the auxiliaries for worship. (3) *ījyā* or worship. (4) *svādhyāya* or the chanting of the holy *mantras* and (5) *yoga* or continuous meditation.

had a beginning, it will have an end also. Consequently, release will be a meaningless concept. It is the soul which is in bondage that is released. It persists in both these states. An impermanent soul will have no such persistence.

Secondly, the Bhāgavatas believe that from Saṅkarṣaṇa, the soul, is originated Pradyumna, the mind, which is an instrument. This notion seems odd because nowhere is it found that the instrument gets originated from its user. Similar consideration makes the assertion that from Pradyumna, the mind, Aniruddha, the egoity, is born unacceptable. This stand of the Bhāgavatas seems rather arbitrary since there is neither empirical nor scriptural evidence for it.

Even if it were maintained, as by the Bhāgavatas, that Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are not souls or mind or egoity in the ordinary sense of these terms and that they are all Lords even as Vāsudeva is, possessing the sixfold² divine attributes like knowledge, lordship, etc., being devoid of other causes for themselves, are eternal and non-originated, the defect of origination and non-eternality is yet present.

This is how it happens. If the Bhāgavatas believe that these four lords possess equal attributes and yet differ from one another and do not have one and the same Self, then there is no need to postulate all of them as lords. Even one among them will do.

Not that the Bhāgavatas are unaware of this. In a way, they do accept this criticism because they say that Vāsudeva is the only highest reality. If the other three Vyūhas are but the manifestations of Vāsudeva, even then, there cannot be origination for them, for, they are the same reality in different forms. If they are the same in reality, there is no need for them to be produced as though they are different.

2. *jñāna*, *aiśvarya*, *śakti*, *bala*, *vīrya*, and *tejas* are these six attributes. The capacity to know the objects of the world individually and collectively is *jñāna*. Unobstructed sovereignty is *aiśvarya*. Being the material cause of the world is *śakti*. The effortless ease and spontaneity of protecting and maintaining the creation is *bala*. In spite of being the material cause, the power to remain changeless is *vīrya*. Independence of external aid in creating and control over others is *tejas*.

Only things different from one another can be causes and effects, like the clay and the pot. The Bhāgavatas do not, in fact, recognize any difference among the Vyūhas. Also, there is no reason why the Vyūhas are only four. All the things that are found in creation are *vyūhas* of the Lord as His manifestation.

Again the Bhāgavatas say in one breath that knowledge etc., are attributes (*guṇas*) and that the *vyūhas* are the owners of these attributes. And in other places, these attributes are stated to be selves or Vāsudevas.

Finally, the Bhāgavata system based on the Pāñcarātra Āgama is itself repugnant to the Vedas as it is declared there that one who has learnt even one letter from Pāñcarātra is superior to one who has mastered all the four Vedas.³

3. Śaṅkara quotes a statement which says that Sāṅḍilya not being able to obtain the truth from the four Vedas, studied this Pāñcarātra Sāstra. *caturṣu vedeṣu paraṁ śreyo'labdhvā śāṅḍilya idaṁ śāstram adhiḡatavān.*

CHAPTER XIV

Refutation of the View that the word "Ānandamaya" refers to Brahman

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* there is a progressive definition of the Self as food, vital airs, mind and intellect and finally as consisting of bliss. These five are the sheaths in which the Self is found covered. The outermost of them is the physical body and the subtlety increases with every sheath till we come to the fifth that is *ānanda-maya*.

The question that is raised is whether this *ānandamaya* is the highest Brahman or the Self or it is only one of the sheaths, though penultimate.¹

Sometimes it is urged, (as is done by one Vṛttikāra and by Rāmānuja later) that it is only the supreme Brahman that is signified by *ānandamaya*. The view opposed to this saying that *ānandamaya* is the transmigrating soul is held for the following reasons. (1) "Ānandamaya" is mentioned in the series of *annamaya* etc., which are all other than Brahman. (2) Members like *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* etc., are mentioned for this *ānandamaya*. But Brahman is partless and is not related to *priya* etc. (3) Ānandamaya is said to be having his abode in the body as it is inside the *Vijñānamaya-śarīra*. Being in the body, pleasure and pain cannot be avoided for it.

The above considerations are now proved to be false and it is shown that *ānanda-maya* is nothing other than the supreme Brahman on the following grounds:

1. The *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* puts the essence of the matter thus: Is *ānandamaya* the transmigrating soul or Brahman, the ultimate reality? The *prima facie* view is that it is the soul as there is the use of *mayat* suffix indicating modification and the usage of members like *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* etc. But this view is wrong. With the criteria of beginning and conclusion it is ascertained that *ānandamaya* is Brahman. The suffix *mayat* means only fulness or abundance. The so-called members like *priya* really belong to mind which is the adjunct of the *ānandamaya* Brahman.

(1) The word 'ānanda' is repeatedly used by the scripture in connection with Brahman.² Brahman is known as Ānanda.³ (2) It is not a defect that *ānandamaya* is mentioned in the series of '*annamaya*' etc., because *ānandamaya* is the innermost reality of all. The intention of the scripture is to teach Brahman slowly and gradually by first presenting *annamaya* etc., as Brahman and progressively taking the mind of the student to the inner and subtler realities finally culminating in the *ānandamaya*. It is only a pedagogical technique adopted towards the obtuse mind of the student. (3) The members of *priya*, *moda* etc., really belong to the preceding *Vijñānamaya* and are thus adjuncts. (4) Even existing in the body for *ānandamaya* is because of the sequence beginning from the *annamaya*. Otherwise for Ānandamaya there is no existing in the body as it is for the transmigrating soul. (5) The suffix *mayaḥ* is used in the word '*ānandamaya*' only to signify fulness or abundance⁴. Therefore, it does not involve modification and non-eternality. In the Upaniṣads, the calculus of bliss is given. The greatest of human happiness is taken as one basic unit;⁵ Brahman that is bliss is hundredfold, thousandfold and so on, of this human happiness and is unexcellable. It is evident that Brahman is full of bliss and that is signified by the word '*maya*.'

Again, Brahman is said in the scripture to make one joyous.⁶ Therefore Brahman is *ānandamaya*, just as a person who makes others rich is said to be full of wealth.⁷

(6) The same Brahman declared in the text: "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss"⁸, as the cause of all, as the indweller in all, as

2. See *Taittirīya*, II, 7, 8 and 9.

3. *Taittirīya*, III, 6. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III-9, 28.

4. *prācurya*. See *Pāṇinisūtra* V-4, 21, *taḥ-prakṛtavacane mayāḥ*. In the expression "*annamayo yajñah*" the '*maya*' means abundance. Similar is the case here.

5. *Taittirīya*, II, 8.

6. *Taittirīya*: II, 7. *esa hy eva ānandayāti*.

7. *pracuradhana*.

8. *Taittirīya*: II, 1. This is the *mantra*.

existing inside and outside of all, is stated here also.⁹ If these two contexts speak of two different things, then, it will be abandoning the context and adopting the irrelevant. (7) Just as in the series beginning with *annamaya*, it is stated that the *prāṇamaya* is subtler than *annamaya*, that the *manomaya* is subtler than the *prāṇamaya* and so on, there is nothing that is mentioned further as the Self of the *Anandamaya*. (8) The promised Science of Brahman¹⁰ (*brahmavidyā*) ends here with this *ānandamaya* and therefore, the latter is Brahman alone. (9) "Ānandamaya" cannot mean the soul because at the commencement of the context of the *Ānandamaya* it is said: "He contemplated as "I will become many". And He created all this whatsoever."¹¹ The three acts here of contemplating before the creation of bodies, the non-difference of the created effects from the cause and the creation of the diverse beings are impossible and unintelligible in the case of the soul. So *ānandamaya* is Brahman alone.

Further the scripture declares that Brahman is *rasa* and that the soul is blissful after attaining Brahman who is *rasa*.¹² This statement will be meaningless if the soul and Brahman are not different. The attainer and the attained cannot be one and the same.

(10) The "Ānandamaya" cannot be the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya. The expression "He contemplated "(*sokāmayata*)"¹³ implies an intelligence. Pradhāna cannot have this power, being inert and physical. (11) Again, liberation and texts teaching liberation will be bereft of sense if a soul or Pradhāna is meant by "ānandamaya". Scripture teaches that becoming one with Brahman is liberation.¹⁴ Such a Brahman is described there as neither gross nor

9. *Ibid.* 11-5. This is the *brahmaṇa*. There could be no incongruence between the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa*. The reference in these two therefore must be the same Brahman.

10. *Taittirīya*: III, 6, *saiṣā bhārgavī vāruṇī vidyā*. The subject started in *Bhṛguvalli* thus ends in this *Brahmavalli* most appropriately.

11. *Taittirīya*: II, 6.

12. *Taittirīya*: II, 7.

13. *Ibid.*, II, 6.

14. *tad-yogaṁ śāsti śāstram*. See *Taittirīya*: II, 7.

subtle, unspeakable, and without any difference. Knowing such a Brahman, one is saved from the fear of death and birth. This result will not be intelligible if it were Pradhāna or the individual soul.

So, it is only Brahman that is designated by the term '*ānanda-maya*' according to the *Vṛttikāra*¹⁵.

Śaṅkara's Refutation of the above Vṛttikāra's view

Śaṅkara urges several criticisms against the above view which we shall now proceed to summarise.

(1) Beginning from *annamaya* the Upaniṣad progressively identifies the Self more and more subtly, through *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya*. The suffix "maya" (*mayat*) has been used in all these five sheaths. It is not reasonable to suppose that it means "modification" (*vikāra*) in the first four expressions and that it suddenly changes its meaning to 'fulness' (*prācurya*) in the *ānanda-maya* alone.

It cannot be argued that since "*ānandamaya*" occurs in the context of Brahman, it should signify Brahman. For, in that case, even the *annamaya-puruṣa* will have to be considered as Brahman.

(2) It may be said that with reference to *annamaya* etc., there is mentioned a Self different from it and yet innermost to it, but that in the case of *ānandamaya* there is no such Self mentioned as different from it. While this is true, yet even with reference to the *ānandamaya*, members like head are mentioned: "*Priya* is the head; *moda* is the right wing; *pramoda* is the left wing; *ānanda* is the trunk; Brahman is the tail and support."¹⁶

The expression "Brahman is the tail and support"¹⁷ is, in continuity with the *mantra* of the Upaniṣad: "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss is Brahman," which is a description of Brahman. In order to teach this gradually, the teacher begins with *annāmaya* and

15. Śaṅkara does not use the expression "*vṛttikāra*" but later writers identify the exponent of this view as *vṛttikāra*.

16. *Taittirīya*: II, 5.

17. *Taittirīya*, II. 5.

ends with *ānandamaya* all of which are thus introductory to the knowledge of Brahman. It is true that the expressions "tail and support" occur in the earlier *kośas* also. From this it may by mistake be concluded that Brahman which is tail and support here is a member of the *ānandamaya* just as in the earlier cases the tail and support are the members of the respective *kośas*.

But this is a mistake because from the beginning it is the context of Brahman. This is evident from the fact that the context begins with Brahman and ends with the same Brahman. Though the expression "tail" seems to introduce a difference between Brahman mentioned in the beginning and Brahman mentioned at the end, yet a little reflection will show that there has been no essential change in the connotation of the word "Brahman" in the different places in one single context. Hence there is no question of the expression "Brahman" becoming the attribute of the *ānandamaya*.

If the contention is that there is no danger of Brahman being an attribute of *ānandamaya* for the simple reason that *ānandamaya* itself is Brahman, this is plainly untenable because one and the same Brahman cannot both be the whole and the parts thereof. And the expression "*pucchā*" and "*pratiṣṭhā*" will become meaningless. In order to avoid this contingency, it has to be decided between the two alternatives of Brahman being the independent reality or being the part of *ānandamaya*. In that case, the decision that it is the same Brahman that is mentioned throughout in the context of the theme is unavoidable. The expression "Brahman" is mentioned in the beginning of the passage and is mentioned at the end also.¹⁸ 3) Moreover, immediately after the statement of *ānandamaya*, there is the declaration: "One who thinks of Brahman as non-existent becomes non-existent; one, however, who thinks of Brahman as existent is considered as virtuous."¹⁹ In this statement, there is no reference to *ānandamaya* at all. On the contrary, knowledge of Brahman as existent is praised, and knowledge of Brahman as non-existent is condemned. The doubt of existence or non-existence is not at all possible to arise in the case of the *ānandamaya* which is patently known

18. *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra* are marks by which one can settle the meaning.

19. *Taittirīya*: II-6.

to everyone. (4) If it were asked how, then, the expression "*brahma pucchaṁ pratiṣṭhā*" (Brahman is the tail and the support) has been used as parts of *ānandamaya*, Śaṅkara replies that the expression "tail" here means "tail as it were". It is like a tail in the sense of being a support and a source. Brahman as bliss is the one basis for all the experience of bliss in the world.²⁰ (5) If *ānandamaya* is Brahman, it has to be deemed as a personal God with attributes. This is repugnant to the declaration of the scripture that reality is beyond mind and speech.²¹ The reference here is obviously to distinctionless Brahman. (6) It cannot be said that the meaning of *mayat* is fullness, because abundance (*prācurya*) involves something that is opposed to that which is not abundant. Hence, it will have to be admitted that Brahman has a shade of pain in it also, though it is abundantly blissful. This will be incompatible with the scripture declaring that Brahman is perfection (*bhūmā*) and infinity where there is not even a shade of the finitude or pain.²² (7) Besides this, *priya*, *moda* etc., vary in each individual. But Brahman is changelessly one in all. It is infinite (*ananta*).²³ (8) The word "*ānandamaya*" is not repeated but only the stem "*ānanda*" is repeated.²⁴ (9) The Upaniṣad declares the transcendence of the *ānandamaya*.²⁵ (10) Even the text "It desired as 'Let me become many'"²⁶ is proximate only to Brahman in "Brahman is tail and support"²⁷ rather than to *ānandamaya*. The rest of the Upaniṣadic texts follow that *puccha brahman*. Hence, the text "He is of the nature of *rasa*" (*raso vai saḥ*) cannot refer to the *ānandamaya*. (11) In the text "He desired", the masculine gender has been used. But this need not be considered contrary to attributeless Brahman. Even in other places, Brahman

20. *pucchavat puccham, pratiṣṭhā parāyaṇam ekaṇiḍaṁ laukikasya ānandajātasya brahmānanda ityetaḍ anena vivakṣyate avayavatvam. S. B. I. 1-19. Cp. Bṛhadāranyaka: IV-3, 32.*

21. *yato vāco nivartante aprāṇya manasā saha.*

22. *Chāndogya: VII-24. 1.*

23. *Taittirīya: II, 1. See also Śvetāśvatara: VI, 11.*

24. *Taittirīya: II, 7, 8, 9; III-6, Bṛhadāranyaka: III-9, 28.*

25. *Taittirīya: II, 8.*

26. *śokāmayata bahusyaṁ prajāyeyeti.*

27. *brahma pucchaṁ pratiṣṭhā.*

has been designated by the terms like "*ātman*" which is masculine."²⁸ (12) Varuṇa taught Bhṛgu the knowledge about Brahman.²⁹ There is no suffix of *mayat* to the word "*ānanda*" here. Nor are the parts of *priya*, *moda* etc., are stated for it. So Brahman is *ānanda*, not *ānandamaya* which is but analogous to *annamaya* etc., and is therefore mere modification. Thus, the Vṛttikāra's views are untenable.

28. *tasmād wā etasmād ātmanaḥ ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ.*

29. *ānando brahmeti vyajānāt.*

CHAPTER XV

Refutation of the view that the soul is atomic

There are three views in Indian thought regarding the dimension or magnitude of the soul: (1) all-pervasive (2) of finite medium dimension and (3) atomic. Of these the medium finite size is evidently unreasonable because the soul of that dimension will be subject to change and destruction like any object in the world that we see.

Hence, two alternatives remain: is the soul all-pervasive or atomic? If the former, then the soul cannot possibly have any activity or movement. But it is frequently stated in the scripture that soul rising from the body on death travels to the other worlds and returns to the earth on exhaustion of merit.¹ Hence, it must be atomic. Scripture, too, seems to be clear and categorical in saying that the Self is atomic.² Just as the lamp spreads its light all around the place, the soul, though atomic pervades the entire body and experiences pleasure or pain. One can also say that the soul uses its intelligence which is its own quality as an instrument to pervade the entire body.³

Saṅkara's criticism

Soul is not atomic for the following reasons. (1) Scripture does not state any beginning for the soul. It is said on the contrary that Brahman itself entered the elements as their Self. Hence the soul is nothing but Brahman. As such it cannot be atomic but only all-pervasive.

-
1. Movement is stated for the soul even within the body. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. 2, VI-3. 11. IV-4. 1.
 2. *Chāndogya*: III-14, 3; VI-8-7, VIII-1.1; *Muṇḍaka*: III-1.9. *Śvetāśvatara*: V-8.
 3. Intelligence or consciousness is separate from the soul and is its quality. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-1. 17.

(2) If the soul were atomic, it cannot experience sensations all over the body. The sensation that is felt all over the body is only that of touch. The other sensations are confined only to the location of the respective sense-organs.

Even restricting ourselves to the sensation of touch, it is not possible to hold that the soul, though atomic, pervades the entire body through the skin which is the sense of touch. For, on this supposition, if one trod on a thorn, the sensation of sharp pain should arise throughout the body since the entire body is covered by the skin. But this is not what happens. The pain is felt pointedly only in that spot of the body where the thorn has pierced the flesh.

(3) It is not possible to maintain that the quality of the atomic soul radiates beyond the centre extending all over the body. Qualities are, by definition, centred only in their substances. If a quality could extend beyond the substance of which it is a quality, it cannot be said to be a quality at all. Even the light that emanates from the lamp is not a quality but a different substance altogether.

(4) If intelligence pervades the entire body, then the soul having that as its quality cannot be atomic.

(5) And it is not admitted that intelligence is but the quality of the soul. It is the very constitutive nature of the soul, just as heat and light constitute the very nature of fire.

(6) Even assuming that intelligence is a quality of the soul, it is not possible to say that the quality and the qualified could be separate at any time.

(7) The reason why scripture sometimes seems to say that the soul is atomic is that the soul is in identification with the intellect (*buddhi*). This is a limitation brought about by that condition (*upādhi*).

(8) Even the scripture which says that the soul is atomic concludes by saying that it is all-pervasive and infinite.⁴ The atomicity is conditional and adventitious while the infinitude is unconditional and real. Infinitude cannot be conditional because all the texts

4. *Śvetāśvatara*, V, 9.

intend to show that Brahman is one with the soul. The mention in the scripture of a size⁵ for the soul is only in the condition of its false identification with the intellect etc., which are limiting adjuncts.

(9) "Atomicity" must be understood to stand for "minuteness" or "subtlety" (*sūkṣma*) as the soul being one with Brahman is subtle and difficult to understand.

(10) The scriptural text⁶ seeming to state that the soul is separate from intelligence which is but its instrument and that the soul pervades the entire body through that intelligence must be interpreted to say, not that intelligence is separate from the body, but only that the soul pervades the body through *buddhi*, its limiting adjunct (*upādhi*). Alternatively, we can take the expression metaphorically as we do when we talk of "the body of the statue". Here, there is nothing but the body in the statue. It has already been shown earlier in these pages that a quality cannot be separate from the substance in the physical sense.

(11) The scriptural statements as to the soul abiding in the heart (which may be a ground for saying that the soul is not all-pervasive but only atomic having a location) refer only to the location of the soul due to the limiting adjunct of the *buddhi*.

(12) The texts talking about the soul passing out of the body also should be understood to refer to the soul as conditioned by the limiting adjunct.⁷ Hence, the statement of the soul moving, going and coming must be taken only in this sense. For the soul in itself, devoid of any limitation by adjuncts, there is neither going nor coming.

(13) Such a limitation by adjuncts is spoken of in the scripture even for Brahman.⁸ It is, therefore, not unintelligible for the soul which is after all one with Brahman.

It is concluded, therefore, that the soul is not atomic, but infinite and all-pervasive.

5. *Ibid.*, V, 8.

6. *Kauṣītaki*: III-6.

7. See *Praśna*: VI. 3, 4. "What is it by whose passing out I shall pass out and by whose standing shall I stay? He sent forth *Prāṇa*."

8. *Chāndogya*: III-4. 2, 3.

CHAPTER XVI

Refutation of Bhedābheda I

Is the soul different totally or different - *cum*-non-different or non-different totally from Brahman? This question has been raised in the *Brahma-sūtras*¹ and Śaṅkara has offered his own views in commenting on them.

Āśmarathya is quoted here as holding the theory of difference-*cum*-non-difference between the soul and Brahman. According to this view, both difference and non-difference are real. The analogy is that of fire and the sparks. The scripture itself uses this analogy. The soul is thus a 'spark' or a mode of Brahman. The spark is neither different nor non-different from its source that is fire. It is not non-different from it because it is now called the spark. And one spark is different from another spark entitatively. One has to say that all the sparks are one with fire by virtue of their being fiery and are different from fire by virtue of their being entitatively different.

Similarly, the soul is one with Brahman by virtue of being a conscious principle and is different from Brahman because of its entitative separateness as soul with a character of its own. What should be noticed here is that depending upon the character, difference and non-difference of the soul from Brahman is determined. The condition of consciousness makes it one with Brahman. The condition of, being a transmigrating soul makes it different from Brahman. But *both* difference and non-difference are real *at the same time*. This is Āśmarathya's view.

Auḍulomi holds a different view. There are difference and non-difference between the soul and Brahman but *not at the same time*. The condition of bondage is real for the soul. When by spiritual

1. I.4,20, 21, 22.

discipline the soul rises above bondage, it becomes one with Brahman.² The analogy is that of rivers with different name, form, source and land merging finally in the ocean becoming one with it with no more of their former individualities.³ So says Auḍulomi.

As different from both the above views, Kāśakṛtsna offers a third view according to which the soul is not a mode of Brahman; nor is it different from Brahman. It is Brahman. The differential notion is born of nescience or *avidyā*.⁴ The analogy is that of the partless ether appearing to be various according to the diversity of the containers like pot, pitcher etc.

When the scripture talks about creation, it mentions everything but the soul. If the soul were different from Brahman, it should have been mentioned among the created entities. If the soul were, on the other hand, a created entity, when it merges with its cause, its own essential nature will be lost. But the scripture has declared time and again that final beatitude and immortality result when soul becomes one with Brahman.

Kāśakṛtsna considers that the soul in its very essence, and devoid of its limiting adjuncts, is the same as Brahman. Name and form which constitute the plural world do not, therefore, belong to the soul but only to the limiting adjunct of nescience causing name and form. The scriptural analogy of the origination of sparks from fire must be taken to mean only the origination of the limiting adjunct, not the soul itself.

The doubt that the soul has origination and destruction arises from certain interpretation of the text of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁵ which says that the soul arises from the elements, and perishes along with those elements and that thereafter there is no consciousness in it.

2. See *Chāndogya*, VIII-12. 13.

3. See *Muṇḍaka*: III-2.8. In the *Pāñcarātra* Auḍulomi's view is echoed.

āmukterbheda eva syāt
jīvasya ca parasya ca
tataḥ param na bhedo'sti
bhedahetor abhāvataḥ

Bhāmati reads the third line as: *muktasyatu na bhedo'sti*.

4. Cp. *Chāndogya*: VI-3-2. Also: *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*: III-1-2-7.

5. II.4. 12

But this interpretation is wrong, for, the origination and destruction that are mentioned there are not for the soul but only for the specific cognitions which arise due to the conjunction with the body, mind and the senses which are the products of nescience.

In the state of release there is no instrument of knowing nor an object to be seen. And the Self is not an object of knowledge.⁶ Number of texts could be given which condemn the plural vision.

Śaṅkara has shown in his commentary on the *Brahma sūtra*⁷ that the soul is Brahman. Śaṅkara says there that the scripture teaches the truth in a twofold manner. It talks about the Supreme directly. It also declares the oneness of the soul and Brahman. In the fourth Adhyāya of the *Brahma-sūtras*, in one Sūtra,⁸ the final realization is said to be of the nature of "I am Brahman."

The question that here arises for which an answer is provided by Bādarāyaṇa is how the soul can realize itself as Brahman which is free from all defects and is in every way different from it. If the soul is the same as Brahman, then all the defects of the soul will have accrued to Brahman also with the result that scripture itself will become useless because there is no Brahman to realize. On the other hand, if the soul is Brahman itself, there will be no soul and again the scripture will become useless because there is no soul to attain Brahmanhood with the aid of the scripture. Again, to say that the soul is Brahman is contrary to all evidence including perception. Even if the identity is stated for the purpose of meditation, soul is in fact not Brahman. Śaṅkara refutes this by saying that there is explicit scriptural pronouncement that the soul is Brahman. For instance, the *Jābāla Upaniṣad* says: "I am thou; thou art I."⁹

6. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: 1-4-10; IV-4-19. *Taittirīya*: II-1: *satyom jñānam anantam. brahma; yo veda nihitam guhāyam*. II-6. "It created; it entered." See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declaring that Self is Brahman: *ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūḥ ity anuśāsanam*. IV-5-19. *Muṇḍaka* declares: *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*. III-2-9

7. I-3-24. *tadatra vijnānāt manaḥ paramātmanā ekatvam upadiśyate*.

8. IV-1-3. *ātmēti tu upagacchanti grāhayanti ca*.

9. *tvaṁ vā aham asmi bhagavo devate ahaṁ vai tvam asi*.

Such statements of identity cannot be mere meditative texts. Where *pratīkopāsana* is meant in the scripture, there the teaching is given only once. For instance, in "Mind is Brahman", "Āditya is Brahman" it is not repeated conversely as "Brahman is mind," "Brahman is Āditya." Where, however, identity is stated as a fact the statement is of the form "I am thou", and conversely "Thou art I."

The alleged contrariety of characters possessed by the soul and Brahman will be a point only when the contrariety is real. The Advaitins hold that the limited and finite character of the soul is due to the conditioning factor of nescience and is not real.

The contention that if the soul and Brahman are one, then there will be only the soul and no Brahman is baseless. For one thing, there is scriptural proof for the assertion of identity between the soul and Brahman as has been shown. For another, it is not the Advaitin's intention to attribute to Brahman all the character of the soul. On the contrary, the Advaitin tries to show that the soul is in its essence Brahman, is eternal and infinite and that it has to realize this true destiny.

It is also wrong to argue that if soul itself is Brahman, there will be no soul but only Brahman, that there is no one, therefore, to desire release and that all this will be contrary to what we perceive. For, all that is the soul with its limitations and finitude and also the entire host of its activities, both spiritual and secular, is a state obtaining prior to its release, and hence is as such valid. But release itself means the freedom from limiting conditions. All empirical activities cease on release.¹⁰

10. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-4.14. "When everything has become the Self, with what will he see what?" Even scripture does not have a place on release. Its usefulness is exhausted by the attainment of release itself. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-3.22. "There the Vedas" etc. Śaṅkara says "*śruterapi abhāvaḥ prabodhe*," Indra taught Pratardana to "know him". The expression "him" does not refer to Indra. Since Indra is a realized soul he referred to himself as Brahman. Vāmadeva is another instance where the realization that he is Brahman reigned supreme even when he was in his mother's womb. See *B.S.* I-1. 30.

CHAPTER XVII

Refutation of Bhedābheda II

That the soul is entitatively one with Brahman (as Advaita asserts) is not as clear as it could be desired. There are, of course, statements in the scripture which talk of identity between the soul and Brahman as the truth. But texts are not wanting which state difference between them.¹

If the texts that teach identity are alone authoritative, the texts that talk of difference will become unnecessary and futile. Scripture cannot be partly meaningful and partly meaningless. Hence, both the kinds of text must be deemed to be authoritative and true. So *bhedābheda* of the soul with Brahman is to be admitted on the analogy of the snake and its coils. The coils are the forms of the snake and are different yet non-different from the snake. Another analogy is that of the sun and its light where the light is an integral feature of the sun.

Saṅkara's criticism

On the account of the doctrine of *bhedābheda*, bondage will never cease because it is real. The form of the snake is real to it and it can never be abandoned. Similarly, light being integral to the sun can never be abandoned. The aim of the scripture will be defeated if bondage is real and eternal.

Secondly, scripture does not teach difference and non-difference as of equal reality. Its intention is to teach non-difference. Where it speaks of difference, it only restates what is given in experience for the purpose of negating it later on.

1. *Muṇḍaka* text (III-1.8) makes out the distinction of the contemplator and the contemplated. The text (III-2.8) speaks of distinction of one who goes and the one that is reached.

Thirdly, there are texts in the scripture which will become unintelligible if both *bheda* and *abheda* alike are equally real. For instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text stating that the individual person is nothing other than the Supreme,² and that Brahman is "not this" "not this"³, denies everything in Brahman.⁴

Fourthly, the denial of anything other than Brahman is elaborately established in the scripture. It is from Brahman that everything arises. But its essential nature has been declared to be one and non-dual.⁵

The scripture has stated that Brahman is the dam (*setu*), that it has a measure (*unmāna*)⁶ and that it has relation (*sambandha*).⁷ Some people interpret these to mean that Brahman admits of things other than itself by which its non-duality is compromised. Their argument is as follows: (a) The description of Brahman as "*setu*" meaning a dam is understandable only when there is something which it dams up. (b) The description of Brahman's measure as having four quarters, eight hoofs and fourteen digits clearly shows that there is something apart from Brahman. (c) The statement of relation for Brahman as "He becomes one with the Reality" where the soul is said to become one with Reality in deep sleep implies that Brahman is limited and is therefore not non-dual. Only the limited can have relation with the limited, as when one says: "People live in cities."

In addition to these, statements like "That Reality that is found in the centre of the sun" which show the sun as the abode of Reality and statements like "That Reality which is found in the eye" are found in the scripture showing the difference of locations for Brahman in the sun and in the eye. And then, Brahman residing in the sun is said to be the Lord of all the higher worlds. By contrast, Brahman residing in the eye is said to be the Lord of all the lower

2. III-7. 23.

3. *Ibid*: II-3.6. Also: II-5-19.

4. *brahma-vyatirikta-prapañca-nirākāraṇāt, brahma-mātra-pariśeṣcatā*. S.B. III.2. 30.

5. *Chāndogya*: VI.2, 1.

6. *Ibid*: VIII-4.2.

7. *Ibid*: VI-8. 1, *Tattvīya*: II-3. 1; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-3-21.

worlds. This is analogous to saying "This is the Kingdom of the Māgadha," "This is the Kingdom of the Vaideha" indicating a limit to their lordships. From these considerations, it follows that there is something other than Brahman limiting It.

Śaṅkara gives a reply to all this as follows. Nothing other than Brahman can be proved to exist. The arguments set forth by the opponent do not bear the construction that he puts on them. In the case of the description of the Self as "*setu*", there is nothing in that scriptural statement to warrant the assumption of anything outside Brahman. It is a metaphor and is not to be interpreted too literally. Otherwise, Brahman must be said to be a physical dam made of earth and wood. By "*setu*", therefore, we should understand that Brahman is the basis by which the world and its laws and regulations are maintained.

The expression "having crossed"⁸ (*tīrtvā*) means "attained".⁹ In worldly usage, if one says "He has crossed the grammar" it means only the attainment of knowledge, and not attaining something else by literally crossing it.¹⁰

Similarly with regard to the statement of measure (*unmāna*), the intention is not to say that there is something outside Brahman. The intention is meditation on Brahman as of four quarters, eight hoofs and sixteen digits. It is to facilitate the mind to get fixed on Brahman. Elsewhere mind and ākāśa are stated to be the images of Brahman. for meditational purposes. Of these on the individual level (*ādhyāt-mika*), speech, mind, eyes and ears are said to be the four quarters of mind. Fire, air, sun and the directions are the four quarters of the ākāśa. Similarly here, Brahman is said to have four quarters for purposes of meditation. To mention another worldly analogy, gold, though one, is said to have different denominations for purposes of convenient trade transaction.

Lastly, even the statement of relation cannot prove that there is anything apart from Brahman. The coalescence of the soul in deep

8. *setuṁ tīrtvā. Chāndogya: VIII-4.2.*

9. *prāpnoty artha eva vartate. S.B. III-2.32.*

10. *yathā vyākaraṇaṁ tīrṇa iti prāpta ity ucyate, na atikrāntaḥ tadvat. S.B. III-2.32.*

sleep with Brahman is a figure of speech with reference to the conditioning factors. The soul is Brahman and there is no question of its coalescing with Brahman. When the conditioning factors are eliminated, the soul is Brahman. The all-pervasive *ākāśa* is spoken of variously as conditioned by receptacles. When these conditions are removed, mere *ākāśa* remains as ever. Still, figuratively the pot-ether, for instance, is said to merge in the universal ether when the pot is destroyed.¹¹

11. The same is the case with the ether inside the body, inside the heart etc. See *Chāndogya*: III-12.7, 8, 8, 9. See also VIII-1.3.

CHAPTER XVIII

Refutation of the view that Brahman is both Nirguṇa and Saṅguṇa

Is Brahman attributeless or endowed with attributes?¹ The scripture seems to lend support for both.² Śaṅkara feels, therefore, obliged to ascertain the true sense of the scripture in the light of the *Brahma-sūtras*. The following are his arguments to show that Brahman is, in its nature, attributeless (*nirguṇa*).

(1) One and the same object cannot be said to be both of the nature of undifferentiated and differentiated forms. It is a contradiction. Hence, Brahman cannot be both attributeless and qualified at the same time.

(2) This twofold character cannot be brought about even by an *upādhi*. The essential nature of an object does not change even by an *upādhi*. The crystal does not lose its natural whiteness even when it is coloured by another substance. That it has lost its natural colour is only a mistaken notion. Similarly, if Brahman appears to be endowed with form or attributes it is a mistaken notion caused by the adjunct of *avidyā* whose products are the objects of creation like earth etc.

Thus, when there are alternatives of form and formlessness, only formlessness is to be chosen as the natureal description of Brahman.³

1. *S.B.* III-2. 11 to 21.

2. See *Chāndogya*: III-14. 2 for *saṁśeṣaṅga*. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*; III-8-8. for *nirviśeṣaṅga*.

3. So the scripture declares. See *Kaṭha*: II. 72.

(3) But it is possible to ask whether the texts that do speak of forms for Brahman are to be taken as meaningless.⁴ To this Śaṅkara replies that in the scripture, for every statement of difference brought about by an adjunct, there is at once the denial of difference.⁵ Differential (*saguṇa*) descriptions in the scripture of Brahman are for the purpose of meditation, while the essential purport of the scripture is the undifferentiated Brahman.

(4) Differential descriptions have been categorically denounced in the scripture.⁶

(5) Scripture has to teach Brahman only through denying all difference in it since there is no other positive method of teaching it by virtue of its attributelessness. The declarations like "Not this, Not this",⁷ "It is other than the known and is other than the unknown."⁸ "From where mind and speech return powerless"⁹ are illustrative of this.

(6) Keeping this nature of Brahman as attributeless and undifferentiated and as impossible of direct positive description through words or conception through mind, the scripture teaches that the differentiated and qualified form of Brahman is, like the reflection of the moon in water, due to the distorting medium of ignorance.¹⁰

The reflection of the moon moves and generally changes according to the changes in the water. But the original moon in itself does not

4. For instance, there are teachings as "*catuṣpāt brahma*," "*śoḍaśakalaṁ brahma*," "*vāmānītvā dilakṣaṇaṁ brahma*" "*trailokya-śarīra-vāṁśvānaraśabdōtitaṁ brahma*" etc.

5. See, for, instance, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-5.1.

6. To wit, *Kaṭha*: IV-11; *Śvetāśvatara*: I. 12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: IV-5-13.

7. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-3.6

8. *Kena*: I. 3.

9. *Tatttirīya*: II-4.1 When Bhāṣkali asked Bādhya to teach Brahman to him, Bhāṣkali kept silent. On the request repeated, he said, "I have been teaching you all the while. You do not understand. This Self cannot be described as it is devoid of differences." *upaśānto'yaṁ ātmā*. See *Gītā*. XIII. 12.

Cp. "Nārada, the form which you see of me is the creation of *māyā*. It is wrong to take me to be such in reality." *māyā hyeṣā mayā sṛṣṭā yaṁ māṁ paśyasi nārada sarvabhūta-guṇairiyuktaṁ naivaṁ māṁ jñātum arhasi*.

10. *ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat*.

change with these changes. It is easy for the ignorant people to mistake the reflection for the original. Similarly, the changes in the world do not affect Brahman which is the changeless reality behind it. The distorting medium of reflection is *avidyā*. Another point of the analogy is that there are not two moons but only one. The ignorant may mistake the reflection to be real because it is seen separately. Similarly one may be inclined to believe that the world is real apart from Brahman because it is perceived by the senses and is generally given in experience.

That the same non-dual Brahman is found also in the condition of the body is further substantiated by the scripture which says that Brahman entered itself into the created bodies.¹¹

(7) The teaching, "Not this" "Not this"¹² is intended to deny all forms and characterisations in Brahman. Brahman is in fact indicated by such a negation of all that is other than Brahman. This is the best method of teaching Brahman.¹³

(8) Such a Brahman is yet not known as an object. It is the witness of all knowing, It is the pure subject.

(9) It cannot be said, however, that Brahman is totally inexperienceable. Yogis with vision are said to realize it.¹⁴

11. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-5.18. *Chāndogya*: VI-3.2 *Brahmasūtra*: III-2.18.

12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: II-3.6.

13. *na prapañcapratiṣedharūpād-ādeśanāt anyatparam ādeśanam brahmanah asti.*
S. B. III-2-22.

14. See *Kaṭha*: IV. 1; *Muṇḍaka*: III-1, 8.

APPENDIX

NOTES ON THE JAINA SYSTEM

Vācaspati gives a summary of the Jaina system. The seven categories accepted by the Jainas have been summarised into two principal ones, the soul and the non-soul. The soul is of the nature of consciousness. The *ajīva* or the non-soul is of the nature of insentient matter. Another way of classifying the categories is into the five *astikāyas*, namely *jīvāstikāya*, *pudgalāstikāya*, *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaāstikāya* and *ākāśāstikāya*.¹

The soul is of three varieties: the liberated, the bound and eternally free (or the arhats). Pudgala is of six kinds: the four physical elements (of earth, water, fire and air,) the moving and unmoving objects (*sthāvara* and *jaṅgama*). *Dharmāstikāya* is the principle of motion inferred by activity.² Similarly *adharmaāstikāya* is the principle of rest (*sthiti*).³

The *ākāśāstikāya* is two fold: (a) *lokākāśa* and (b) *alokākāśa*. Worlds on worlds constitute the cosmic extension. Beyond this is the *alokākāśa* which is the abode of release devoid of any material bodies.

If we take the sevenfold classification of the categories (a) *jīva* (b) *ajīva* (c) *āsrava* (d) *saṁvara* (e) *nirjara* (f) *bandha* (g) *mokṣa* the last three are activities which are of two types, right and wrong. Of these the latter is *āsrava*; the former is *saṁvara* and *nirjara*.⁴

1. *astīti kāyante śabdyante ity astikāyāḥ. Kalpataru: II-2.33.*

2. *Kalpataru* says that activity is of two kinds: (1) right and (2) wrong. Conduct according to Jaina scripture is the first variety. The opposite is the second one. Both are inferred because it is through such conduct that *dharma* called *opūva* is generated.

3. *Kalpataru* says that *adharma* or immobility or is inferred by the fact of immobility of the body wherein the soul lives. The free soul by its very nature inclines to move upward. When this is retarded immobility results and this is *adharma*.

4. *āsravaḥ srotasāṁ dvāraṁ saṁvṛṇōtīti saṁvaraḥ
āsravo bhavaḥetuḥsyāt saṁvaro mokṣakāraṇam.*

Parimala on II.2-33.

Samvara is of the form of activity characterised by control of the mind and senses preventing the fresh gravitation of *karmas*. *Nirjara* is the destruction of the *karmas* accumulated already. This is accomplished by the experience of the results of the virtuous and vicious actions done earlier.

Bandha due to activity is divided into two major types: (a) *ghāti-karmas* (b) *aghātikarmas*. The former is of four kinds: (1) *jñānā-varaṇīyam* (2) *darśanāvaraṇīyam* (3) *mohaṇīyam* and (4) *antarāyam*. The latter are of four kinds: (1) *vedaniyam* (2) *nāmikam* (3) *gotrikam* and (4) *āyuskaṁ*. These are explained respectively as follows. The belief that right knowledge can not be the means to release because an object is never brought into being by mere knowledge of it is false. Such a belief is the result of acts called *jñānāvaraṇīya*. The thought that release cannot be achieved by the practice of the Jaina doctrine is due to acts called *darśanāvaraṇīya*.

The puzzlement as to what is true among the various religious teachings is the result of *mohaṇīya* acts. Acts that obstruct the progress of one who wants to get release are *antarāya*. Such are the *ghāti karmas* as they tend to destroy the well-being of man.

Among the *aghātikarmas*, those which are responsible for the production of the body from germinal energy are *vedaniya karmas*. The activity in the seminal energy that starts the process of the formation of the body is *nāmika*. The inner potency for such a development is *gotrika*. The body that is produced by the compound of the male and female germs is *āyuska*.⁵ These are called *aghāti* because they are not injurious to the spiritual growth. After all, it is only in a body that true knowledge has to arise. Even then the body is certainly bondage.

Release is freedom from *karmas* of all these above varieties and settlement in the *alokākāśa*.⁶

Refutation of Syādvāda by Vācaspati

That which exists really certainly exists by all means always everywhere, in its entirety and in determinable form. It is not that

5 See *Kalpataru*: II-2.33.

6. *ātmanah uparideśāvasthānaṁ mokṣa iti. Kalpataru*: II-2.33.

it is not. But that which is said to exist somewhere somehow, some time and in any form, as in the case of the world, is real only empirically because of inscrutability. And mere cognition does not establish reality. Even the materialist will be right if a mere idea is right. The identification of oneself with the body is ordinary experience that remains uncontradicted to the undiscerning. If the *anaikāntavāda* is to be accepted, even the sublation of materialist notions by enquiry is inconclusive.

Moreover, distinction of real or unreal is possible because the real cannot be reduced to the unreal. In one and the same object, distinction is not possible. Even the Jainas try to determine the categories as soul and non-soul or as five in number, or as *astikāyas* or no, or as *bandha* and *mokṣa*. If indeterminacy is ultimate, the system of Jaina metaphysics is shaken to its foundations and becomes unstable and uncertain.

Regarding the size of the Soul

Whatever is limited is subject to the laws of change. The soul cannot occupy the entire body of the elephant; nor, leaving the elephant's body, can it enter an ant's body on rebirth.

If it is said that as the lamp placed in the pot and in a palatial hall contracts and expands, the individual soul contracts and expands in the bodies of the ant and the elephant respectively, it is replied that the lamp cannot be a suitable example. A lamp contracts and expands because it has parts. If the soul had parts, it will be mutable and will perish.

If the eternality of the soul is accepted, and also its parts, and if the parts are infinite and undetermined, there could be no knowledge of the soul at all completely because of infinity of undetermined parts. There will be no release consequently.

Again do these parts of the soul function individually or collectively? If the intelligent parts of the soul function severally, the body will be divided into warring centres pulling in different directions. On the other alternative, when a soul enters the body of an ant from that of an elephant the soul that remains in excess after having

accommodated into the size of an ant will not have any intelligent function to discharge because the aggregate collection cannot as such without diminution enter into the body of the ant.

Even apart from the indecision of the magnitude of the soul, and even when the soul as in the case of Buddhism is said to be a momentary series, on the theory of the permanence of the series itself as one continuous stream it remains to be answered whether the series that is the soul is itself a substance or no. If it were a substance, it will be subject to change. If it were not a substance, there is the defect of soullessness in which case there is no meaning in the talk of bondage and *nirvāṇa*.

The magnitude of the released soul at least must be permanent and fixed because there is no more incidence of a birth in a future body. This must be the *real* magnitude of the soul and cannot be indecisive. It should be so even in the state of bondage and birth in bodies. It cannot be said that this final magnitude of the soul at the time of release was not there earlier during bondage but came into being at the time of release. Such postulation will involve the impermanence of the soul. Whatever is produced at a time is according to natural laws perishable. Nor is it possible to hold that though the soul has finally a determined magnitude this magnitude may grow less or more according to the size of the bodies, since that would mean the difference of the bound soul from the released soul. And it is common sense that all the three magnitudes cannot be attributed to the soul at the same time.

For all these reasons, the soul cannot be of the finite size or of *madhyama parimāṇa*.

NOTES ON THE PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM

Māheśvaras¹ are of four groups. (1) Śaivas (2) Pāśupatas (3) Kāruṇika Siddhāntins and (4) Kāpālikas. According to them Lord is the cause of the world. The effect is Pradhāna and its evolutes. Yoga is meditation on "Om" and other limbs of Pātañjala yoga. The ethical discipline consists of *trisavana*, *snāna* etc. Liberation is release from sorrow. The souls are the Paśus. *Pāśa* is bondage the freedom from which is *mokṣa*.

Just as the potter is only the efficient cause, *nimittakāraṇa*, in the production of the pot, even so God who is only a *Puruṣa-viśeṣa*, or the most excellent soul, is but the efficient cause of the world and not the material cause also.

Appayya Dīkṣita gives a short account of this Māheśvara system as follows: The Nakulīśa Pāśupatas, as he calls the school, accept five categories: (1) *Kārya* (2) *Kāraṇa* (3) *Yoga* (4) *Vidhi* and (5) *Duḥkhānta*. A knowledge of these five categories is essential for release.

Among them, by the tenfold *Kārya* is meant the products of creation like the five physical elements, their qualities like smell, taste colour, touch and sound. The *Kāraṇas* are five senses, the five organs of action, mind, intellect, and the *ahaṅkāra*. Yoga is meditation etc. The ethical conduct is *vidhi*.

Vidhi is twofold in the form of observance and *dvāras*: (1) *bhasmasnāna* and *bhasma-śayana* and (2) *upahāra* etc. The first has reference to sacred ash. The second is of six varieties: (1) *hasita* (2) *gīta* (3) *nṛtta* (4) *huḍukkāra* (5) *namaskāra* and (6) *japa*. Of these *hasita* is *aṭṭahāsa* or laughter. The second is music, the third is

1. The followers of Mahesvara. *Bhāmātī*: II, 2-37.

dancing, the fourth is roaring like a bull,² *Japa* and *Namaskāra* are chanting and prostrating.

The *dvārās* are six. (1) *kāyana* (2) *spandana* (3) *mandayāna* (4) *śṛṅgāraṇa* (5) *tatkāraṇa* and (6) *tad-bhāṣaṇa*. The first among these is to show the state of sleep while really not asleep. The second is the shaking of the body as if afflicted by disease. The third is to walk as if limping. The *śṛṅgāraṇa* is to behave as if subject to the lures of beauty and the presence of lovely objects. *Tat-kāraṇa* is, as if in ignorance, performance of acts which are ordinarily reproachable. The utterance of words which are improper is *tadbhāṣaṇa*.

Duḥkhānta is twofold as *anātmaka* and *sātmaka*. The first is the total cessation of all sorrows. The second is the possession of powers of knowledge and action. Of these knowledge is of five kinds: (1) *darśana* (2) *śravaṇa* (3) *manana* (4) *viññānam* (5) *sarvajñatva*. These are respectively the powers of perceiving the distant far-away objects, hearing all the sounds, knowledge of the entirety of scripture, doubtless knowledge of all the texts and their meanings, omniscience.

Similarly, the power of action, too, is threefold: (1) *manojavaṭvam* (2) *kamarūpīṭvam* and (3) *vikaraṇadharmīṭvam*. These are respectively the capacity to travel spaces with utmost speed, assumption of infinite number of bodies, unobstructed powers of the body and the senses.

Paśupati is the Lord of the universe and dispenses justice according to the deeds of the souls. He is infinitely free. His will is done, it leads to beneficial results. So the souls do acts in consonance with His will. The Lord is only the efficient cause of the world, not the material cause also.

Vācaspati explains the criticism of Pāśupata system by Śaṅkara as follows:

The efficient causality of the Lord for the world must be established either on the authority of the scripture or on other proofs like inference or implication. Scripture is not the proof for the obvious

2. *vr̥ṣabhanāda-saṁśṛṭa*. *Parimala*: II. 2. 37.

reason that scripture has been repeatedly shown to declare the material causality of the Lord for the world.³

Inference cannot be the proof here. If God is inferred as the efficient cause alone on the model of a potter, if this model were taken too seriously (and not as a mere model for purposes of facility of understanding) then one also will have to conclude, against his wish, that God is subject to partiality and preference. What has to be understood is that God cannot be established by inference at all. The scripture is the only authority which does not depend upon our perceptual experience for its authority as inference does. Even when what the scripture says seems to be quite contrary to what we experience here and now, it is no fault. The very authority of the scripture is derived from the fact that it tells us verities that are not attainable on other grounds.

If it were argued, to press the inference based on the model of a potter, that the alleged partiality and preference do not follow from that inference because God dispenses justice according to the deeds of the souls, and not arbitrarily, it is replied; If the Lord is the efficient cause, He should be thought of as inducing the souls to act in some particular way and, thus, as responsible for the act. God being all-merciful can hardly be expected to involve the souls in any reproachable act. If, in order to avoid this contingency, it were said that God dispenses justice alone but does not induce the souls to act, then it amounts to saying that God is independent and that yet He is guided by the acts of the soul. Thus, there is mutual dependence. God is guided by acts of the souls and souls are induced to act by God.

Again, if God acts out of compassion for the souls, that will prove that God has some personal interest. He is pained at the sorrow the souls suffer from and He acts in order to alleviate His own pain.

Moreover, no relation among God, Pradhāna and the soul could be conceived by the Pāśupatas. It cannot be *samyoga* because all of them are accepted to be all-pervasive and partless. Nor can the relation be *samavāya* because such a relation could obtain only

3. See S.B. I. 4-23.

between an *ādhāra* and *ādheya*. God, soul and Pradhāna do not have that kind of relation. No other category of a relation in the form of cause and effect is available for the simple reason that such a causal relationship is precisely the issue to be settled. There is no proof, for example, that *mahat* etc., are produced by Pradhāna.

The Advaitin, on the contrary, has an advantage over the Pāśupata because he holds that God, soul and matter are all related by identity (*tādātmya*) which is determinable neither as real nor as unreal.⁴

The Advaitin does not rely on inference for the establishment of his view that Brahman is the cause of the world. If he did, he will have to accommodate his inference to the reports of his sense-experience. He will, thus, not be able to believe anything that his own limited experience does not support. Anything contrary to his own experience will be discredited as untrue. But there are areas of truth and reality that do not come within the orbit of sense-experience but are revealed to us only through scripture, even though such areas seem to be quite contrary to our experience and are bewilderingly unbelievable.⁵

It cannot be said by the Pāśupata that he, too, holds his view only on the authority and strength of his own scripture which is the work of omniscient wise men. But these sources are said to be omniscient because the authoritative scripture is their work and the scriptures are authoritative because omniscient sources wrote them.⁶

Inference cannot again be employed to show that just as the soul induces the formless sense organs, God uses Pradhāna as its controller even though Pradhāna is formless. For, the soul uses the senses for the purpose of his own enjoyment. God cannot be having

4. *anirvacanīya-tādātmya-lakṣaṇa-sambandha-upapattēḥ. Bhāmātī II-2.38.*

5. *āgamaḥ hi adṛṣṭapūrve tad-viruddhe ca pravartitum śakyate. Bhāmātī: II-2.38.*

6. *āgama-pratyayāt sarvajñatvasiddhiḥ, sarvajñapratyayāt āgamasiddhiriti. S. B: II-2.38: In Advaita, such a mutual dependence does not occur because both God and scripture are beginningless. As such, though the scripture is transmitted by God, there is no difficulty. īśvara āgamyoh anāditvāt īśvarayonitve'pi āgamasya na virodhaḥ. Bhāmātī: II-2.38.*

any purpose of enjoyment. If he had, there will be no Godhood for Him.

Even to assume an instrument of enjoyment like the body and the senses will revolt against Godhood.

Again, those who try to establish God through inference must admit finitude and numerical difference for Pradhāna, God and soul because of their being three different categories. As a consequence only perishability will result for all of them. Since God at least should know the limit of the number of the souls, the limit of Pradhāna and His own difference from both of these, the limit will be a mark of impermanence with all the attendant undesirable consequences. On the contrary, if He does not know, He will not be omniscient.

NOTES ON THE YOGA SYSTEM

Śaṅkara and Vācaspati alike make it abundantly clear that Patañjali's Yoga system is not invalid altogether. Only those parts of the system which carry over the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the Pradhāna being the material cause of the world and of Mahat, Ahaṅkāra and the five *tan-mātrās* being its evolutes are objected to.

But it should be remembered that Patañjali's Yoga is not centrally concerned with Pradhāna as its main message. It is interested in the practical discipline of yoga, its various steps, the secondary results like the supernormal powers and release. The doctrine of Pradhāna was merely an occasion for the teaching of Yoga, as in the Purāṇas which do not have as their central motive the creation, the aeons, the royal dynasties etc., though they do talk about them in detail. Their motive is to teach about the Lord of the universe.

Even an occasion or a pretext can be accepted if it were not in conflict with another authority like the Vedas. But the doctrine of Pradhāna is in conflict with the Vedic authority¹.

An objection can be raised here. If Pradhāna is not accepted on the authority of the Sāṅkhya which is perhaps in conflict with the Vedic authority, it can at least be accepted on the authority of the Yoga which is admitted to be in consonance with Vedic testimony. Even to get the knowledge of the Upaniṣads, methods like *dhāraṇā* and *dhyāna* are indispensable. These are the *antaraṅga sādhana*, let alone *yama*, *niyama* etc., which are *bahiraṅga sādhana*.

-
1. Vārṇajanya commenting on the *Yogaśāstra* says: "The real or basic form of Guṇas (of Prakṛti) does not come within the purview of experience. That which comes within sight is *māyā* only, absolute void." The statement of Guṇas is only casual here as they are unreal. The intent is rather the teaching of Yoga, not of the Guṇas.

It is not reasonable that Yoga system becomes totally unworthy simply because it erred in a few directions like the theory of Pradhāna. Can it be partly unauthoritative and partly acceptable? Monkeys and ghosts once they get a foothold in a tree try to occupy the whole tree.² A defect will pervade the entire stretch of the system. Hence, if the system of Yoga is acceptable in any part because of its consonance with the Vedas, it should be possible for one to accept the theory of Pradhāna integrally woven into it.

To this Vācaspati replies that if Yoga is declared to be right in asserting as its principal tenet the Pradhāna on the ground given above, it can be opposed by saying that Yoga system will be taken to be vitiated in its doctrine of *yama* etc., because its principal tenet manifestly is repugnant to the authority of Vedas. Hence, it is prudent to admit that Pradhāna is not the principal tenet of the Yoga system, but only the spiritual disciplines of *yama* and *niyama*. The Pradhāna is only a pretext for such an exposition. Therefore the Yoga system does not fall as a whole when an insignificant part of it that is not its prime concern and is only accidental is rejected.³ The eyes are not blinded because they are not instruments of hearing. They are instrumental in their own area of perception. So too, the Yoga system may be valid in its teaching of *yama* etc., though not in Pradhāna.

2. *prasavaṁ na labhante hi yāvat kvacana markatāḥ nābhidravanti te tāvat piśacāvā svagocare.*

3. *pradhānādīḥ asya aviśayaḥ, natu aprāmāṇyam iti paramārthaḥ. Bhāmātī: II-1.3.*

Sāṅkhya and Yoga are dualist doctrines and are therefore opposed to the non-dualist view. The scriptural text: *tat-kāraṇaṁ sāṅkhya-yogābhipannam*, refers by the term "*sāṅkhya*" to knowledge and by the term "*Yoga*" to meditation. *Sāṅkhya samyag-buddhir-vaidikī tayā vartante iti sāṅkhyaḥ*. Vācaspati says that *cittavṛtti-nirodha* is *Yoga* and the means to it is *dhyaṇa*.

The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga hold *Puruṣa* to be of the nature of pure consciousness. The Yoga preaches detachment and non-possession. To this extent they fall in line with the Vedic and Vedāntic doctrine. Any system is acceptable to the extent it helps the rise of Vedantic wisdom. But this wisdom can directly arise only through the Upaniṣads: *tattva jñānaṁ tu vedānta-vākyebhya eva*. *Bhāmātī S.B.: II-1.3.*

NOTES ON THE BHĀGAVATA VIEW

If the soul had a beginning there will be non-eternality, and absence of release for it. Since there will be no one who goes to heaven or hell, heaven or hell are absent. The denial of all these consequent on the soul being perishable will perilously border on heterodox materialism. The origination for the soul itself is unelligible. It is said by the Bhāgavatas that Saṅkarṣaṇa produces Pradyumna, the mind. The question is how Saṅkarṣaṇa could manage to do it without an instrument. One is seen to use instruments in his execution of acts like cutting a tree with an axe or in his act of knowing objects through the senses and other means. It passes our understanding how the soul (Saṅkarṣaṇa) produces a mind without an instrument.

If Saṅkarṣaṇa stands in no need of an instrument for the accomplishment of its intentions, then everything could be accomplished even without the instrumentality of the mind. Why should Saṅkarṣaṇa require a mind as an instrument when he could produce a mind without an instrument?¹

The Bhāgavatas cannot possibly say that the *vyūhas* are all of them gods and not souls. If all of them share the glories of Godhood like complete knowledge etc., then there is no reason why one should postulate four principles when one will do.² Left with four equals there will be only conflict of intentions and nothing will ever be done. If there were collective lordship for the four, no *one* of the collective group will be decisive. There will be the damage to the view of the Bhāgavatas also who hold that Vāsudeva alone is the supreme God.

1. *akaraṇasya vā karaṇanirmāṇa-sāmarthyē kṛtāṁ karmanīramāṇena. Bhāmātī* II-2,43.

2. *ānarthakyaṁ itareṣāṁ. Bhāmātī: II-2,44.*

The attributes of complete knowledge are at one time declared by the Bhāgavatas to be different from the Lord who possesses them. At another time, they declare that the attributes are the very self of the Lord and are therefore identical with him. Again, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are declared at one time to be different as mind and egoity from the Self and at other times, they are said to be the very Self. The statement that all these are the very selves of Vāsudeva is another instance of such contradiction.³

To the doubt that *Pāñcarātra* is not authoritative because it is the work of an author however eminent or exalted he may be, and cannot have parity with, much less in superiority to, the Vedas, a defence is offered by the followers of *Pāñcarātra*.

Pāñcarātra is not Avaidic or unscriptural because it is based on the Vedic branch renowned as *Ekāyanaśākhā*. This has been acknowledged even in the *Pāñcarātra* text itself.

Saṅkarṣaṇa and others are not merely soul, mind and egoity respectively but manifestations (*vyūhas*) of the Lord presiding over them. Their birth is only their own free will and desire. Hence, there is no conflict with the Vedas on the score of the alleged origination of the soul.

3. Appayya Dīkṣita gives an account of this Bhāgavata system as follows:

The Viṣṇu-bhāgavatas hold that Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa is the supreme reality. He manifests himself in the form of four *Vyūhas*, as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.

Of these, Vāsudeva is the Lord having six auspicious qualities like *jñāna*, *śakti*, *bala*, *aiśvarya*, *vīrya* and *tejas*. Since He is the indwelling principle and knows everything both collectively and individually, that is *jñāna*. *Śakti* is the material causality of the world. *Bala* is the effortlessness of creation and effortless sustenance of the created beings. *Aiśvarya* is the unobstructed sovereignty. *Vīrya* is the immutability in spite of his being the material cause of the world. *Tejas* is independence of external aid in creating the world and in quelling the obstructions and enemies.

From the powers of *jñāna* and *bala*, Saṅkarṣaṇa is born; from *vīrya* and *aiśvarya*, Pradyumna is born; from *śakti* and *tejas*, Aniruddha is born. Saṅkarṣaṇa is the soul; Pradyumna is the mind; Aniruddha is egoity.

The means of attaining the Lord are (1) *abhigamana* or the chanting the Lord's name, uttering the holy syllables, doing prostrations etc., in the morning. 2. *upādāna* or gathering flowers for worship. 3. *ījyā* or worship. 4. *svādhyāya* or study of the scripture, *itihāsas*, *purāṇas* and *āgamas*. 5. *yoga* is meditation on the Lord in the evening.

Sometimes it is said that the forty eight *saṁskāras* mentioned in the scripture are not followed in the *Pāñcarātra āgama* and that a different set of *saṁskāras* at variance with the ones in the Vedas is given there. From this circumstance, it is argued that the *Pāñcarātra* school of thought is not authoritative. The reply of the Bhāgavatas is that these *saṁskāras* are indeed mentioned in the *Ekāyanaśākhā* and it is not a fault that the practice of the ritualistic and sacramental works differs from one branch of the Vedas to another. Each one is expected to follow the rules of religious action according to one's own Vedic branch.⁴ Even those who study the *Vājasaneyīśākhā* are known to practise the *Kātyāyana-grhya-sūtra* with reference to the *saṁskāras* like *garbhādāna* and they do not commit a sacrilege.

Appayya Dīkṣita does not, however, seem to grant these deviations as justifiable. Those who profess to be Vajasaneyīśākhins and yet say that they follow a *grhya-sūtra* that does not belong to that *śākhā* are certainly committing a sacrilege. Those who abandoning the acts mentioned in the three Vedas prefer to follow the prescriptions of the *Pāñcarātra-āgama* must be declared unorthodox.

There is no *śākhā* called *Ekāyanaśākhā* studied as scriptural text by anybody. Nor is it reasonable to call it *Khila śākhā*. Such are the strictures of Appayya Dīkṣita against the *Pāñcarātra* system.

4. *svasvaśākhokta-prakārakarmānuṣṭhāna-darśanāt. Parimāla: II-2.42.*